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Abstract
The account of rational morality presented in Morals by Agreement is based, to a large 
extent, on the concept of constrained maximisation. Rational agents are assumed to have 
reasons  to  constrain  their  maximisation  provided  they  interact  with  other  similarly 
disposed agents. On this account, rational agents will internalise a disposition to behave 
as  constrained maximisers. The assertion of  constrained  maximisation is problematic 
and unrealistic mainly because it does not explain how the process of internalisation 
occurs. I propose an amended version of  constrained  maximisation that is based on a 
conventional  understanding  of  social  behaviour  and  the  social  contract.  Repeated 
interactions between rational agents lead to the creation of social conventions, which in 
turn  serve as  supportive mechanisms for  behaviours  that  reinforce  their  stability.  In 
addition, established social  conventions facilitate and ensure information sharing, thus 
making  it  possible  for  conventional  agents  to  know  others'  dispositions.  The 
development and establishment of social conventions are best described and explained 
through an evolutionary account of social structures. The evolutionary account offers a 
more  powerful  and  more  realistic  method  of  discussing  cultural  evolution,  since  it 
considers large populations over long periods of time and the interdependence between 
social  structures  and  individual  behaviour.  In  this  context,  information  availability 
ensures that the most efficient conventions take over and maximising strategies become 
dominant. While for Gauthier moral behaviour depends on constrained maximisation, in 
the conventional account of morality it comes about as a result of repeated interactions 
between rational agents within the bounds of social conventions.
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1. Introduction
Morals  by  Agreement  (1986)  proposes  a  theory  of  morals  grounded  on  rational 
premises. For Gauthier, morality is the outcome of agreement between rational agents 
given certain conditions of rational agency. The argument in this thesis reinforces the 
theory of Morals by Agreement and suggests a closely linked alternative account of the 
rationality of moral behaviour grounded on the repeated interactions of rational actors. 
Morality is viewed as the result of agreement between rational agents, just as in 
Gauthier's  theory,  but  in  addition,  social  conventions  serve  as  a  supportive  and 
enforcing  mechanism  of  the  agreement.  A  social  contract,  consisting  of  social 
conventions,  provides  a  social  environment  in  which  reaching  an  agreement,  and 
complying with it, is rational. The conventional account of morality deals with some of 
the problems of the theory of  Morals by Agreement  and especially the rationality of 
“constrained maximisation” (Gauthier, 1986: 167). It will be shown that within social 
conventions it is rational for one to adopt a joint strategy, without the need to call upon 
– or to ‘smuggle in’ – considerations that are not rational. Unlike Gauthier's theory, the 
conventional account does not need quasi-rational concepts to support an argument for 
moral behaviour and eventually a theory of justice.
One of the main problems with theories of justice in which morality is based on 
rationality is that they are not considered broad enough to include all cases where justice 
and moral behaviour are required. For critics of a rational morality, the requirements of 
rational and moral behaviour are in conflict and, as a result, principles of justice cannot 
flow from the premises of rational agency. In contrast,  a theory of moral rationality 
presupposes that rational and moral behaviour are based on common principles and, 
moreover, it answers the most fundamental question of social interaction: namely why 
one should care for others. 
Viewing social  interactions  in  the  context  of  social  conventions  that  are  the 
result of interactions between rational individuals, can offer an alternative solution to 
the problem of morality. Rational agents behave morally provided there are appropriate 
social  structures  that  support  and  bound  their  actions;  at  the  same  time,  repeated 
interactions  between  rational  agents  lead  to  the  formation  of  social  conventions.  In 
addition,  established  social  conventions  facilitate  social  welfare  maximisation  by 
ensuring long term maximisation for agents who behave conventionally. When these 
conventions are seen as the components of the social contract, they can facilitate and 
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accommodate moral behaviour by rational actors, not just in local interactions within 
small groups but also at the level of society. Thus, conventions of rational morality are 
viewed in the context of moral contractarianism.
Contractarianism makes up the basis, and provides the framework, for the theory 
of rational morality presented in  Morals by Agreement.  Therefore, in this thesis social 
conventions will be examined in the context of social contract theory and in relation to 
evolutionary accounts of social structure. Conceptually, the thesis can be divided into 
four sections; the first two chapters examine the related literature in contractarianism, 
rational choice theory, and evolutionary game theory. The second section consists of 
Chapters  Four  and  Five,  which  put  the  literature  in  the  context  of  conventional 
rationality in a framework of the evolutionary dynamics of social structures. The third 
section,  made  up  of  Chapters  Six  and  Seven,  deals  with  morality  and  justice 
respectively. Specifically, Chapter Seven shows that conventional rationality is the basis 
for moral behaviour and justice. Finally, in the fourth section, Chapters Eight and Nine 
discuss the application of the analysis in the real world and conclude the thesis. 
In  the  following  paragraphs  contractarianism,  rationality  and  justice,  and  a 
naturalised version of the social contract, will be examined in that order so as to provide 
a general overview of the main arguments of the thesis.
1.1 The social contract tradition
The  contemporary  social  contract  paradigm is  primarily  a  method of  understanding 
society as a hypothetical contract between the people and the government when we talk 
about political contractarianism or a contract dictating moral obligations in the context 
of moral contractarianism. Although the discussion of why one should behave morally 
was started by Plato (2006), there have been significant contributions to it much more 
recently. Hobbes (1976) in the 17th century and Hume (2008) and Rousseau (2008) in 
the 18th, reformulated the problem and attempted to offer plausible accounts for moral 
behaviour.  The  Hobbesian  tradition  is  especially  relevant  since  it  is  based  on  the 
assertion that humans are self-regarding rational agents, whose main aim is to maximise 
their benefit. The work of these thinkers has set the framework in which we think of 
rationality and morality today within the social contract tradition; a tradition which can 
be usefully thought of under two headings: political and moral contractarianism. 
Political  contractarianism,  in  its  contemporary  form,  was  first  introduced  by 
Hobbes in  Leviathan  (Hobbes,  1976).  In Hobbes’s argument,  the rules of the social 
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contract include the responsibilities and rights of both the people and the government. 
Moral contractarianism, which is closely linked to, and to some degree embedded in, 
political  contractarian arguments,  is a method of deriving moral obligations towards 
other  people  without  the  need  to  refer  to  established  political  institutions.  “The 
contractarian enterprise...seeks answers to questions about the moral obligations we owe 
to  one another,  about  the legitimate functions  of  government  and the nature  of  our 
obligations to it, and about justice in the distribution of income and wealth” (Gauthier & 
Sugden, 1993: 1). Thus, moral contractarianism addresses, and to a great extent solves, 
the issue of what one ought to do by referring to individual reason and rationality; one 
ought to behave in a certain way because it is in one's best interest to do so. 
Gauthier's theory builds on the Hobbesian contractarian tradition to construct a 
primarily moral contractarian theory. He argues, more convincingly and plausibly than 
those before him, for a morality that is exclusively based on practical rationality. For 
Gauthier, there is no need to import moral constraints into the contract or to assume that 
humans are pre-disposed to  act morally.  The purpose of  Morals by Agreement is  to 
“develop a theory of morals as part of the theory of rational choice” (Gauthier, 1986: 2). 
His  aim of  the  project  is  to  show why one  ought  to  be  moral.  In  terms  of  social 
interactions, theories of moral contractarianism need to justify why individuals who are 
“mutually unconcerned (take no interest in each other's interests)” (Vallentyne, 1989: 
187), ought not exploit those weaker than themselves. The social contract theory makes 
possible  the  reconciliation  of  moral  and  rational  behaviour  within  a  common 
framework.  Even  if  the  type  of  rational  morality  that  Gauthier  proposes  is  not 
convincing,  and  his  critics  correct,  moral  contractarianism remains  the  only  viable 
theoretical paradigm that allows morality to be viewed as a consequence of rational 
action. 
In  this  thesis,  the  social  contract  will  be  shown  to  be  a  dynamic  process 
consisting  of  social  conventions.  Conventions,  viewed  as  the  outcome  of  repeated 
interactions  between rational  agents,  evolve  as  individuals'  strategies  and  behaviour 
change. The dynamics of social structures will be examined through a game theoretical 
analysis of repeated interactions. In this context, it  is possible also to claim that the 
status-quo and the agreement point are part of the dynamic process characterising the 
social contract. Social conventions are affected by pre-existing social contracts, which 
define the established status-quo. In conclusion, individual strategies, social conventions 
and the social contract are interdependent, with each influencing the other.
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The social  contract  will  be  examined  in  the  context  of  repeated  interactions 
between  rational  actors  and  therefore  game  theory  provides  the  necessary  tools  to 
describe and to understand these interactions, just as in Morals by Agreement. The next 
section  will  discuss  the  importance  of  traditional  and evolutionary  game theory  for 
analytical and moral philosophy and the advantages a theoretical paradigm can gain 
from using games to analyse social interactions.
1.2 Game theory as a tool for the moral philosopher
Hobbes  (1976)  was  the  first  to  use  an  analysis  that  later  would  be  described  as 
informally game theoretical. Hobbes’s approach, especially in terms of rational agency 
and the conflicting  interests  of  individuals,  comes  very close to  the assumptions  of 
modern  economics  and  game  theory.  Moreover,  Hume  (2008)  implicitly  uses  an 
informal  game  theoretical  analysis,  although  in  a  repeated  games  framework.  In 
contemporary contractarian theory, Gauthier was the first political philosopher explicitly 
to use game theory and to draw from a formal analysis in order to construct a theory of 
justice. To a large extent Gauthier's use of game theory was made possible by a 1954 
inaugural lecture given by Braithwaite. In his lecture entitled  Theory of Games as a  
Tool for the Moral Philosopher  (2009), Braithwaite suggested a new way of thinking 
about issues of moral philosophy.
The great  advantage of using game theory to  describe human behaviour  and 
social interactions is that game theory analyses the possibility of cooperation between 
people with different aims and conflicting interests. Game theory proposes a method of 
examining  interactions  between  self-interested  individuals  who  can  benefit  from 
collective action. In that respect, game theory introduces an aspect of realism into moral 
philosophy; individuals in the real world have conflicting interests more often than not, 
and asserting that they will agree on common ends and actions is idealistic. Given that 
moral philosophy is usually seen as disassociated from the real world, game theory can 
introduce  some  much  needed  plausibility  and  realism in  the  field,  without  altering 
philosophers' main function, “to think about thinking about ethics” (Braithwaite, 2009: 
3). 
In addition, game theory has the advantage of being ethically neutral. Being a 
quasi-mathematical theory, it ensures that the outcome of interactions is not biased by 
pre-existing views about what is good or morally desirable. It is only concerned with 
what is feasible in a given social context and with how individuals can maximise their 
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utility through their interactions. In economic analysis, where game theory has been 
primarily successful, considerations about the morality of an outcome are irrelevant. 
The same does not usually apply in moral philosophy, but the introduction of game 
theory ensures that moral philosophy becomes amoral and reaches moral principles that 
can  be  objectively  justified.  Despite  the  fact  that  game  theory  does  not  include 
normative  suggestions,  the  subsequent  “recommendations  themselves  will  constitute 
what may be called second-order moral principles” (Braithwaite, 2009: 6). Therefore, 
the use of game theory in moral philosophy offers two advantages of great significance: 
realism and moral neutrality.
For Braithwaite – as well as for Gauthier – game theory can be used to solve 
some of the analytical problems of moral  philosophy;  namely reconciling the moral 
priority of the individual with justice. More generally, this translates into dealing with 
the conflict of individual maximisation and collective benefit, which can be done most 
effectively with a game theory analysis. In that respect, game theory is vital for any 
theory of justice that assumes rational agents. Despite the risk of transforming moral 
philosophy into a formal model of human behaviour, the framework and basis of all the 
thinking about these problems is philosophical. The premises of game theory must be 
grounded in moral philosophy in order for game theoretical analysis to be useful when 
examining morality and justice, otherwise we could end up with a mathematical model 
of morality which would be limited and misleading since human behaviour cannot be 
completely described by mathematics.
Grounding game theory in philosophical thinking bypasses the main problem 
with  formal  modelling  in  the  social  sciences  and  the  humanities.  Game theoretical 
assumptions are based on oversimplified assumptions about the structure of interactions 
and the capacities of the actors. Therefore, the philosophical background is essential if 
we are to avoid falling into the trap of taking game theoretical conclusions at face value 
(as is the case in neoclassical economics). A critical view of game theoretical models, 
gained using the lenses of moral philosophy, can help us understand the limitations and 
the true value of game theory in examining human behaviour.
Gauthier's analysis does just that; it is based on a game theoretical analysis and 
accepts individual rationality. However, in  Morals by Agreement the formal economic 
model of behaviour is limited by the analysis of the arguments that surround individual 
behaviour  and  the  concept  of  rationality.  For  Gauthier,  “the  rational  principles  for 
making choices...include some that constrain” (Gauthier, 1986: 3); this is unacceptable 
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in traditional game theory where actors have been dehumanised in order to be modelled 
more effectively. At the same time, it would be accurate to say that Gauthier's theory 
utilises game theory through rational choice theory; put differently his approach is more 
cautious than the classic economics approach to formal models. Just as Rawls (2005) 
before him, Gauthier aims at developing a theory of justice within the limits of rational 
choice theory (Gauthier, 1986).
In this respect, a further methodological step is needed that relates to the social 
structures that bound interactions between rational agents. In the final paragraphs of 
section 1.1 we talked about the dynamic nature of the social contract. This can also be 
examined through game theory.  However,  traditional game theoretical paradigms are 
not  sufficient  to  represent  complex  dynamic  interactions  within  societies.  For  that 
reason, it is essential that we use a different version of the theory of game: evolutionary 
game theory. 
Evolutionary game theory will be shown to be compatible with assumptions of 
individual rationality, provided we assume boundedly rational agents. Relaxing the strict 
assumptions  of  economic  rationality  gives  us  a  more  realistic  account  of  human 
behaviour, which takes place in a dynamic world of repeated interactions. Therefore, 
rationality is bounded by social conventions, that facilitate and at the same time limit 
individual  strategies.  Bounded  rationality  is  a  more  realistic  account  of  individual 
behaviour while being compatible with concepts of cultural evolution that describe a 
dynamic social contract. It is more realistic because it does not rely on agents having 
complete information, unlimited memory and extraordinary logical capacities, in order 
to be rational. Bounded rationality describes more adequately humans’ behaviour,  as 
opposed to the simplifying models of traditional rational choice theory. In this sense, 
bounded rationality is a more appropriate approach to human behaviour, without being 
an exact description of it. To sum up, there are two central concepts in the argument: the 
dynamic  nature  of  the  social  contract  and  the  bounded  character  of  individual 
rationality. 
The first five chapters of the thesis will focus on showing how the combination 
of the dynamic nature of the social contract and the bounded character of individual 
rationality  can  create  a  plausible  description  of  social  behaviour.  This  discussion 
provides the basis for a more explicit examination of morality and justice, which will 
take place especially in Chapter Seven. The account of rational morality that is based on 
local social conventions can only be topical; morality depends on conventional rules, 
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which in  turn stem from the history of interactions within a  given convention.  The 
following section will deal with the evolutionary account of the social contract and the 
understanding of morality that flows from it.
1.3 Naturalising the social contract 
Morals by Agreement is “an attempt to write a moral theory for adults, for persons who 
live consciously in a post-anthropomorphic, post-theocentric, post-technocratic world” 
(Gauthier, 1988: 385). When we remove all these possible grounds of a moral theory, 
what is left is a naturalised moral theory; naturalised not in the sense of natural law 
(Hobbes, 1976), but in that it does not need a reference outside the natural world to be 
successful.  Humans  are  defined  by  their  natural  capabilities,  one  of  which  is  the 
capacity for rational deliberation, and subsequently thus, a social contract that is not 
metaphysical can only be natural.
The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare (Sugden, 2004), proposes an 
evolutionary account of contractarianism, which will be examined in §3.2. Sugden bases 
his analysis on the fact that social conventions make up the social contract and that 
these conventions do not need a hypothetical – or even an actual – agreement in order to 
be binding. The core of his argument is that self-interested individuals who interact 
without outside influences will reach a state of “spontaneous order” (Sugden, 2004: 1). 
Sugden  assumes  that  individuals  are  reasonable,  but  not  hyper-rational,  utility 
maximisers. Interactions among agents of this type, in a state of anarchy, will lead to the 
creation of social norms and as a result “people will come to believe that their behaviour 
ought to be regulated by convention” (Sugden, 2004: vii).
Unlike Gauthier,  Sugden is  more  influenced by the  Humean,  rather  than  the 
Hobbesian,  tradition  of  understanding  human  interactions  and  rationality.  In  that 
respect,  his  analysis  is  closer  to  holistic  explanations  of  social  behaviour  than  to 
methodological individualism. This is important because in the following chapters there 
will  be  an  attempt  to  reconcile  the  Hobbesian  and  the  Humean  traditions  and  by 
extension,  holistic  and  individualistic  methods  of  social  explanation.  In  addition, 
Sugden uses evolutionary accounts of social conventions to explain their formation and 
sustainability without abolishing the assumption of individual rationality. Therefore, or 
so  I  will  argue,  an  evolutionary  account  of  social  conventions  similar  to  the  one 
proposed by Sugden can be used to explain the rationality of constrained maximisation 
as described by Gauthier. 
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Sugden uses evolutionary game theory and repeated games to give an account of 
the establishment of social  conventions.  However,  although he analyses a variety of 
repeated games,  he does not go to great lengths to discuss the relative dynamics of 
social conventions.  The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of the Social Contract  (Skyrms, 
2004, discussed below in §3.3), provides a more detailed and formal explanation of the 
evolution of the social contract and the coevolution of social structures and individual 
strategies. Skyrms's analysis, although clearly explanatory, is more analytical in terms 
of the dynamics of social structures as it examines how they are affected by individual 
strategies  and  local  equilibria.  The  coevolution  of  social  structures  and  individual 
behaviour is central to the argument presented in Chapters Four and Five; it shows how 
individuals influence social equilibria and are influenced by established conventions, 
thus making it possible for us to argue that individual rationality can fit in an account of 
dynamic social structures.
Binmore (1998; discussed below in §3.4), continues the work of Sugden and 
combines it with aspects of the Skyrms's evolutionary account of social interactions. His 
main argument is that our moral norms are linked to our biological evolutionary history 
and  consequently  that  our  cultural  evolution  and  social  structures  depend  on  our 
biological history. Thus for Binmore, morality is not exclusively an artificial virtue, but 
our ideas of what we ought to do are heavily influenced by our biological past. In that 
respect, Game Theory and the Social Contract (Binmore 1998), explicitly suggests the 
naturalisation of the social contract.
The naturalisation of the social contract tradition, as understood in this thesis, 
does  not  mean  that  human  and  animal  social  contracts  are  bound  by  the  same 
limitations; nor that the rational and moral character of humans are determined by their 
biology. Rather, we will follow Sugden and Skyrms in arguing that the social contract 
paradigm can benefit  from the inclusion of evolutionary theory,  in conjunction with 
game theory, in order to promote a plausible alternative method of understanding social 
structures  and  human  behaviour  within  society.  Normative  recommendations  of 
behaviour follow from that understanding of the dynamics of social interactions, but are 
not determined or limited by our biological nature.
Established  social  conventions  and  the  social  contract  follow  evolutionary 
processes;  they  are  dynamic  and  their  equilibria  depend  on  population  dynamics. 
Therefore,  established  moral  norms  are  influenced  by  a  given  society's  cultural 
evolution. Rational morality, within the context of social conventions, is the outcome of 
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repeated  interactions  between  boundedly  rational  agents;  these  interactions  are  best 
described by an evolutionary account and lead to local equilibria that define the local 
moral norms. Put differently, a social contract, consisting of social conventions, defines 
equilibria of justice; since different societies have different cultural evolutionary pasts, 
their  equilibria  of  justice  will  differ.  The  conventional  account  allows  for  as  many 
understandings of  morality  and justice as  there are  possible  evolutionary paths  to a 
social equilibrium.
The discussion in this section attempted to give a general description of the main 
works  in  contractarianism  and  evolutionary  game  theory  and  their  relation  to  the 
argument in this thesis. The evolutionary account of the social contract will be further 
analysed in Chapters Three and Four. Moreover, in Chapters Four and Five evolutionary 
game theory will  be shown to be a valuable tool  for moral  contractarianism, which 
allows us to claim that moral norms are the outcome of repeated interactions between 
rational actors. 
In sum, this thesis lies in the field of moral contractarianism and the argument 
presented  for  a  rational  morality  is  based  on  the  evolutionary  process  of  social 
conventions. Established moral norms vary according to specific evolutionary processes 
that set the bounds for rational strategies. Thus, the interdependence of social structures 
and conventional rationality may give rise to very different moral norms that are equally 
justifiable. The following, final, section of this introduction provides a brief description 
of the chapters that follow, thus giving a fuller indication of the main arguments that 
will be used.
1.4 Thesis overview
Chapters two and three consist of a critical review of the literature mentioned above. In 
chapter one, the main points of what I call “the Gauthier project” are discussed followed 
by  a  review  of  the  main  criticisms  of  that  project.  Morals  by  Agreement  aims  at 
introducing a theory of moral behaviour and justice that is based on rational premises. 
However, in order for it to be successful, the definition of rational agency has to be 
relaxed.  The  principal  of  minimax  relative  concession,  the  Lockean  Proviso,  and 
constrained maximisation are the main loci of criticism of Gauthier's  theory.  Critics 
argue that the Gauthier project has failed since moral principles are smuggled into what 
Gauthier claims to be a merely rational baseline. In addition, another line of criticism 
deals with the fact that the theory of morals produced is not general and broad enough to 
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qualify as an adequate theory of justice. 
Gauthier's theory may not have a plausible answer to every point of criticism. 
However, this is hardly surprising and the Gauthier project should be seen as part of a 
greater process within the contractarian tradition; a process that aspires to create a moral 
theory that is relevant to modern individuals and contemporary social life without the 
need  for  metaphysics.  Moreover,  the  theory  of  Morals  by  Agreement  can  be 
strengthened by looking at rational behaviour in the context of social conventions and 
evolutionary dynamics. The literature in these fields is discussed analytically in Chapter 
Two.  The  works  of  Sugden,  Skyrms and  Binmore  will  be  examined  critically  as  a 
prelude to Chapter Four, which will look at how it is possible to combine the Gauthier 
project  with  an  account  of  social  behaviour  that  is  based  on  conventions  and 
evolutionary theory.
Chapter  Four,  “Rationality  and  Evolutionary  Theory”,  as  its  title  suggests, 
attempts to show that it  is  reasonable and realistic to use evolutionary principles in 
conjunction with rational choice theory premises. This will make it possible to argue 
that the dynamics of social structures and individual rationality are interdependent and 
that, despite the determinism of traditional evolutionary theory, the evolutionary account 
of social conventions is based on individual action and rationality. 
Chapter Five continues the discussion of dynamic contractarianism and focuses 
on the evolutionary nature of social conventions in general and on the social contract in 
particular. Chapters Four and Five are linked as they deal with closely related arguments 
over individual rationality in an evolutionary framework and the role of evolutionary 
dynamics in the formation of stable social conventions and the social contract. Thus, 
they present the main argument of how individual rationality can be reconciled with 
collective action and give rise to evolutionarily stable social conventions.
Chapter  Six  looks  at  the  possibilities  of  free-riding  within  the  context  of 
evolutionary conventions  and repeated interactions.  Free-riding will  be shown to be 
irrational if we assume non-random repeated interactions within a social structure of 
conventions that facilitate and accelerate information sharing. 
Social conventions are the main topic in Chapter Seven. They will be shown to 
be essential for supporting and enforcing the moral behaviour of rational individuals, 
thus leading to a social contract that is just. Justice as mutual advantage will be shown 
to be in accordance with the previously described version of evolutionary conventions.
Finally, Chapter Eight examines under what conditions the arguments presented 
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in  the  previous  chapters  can  make  sense  in  the  real  world.  Relatively  recent 
technological and social developments make it plausible to claim that information is 
readily available and that rational agents within social conventions are equally rational.
The  overall  argument  admits  that  there  is  no  one  single  version  of  moral 
behaviour. Rational actions depend on one's environment and on available information. 
Depending  on  the  established  convention  and  the  local  history  of  interactions,  a 
conventional rule of turning the other cheek is as rational and as moral as following a 
rule requiring an eye for an eye; in contemporary terms, a society that allows the death 
penalty is as just as a society that punishes only with short prison terms, irrespective of 
the crime. A stable conventional equilibrium is the topical moral norm irrespective of 
possible  non-conventional  moral  imperatives.  Each  society  reaches  its  own  social 
equilibrium that dictates moral behaviour and as such, morality is relative to the local 
history of interactions. Hence, the understanding of rationality and morality presented 
here depends on social  structures  and cultural  history and as such has  no room for 
universal moral rules. Nevertheless, there is room for optimism that we may reach, at 
some point, a common account of morality.
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2. The Gauthier Project and its critics
Grounding moral  behaviour on reason has been a philosophical problem at least since 
Plato's Republic, but it was reinvented more recently by Thomas  Hobbes (1976) and 
David Hume (2008). David Gauthier continued on the same path,  providing a more 
plausible  normative  account  of  rational  morality.  Morals  by  Agreement (1986) 
introduces a theory of morals based on rational choice, whose principal project is to 
reconcile rational choice theory with morality using a contractarian methodology. The 
aim of this chapter is to analyse the components of  rational morality as presented by 
David  Gauthier and to discuss its strengths and weaknesses. These are seen through 
three main concepts of the “Gauthier project”: the concept of rationality, its relation to 
morality and the definition of  moral  behaviour. A critical analysis of  Gauthier's work 
will allow an assessment of its effectiveness and provide a framework for the following 
chapters that will  attempt to link  Morals by Agreement (MbA)  to a theory of  social 
conventions. Thus, conceptions of morality and rationality are crucial for the “Gauthier 
project” and have to be examined closely in order to obtain a deeper understanding of 
MbA. 
Rationality is central to the “Gauthier project”. According to the “maximising 
conception of rationality” (Gauthier, 1986: 7), it is rational for different rational agents 
to want to maximise different interests. Thus,  MbA follows the concept of rationality 
used  in  neoclassical  economics  and  game  theory.  In  the  economics  account  of 
rationality,  rational behaviour is related to individual preferences over a set of choices 
and an individual is characterised as rational when she acts in a way that she thinks will 
maximise her utility, within the given circumstances. Therefore,  rational  behaviour is 
subjective  since  it  depends  on  subjective  individual  preferences.  Although  rational 
behaviour  is  utility  maximising  behaviour,  the  subjectivity  of  preferences  means 
individual behaviour varies, as each person maximises in a different way. In addition, 
the  concept  of  rationality  in  MbA lies  on  individuals  realising  that  it  is  rational  to 
constrain their maximisation. Interactions between constrained maximisers are mutually 
beneficial  and yield  optimality  as opposed to  straightforward  maximisation that is  a 
strictly  rational  behaviour;  constrained  maximisation  is  a  joint  strategy,  which 
maximises the constrained maximisers' utility in the long term whereas straightforward 
maximisation yields immediate maximisation for a single agent. Morality is then seen as 
the rational constraints on individual maximisation. For Gauthier, it is rational for one to 
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constrain one's  maximisation in order to benefit from interactions with other similarly 
disposed agents. 
MbA is based on five main components. The first one is a  morally free zone, 
which refers to an ideal economic  market. In this perfect  market, interactions among 
rational self-regarding individuals are mutually advantageous and hence there is no need 
for non-rational constraints. In the morally free zone, constraints on individual actions 
can only be imposed as the result of a mutually beneficial  bargaining procedure. The 
second component of the theory is  minimax relative  concession which describes the 
bargaining  procedure,  which  is  “a  principle  that  governs  both  the  process  and  the 
content  of  rational  agreement”  (Gauthier,  1986:  14).  Constrained  maximisation,  the 
third  component  in  Gauthier's  theory,  calls  for  rational  agents  constraining  their 
maximisation when interacting with others similarly disposed. The Lockean Proviso is 
the fourth component of the theory presented in  MbA,  which is used as a mechanism 
that regulates the original position of the bargaining. Finally, the Archimedean Point is 
Gauthier's  version  of  the  Rawlsian  veil  of  ignorance.  A  rational  agent  at  the 
Archimedean Point is one who is able to make impartial decisions. These five elements 
constitute the basis of the theory of morality that is introduced in MbA. The theory is 
based on the idea that there can be moral constraints deriving from rational premises.
A contractarian framework is essential in order to derive morality from rational 
choice  theory  premises.  Rational,  self-regarding  individuals  will  constrain  their 
maximisation if they are bound by the terms of a rational agreement. If the terms of the 
contract are mutually beneficial, then compliance with the contract has to be  rational. 
This is an improvement on  Hobbes’s  contractarianism. Despite  Leviathan's influence 
being apparent throughout the book, coercion is not part of  Morals by Agreement. In 
Leviathan,  the  state  is  introduced  as  a  method  of  forcing  rational  maximisers  to 
constrain their  behaviour; in the absence of a strong, coercive  government  individual 
rationality would lead to a “war of all against all” (Hobbes 1976, vii). In addition, the 
theory  of  state  in  Leviathan requires  individuals  to  abandon  their  rights  for  the 
commonwealth to work. Gauthier replaces Hobbes's sovereign with a voluntary rational 
agreement to comply with the contract. In that respect, Hobbes's crude conception of 
rationality as  self-interest creates grounds for criticism for  Gauthier's theory;  Hobbes 
would not accept that  constrained  maximisation is  rational nor that it  is possible for 
rational agents to comply with their agreements unless there were a government to force 
them to comply. In both  Leviathan and  MbA, complying with a  rational  agreement is 
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maximising only when the act  of compliance is  rational in itself.  However,  Hobbes 
ensures compliance through  government coercion whereas for  Gauthier compliance is 
based  solely  on  individual  rationality.  The introduction  of  a  third  party,  a  mutually 
accepted  enforcer,  makes  Hobbes's  account  more  plausible  given the  assumption  of 
individual rationality. 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the account of rationality assumed in 
MbA has been the object of much of the criticism. Gauthier has been criticised for the 
inclusion  of  assumptions  that  can  be  seen  as  not  purely  rational,  such  as  minimax 
relative  concession and  constrained  maximisation.  To conclude,  the theory has been 
criticised  on two accounts:  firstly,  because  it  is  not  plausible  to  assert  that  rational 
agreement in the Gauthier framework described above will lead to rational compliance. 
Secondly, because its basic concepts are not purely  rational as  Gauthier claims. The 
criticism of Gauthier's account of rationality will be discussed more analytically at the 
end of the chapter. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the “Gauthier Project”. 
Before looking at the criticism, the theory's main components will have to be examined 
and  assessed  in  terms  of  plausibility  and  effectiveness  in  showing  that  rational 
behaviour can be moral. Each component will be discussed separately, following the 
order of the book and starting from the ideal market as a morally free zone. 
2.1 A morally free zone 
The concept of a morally free zone is used in MbA to describe a situation where there is 
no need for principles of moral behaviour. A perfectly competitive market, as described 
in MbA, is a morally free zone where moral principles are redundant. Because an ideal 
market combines optimality with equilibrium as is shown by economic theory, a rational 
agent maximises her utility through interactions without making anyone worse off. The 
market as a morally free zone is a state where a Nash equilibrium coincides with Pareto 
optimality. Thus, the perfectly competitive market is one in which no moral constraints 
are required in order for the market to reach optimal equilibrium. In that respect, the 
concept of a perfectly competitive market is a loan from theoretical economics. The free 
market  is  an  ideal  environment  in  which  to  study  rational  interaction.  However, 
Gauthier's use of the ideal  market is in the context of  moral  behaviour which sheds a 
different light on the paradigm. In order for the ideal market to work as part of a moral 
theory its main characteristics have to be qualified.
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By definition a free market must encompass the rights of private ownership and 
private consumption. In addition, an ideal  market requires the absence of positive or 
negative externalities and the existence of market certainty. These four characteristics, 
private ownership and consumption, absence of externalities and certainty, are essential 
and have further  implications for the workings  of  a  completely competitive  market. 
When all of the four conditions are met, there is an ideal market which can be used as a 
model for moral anarchy. The above mentioned conditions of the perfect  market and 
their implications will have to be discussed more analytically in order to show how they 
relate to the absence of a need for moral principles.
Private ownership is linked to and depends on individual factor endowments and 
free market activity. Individual  factor endowments define each agent in the market by 
describing her capabilities and preferences. She can use these to profit in the market and 
improve her situation. The owner of a good, a product or a factor of production, is free 
to use it as she pleases in order to make the most of it. In other words, the assumption of 
individual factor endowments refers to the fact that each person in the ideal market has 
a set of capacities and owns a number of goods. The assumption of free market activity 
refers to the freedom of each individual in the market to act in any way she thinks will 
maximise her utility.
Private consumption comes as a result of private ownership. If there are goods 
that are privately owned and are exchanged freely, then these goods must be consumed. 
The right of private ownership of a product or a factor of production includes the right 
to  their  consumption.  In  essence  this  condition  means  that  all  products  have  to  be 
private, that is, each product can only belong to only one person. This idealised account 
of the market presupposes that there are not any goods that are public, shared or free. A 
product or factor of production can only belong to a single individual. Therefore, in the 
ideal market all goods are private. In addition, since all consumption must be individual, 
the benefit from its consumption is also individual. A rational agent consuming a good 
can  only  be  concerned  with  her  own  maximisation.  Hence,  similarly  to  private 
ownership, private consumption can be seen as consisting of two components; private 
goods and mutual unconcern.
In summary, the first two, conceptually linked, conditions for a perfect  market 
are private ownership and private consumption. Private ownership requires individual 
factor  endowments  and  free  market  activity  and  private  consumption  needs  private 
goods  and  mutual  unconcern.  The  two  following  conditions  are  the  absence  of 
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externalities and uncertainty.
The absence of externalities means that the actions of an individual only have an 
impact on those with whom he interacts. An exchange between two individuals changes 
their utilities without affecting anybody else's. For instance, my building a road to my 
house can create a positive externality for my neighbour who will also be able to use it. 
This example shows how the presence of externalities can also contradict the previous 
condition of the existence of exclusively private goods. The moment that my neighbour 
can use the road without having participated in its construction, the road becomes a 
shared good. Thus, all the above conditions for an ideal market, private ownership and 
consumption  and  absence  of  externalities  have  to  apply  simultaneously  and  are 
interdependent;  the  failure  of  one  inhibits  the  possibility  of  a  perfectly  competitive 
market.
Finally, certainty about production and prices is assumed as well. Agents have 
full knowledge of future changes in their utility functions and the production functions 
of society. In an ideal market rational individuals know the prices for their products and 
the supply and demand functions. Rationality demands that each agent will share all 
available information and therefore everybody will be able to maximise their utility, 
given their  original  factor  endowment,  market  activity,  consumption and absence of 
externalities. Perfect competition requires equal information which is assured by honest 
communication between rational agents.
 In  a  society  where  the  above  conditions  for  an  ideal  market  apply,  rational 
interaction leads to an optimal state.  They are typical idealised assumptions used in 
economic theory models. Economic theory shows that in a perfect market in equilibrium 
no one can improve her situation without worsening somebody else’s; in  equilibrium 
each  agent  maximises.  By  maximising  individual  utility,  social  welfare  is 
simultaneously  maximised.  This  social  welfare  is  the  optimal  outcome  of  market 
interaction – the social optimum. In a perfectly competitive market the equilibrium is a 
point of optimality. Thus, perfect competition, as defined by the conditions mentioned 
above,  leads  to  a  socially  optimal  equilibrium.  Given  perfect  competition,  “each 
individual, intending only her own gain, promotes the interest of  society” (Gauthier, 
1986: 89). Under these circumstances, a  morally free zone where both  optimality and 
equilibrium are present, is plausible. However,  Gauthier has to show that ideal market 
conditions ensure that moral constraints on rational behaviour are redundant. In order to 
achieve this, he explains how the ideal market is also impartial and there is no conflict 
21
between  moral  and  rational  requirements,  since  “market  interaction  is  rational  and 
morality is not opposed to rationality” (Gauthier, 1986: 95).
Equilibrium and optimality coincide in the perfect market and therefore rational 
interactions lead to an impartial society. Just as Robinson Crusoe does not need morality 
to justify or motivate his actions, the rational agent in the ideal market has no use for a 
moral code. Free market activity is similar to the activity of Crusoe. Just as Crusoe, each 
agent in the ideal market makes the most out of the situation without any compulsion or 
partiality.  Crusoe  can  only  blame  himself  for  sub-optimal  outcomes;  in  the  market 
where there is no coercion, each  rational agent cannot blame others for an interaction 
outcome he sees as impartial. Moreover, the absence of externalities ensures the absence 
of free-riders and hence establishes an impartial interaction. Finally, rational interactions 
in an ideal market lead to an optimal equilibrium, which means that no one can become 
better  off  without  worsening  another's  position.  Ideal  market  conditions  ensure 
impartiality and hence ensure that the market is a morally free zone. Therefore, both the 
agents  and  the  market  are  morally  free.  Given  free  market  activity,  absence  of 
externalities and rational interactions that lead to optimality, the market is shown to be a 
morally free zone. Should these conditions hold, there is no need for moral constraints 
on rational behaviour.
However,  the  ideal  market  and  the  subsequent  morally  free  zone  are 
hypothetical constructions and  Gauthier states this very clearly when he says that his 
intention is to: “show that there would be a morally free zone in ideal interaction, not to 
argue for its presence in most of our daily activities” (Gauthier, 1986: 93). Despite his 
presuppositions being unrealistic, the thought experiment he uses shows it is possible to 
have  an  impartial  society,  without  enforced  constraints  and  coercion.  This  moral 
anarchy presupposes and requires that there are no market failures. However this is not 
usually the case as the idealised conditions for a perfect  market are not met. Market 
failures require the discussion of interactions outside the realm of the ideal market and 
the  introduction  of  constraints  on  rational  behaviour.  In  Morals  by  Agreement  
cooperation and bargaining examine the possibility of inequalities in factor endowments 
and  discuss  the  extent  to  which  these  lead  to  impartial  outcomes.  These  ideas  are 
discussed in the following section.
2.2 Minimax Relative Concession
Outside the ideal market,  rational interactions take place in the context of cooperation 
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and  bargaining.  Cooperation  is  necessary  when  resources  are  scarce  and  there  is 
competition  over  their  use.  Moreover,  cooperation  creates  additional  resources  by 
increasing the total output; the collective output is greater than the sum of the individual 
inputs. Cooperative behaviour creates a surplus that would not be available otherwise as 
individual  factor endowments are multiplied through cooperation. The creation of this 
surplus creates a need for its distribution. In order for this surplus to be divided between 
the contributors, a bargaining process has occurred. Bargaining between rational agents 
leads to a  division of the cooperative surplus that is mutually accepted as impartial. 
Therefore,  cooperation  and  bargaining  arise  from  market  failures  and  the  need  to 
maximise given these failures. The following will be a discussion of the details of the 
bargaining  procedure  presented  in  MbA  and  the  way  it  may  lead  to  fair,  mutually 
beneficial outcomes.
The central components of the  bargaining procedure are the initial  bargaining 
position,  the  cooperative  surplus  and  the  bargainers'  claims.  The  initial  bargaining 
position  refers  to  the  factor  endowments  each  actor  has  at  the  beginning  of  the 
interaction. A rational agent expects to leave the  bargaining table with more than she 
had originally. The cooperative surplus should create a good that after its distribution is 
greater  than the initial  individual  endowments.  Otherwise,  it  is  irrational  for one to 
engage in bargaining in the first place. During bargaining, each actor makes a claim for 
her share of the surplus. After the original claims, bargainers have to make concessions 
from their original claims in order for an agreement to be reached. The optimal outcome 
of  the  original  claims is  unattainable  since at  the strictly  optimal  point  both agents 
would  receive  their  maximum claim which  is  more  than  the  additional  cooperative 
product.  Bargaining  in  Morals  by  Agreement,  partly  based  on  Zeuthen’s  bargaining 
theory, includes two stages: making a claim and making a concession. A claim asks for a 
concession from the other party or parties in the bargain. In this procedure, cooperation 
is a given; everyone wants to share the cooperative surplus and reach an agreement. And 
everyone  would  be  worse  off  should  an  agreement  not  be  reached.  Therefore,  all 
bargainers want to avoid endangering the agreement by making claims that are too great 
to be accepted by others. At the same time,  bargainers have to make  concessions in 
order  for  the  process  to  continue;  they  have  to  be  willing  to  accept  less  than  their 
original  claim.  Rational  agents  want  to  maximise  their  claim  and  minimise  their 
concession, in order to maximise their share of the cooperative surplus. An agreement is 
reached  once  all  bargaining  parties  are  satisfied  that  their  share  of  the  cooperative 
23
surplus  is  the  maximum they  could  have  gained,  considering  their  contribution  by 
comparison  to  the  other  party's  contribution.  In  conclusion,  bargaining  involves  an 
initial position, claims and  concessions. These elements of the  bargaining process are 
used in MbA as a basis for introducing and examining the relative concessions and the 
subsequent minimax relative concession.
More  specifically,  relative  concession  is  introduced  as  a  meaningful 
comparison of the relative concessions of the bargainers. Relative concession is defined 
as the proportion of absolute concession by comparison to the absolute concession at the 
starting point of the  bargaining. In this way, relative utilities can be compared while 
interpersonal utility comparison is avoided. Since a rational agent would try to minimise 
her  concession,  the  optimal  outcome  would  be  one  where  the  magnitude  of  the 
concession  required  by  each  bargainer  is  a  minimum.  Each  agent  compares  the 
concession she makes at the bargaining table with the concessions others make. He only 
accepts the  agreement if he feels the difference between these  concessions is not too 
great.  If  the  relative  concession  is  small,  then  it  is  more  likely  that  the  eventual 
agreement will be seen as fair and hence more likely to be accepted. Hence, the idea of 
relative concession is critical for the bargaining process in MbA. Furthermore, minimax 
relative concession is introduced to describe the relative concessions that rational agents 
may accept.
According  to  minimax  relative  concession,  the  maximum  concession  each 
person makes is the minimum from all possible outcomes. In other words, the maximum 
concession one is prepared to make is the minimum of all alternative concessions. In a 
sense,  this  is  a  tautological  claim  given  rational  agents;  rationality  calls  for  utility 
maximisation and conceding the least possible amount is essential in maximising. In 
Gauthier’s  words:  “in  any  cooperative  interaction,  the  rational  joint  strategy  is 
determined by a  bargain among the cooperators in which each advances his maximal 
claim and then offers a  concession no greater in relative magnitude than the minimax 
concession” (Gauthier, 1986: 145). 
More formally,  there are four conditions of  bargaining theory in  Morals by  
Agreement: a rational claim, a concession point, a willingness to concede and the limits 
of  concession.  The  two  latter  conditions  are  derived  from  the  former  ones.  The 
willingness to concede refers to the fact that all bargainers are rational and expect others 
to behave rationally as well; thus, they do not expect others to concede more than they 
would. This expresses the “equal  rationality” (Gauthier, 1986: 143) of the  bargainers. 
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Similarly,  rational agents have limits to the amounts they are willing to concede; the 
limits of concession cannot be so large so as to cause a decline in utility for any party.
These steps of bargaining make up the internal  rationalisation of cooperation. 
They are a  rational procedure for  bargaining and cooperating and lead to an optimal 
bargaining outcome from which no rational individual has an incentive to defect. Since 
this outcome is optimal every other option will be inferior in utility for the parties in the 
bargain. Moreover, agents have accepted each step of the process as rational and in the 
absence  of  coercion;  they  will  accept  an  outcome that  is  based  on  rationality.  The 
optimality and rationality of the outcome ensure the stability of the agreement. Rational 
agents will have no reasons not to comply with the optimal outcome. 
Thus, minimax relative concession is central to the theory of bargaining. First, 
it requires agents to maximise their utility at the bargaining table. Then, it defines the 
bargaining procedure which is meant to leave them better off than they were in their 
original position. Finally, mimimax relative concession moves the centre of bargaining 
from  individual  rationality to maximising the  bargaining outcome making  bargaining 
the vehicle in which  rational utility  maximisation coincides with impartiality. In other 
words, minimax relative concession is a constraint, on rational behaviour. And since it 
maximises  social  welfare  it  is  a  moral  constraint  exclusively  derived  from  rational 
premises; “the principle of minimax relative concession serves … as the ground of an 
impartial  constraint”  (Gauthier,  1986:  150).  Minimax  relative  concession  links  the 
concepts of  cooperation and  bargaining with that of  justice. Rational individuals will 
engage in cooperation and bargaining in order to maximise their utility. The constraints 
on  maximisation that are agreed at the  bargaining table are constraints on individual 
maximisation. In other words, the constraints decided during a  rational interaction are 
impartial and thus serve as a principle of justice.
The ideal market model shows how morality may be redundant in a perfectly 
rational world; then rational bargaining exhibits how even in the case of market failures 
rationality does not need explicitly moral constraints to reach an optimal  equilibrium. 
Bargaining and its  subsequent  fair  outcome have focused on making and accepting 
claims and concessions according to the principle of minimax relative concession. They 
have ignored the original endowments as a possible means of instantiating impartiality. 
However,  given this  process,  an injustice at  the beginning will  be transferred to the 
bargaining outcome. In the limitations of the above discussion of bargaining, the unjust 
outcome  will  still  have  to  be  characterised  as  impartial  and  optimal.  Therefore,  it 
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becomes  clear  that  an  additional  construct  is  needed  to  ensure  that  the  original 
bargaining  position  is  also  impartial.  For  Gauthier,  this  construct  is  the  Lockean 
Proviso, which will be discussed next. In combination with rational compliance with the 
terms of the agreement that will follow it, they make up Gauthier's theory of justice. 
2.3 The Lockean Proviso
The discussion of bargaining and justice has ignored the effect the original position can 
have  on  the  agreement  point.  A coercive  or  extremely  unequal  starting  bargaining 
position will lead to a contract that is similarly coercive or unequal, given the above 
mentioned  bargaining  process.  In  order  to  address  this  issue,  MbA needs  a  new 
component that ensures that the original position does not have an unjust impact on the 
bargaining  outcome.  The  Lockean  Proviso  ensures  that  bargaining  starts  from  a 
non-coercive,  impartial  position  that  is  rationally  acceptable.  Then,  following  the 
bargaining  procedure  described  earlier,  rational  interactions  reach  an  optimal 
equilibrium. The following paragraphs will examine the need for the inclusion of an 
interpretation of the Lockean Proviso in Gauthier's theory and will consider whether it is 
a rational and not strictly a moral principle.
The proviso is used at the starting point of bargaining, where there are no moral 
constraints  on individual  behaviour.  The initial  bargaining  position  is  central  in  the 
bargaining procedure of  MbA. Having accepted the priority of individual freedom and 
rationality  over  moral  principles,  Gauthier  needs  to  address  the  issue  of  bargaining 
between  rational agents characterised by great  factor endowments inequalities. Utility 
maximisers  cannot  accept  a  contract  that  does  not  allow them to maximise,  or  that 
leaves  them  worse  off.  Therefore,  the  bargaining  process  must  not  threaten  their 
endowment for the benefit  of the weaker  bargainers.  Within this  context  of  rational 
agency, the role of the initial  bargaining position becomes even more important as it 
directly  affects  the  bargaining  outcome.  That  is  not  to  say  that  the  initial  factor 
endowment  distribution  has  to  be  roughly  equal  but  that  it  has  to  be  considered 
impartial.  If one agent in the agreement feels that the endowment distribution is not 
impartial,  then the contract cannot be stable as described in Gauthier's slave society 
example (Gauthier, 1986).
If the contract is to be impartial then the original factor endowment distribution 
has to be impartial and the initial bargaining position has to be non-coercive. Only then 
will  compliance  by  rational  agents  lead  to  a  stable  mutually  beneficial  contract.  A 
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pre-contract state of nature where there is coercion, such as a slave and master society, 
cannot lead to a stable, mutually accepted agreement. If one is being taken advantage of 
originally, then one has no reason to comply with any agreement made. In the masters 
and slaves society story in  Morals by Agreement (Gauthier,  1986: 190),  the masters 
promote a new contract for the abolition of slavery the terms of which the slaves will 
not have a rationally compelling incentive to comply with once they are free. During the 
original social contract, where the bargaining takes place, the slaves were being taken 
advantage of. Hence, the bargaining process in a coercive contract could not have been 
fair or mutually beneficial, which nullifies the concept of rational bargaining. Therefore, 
if they are rational they will not accept the contract. The slaves, being in a position of 
coercion will have reasons to accept any deal that improves their situation. However, 
once  their  situation  has  been  improved,  even  incrementally,  they  have  no  rational 
incentive to keep the agreement if its terms are still partial in favour of the slave owners. 
Therefore, it is essential to start from a state where none of the bargaining parties is 
impartially advantaged; in a different situation the eventual contract would be unstable
A stable contract between rational agents must be based on an impartial initial 
position. Minimax relative concession by itself does not justify cooperation between the 
ex-slaves and the ex-masters  since a  cooperative  agreement  is  impossible  without  a 
commonly accepted original position. Cooperation is rational if, and only if, the original 
bargaining position is non-coercive. Therefore, coercion has to be removed from the 
initial position, for the contract to be optimal. In addition, removing coercion will not be 
enough in  Gauthier’s theory. The possibility of taking advantage by worsening others' 
situation has to be removed from the original position. From both a moral and a rational 
perspective,  the original  bargaining  position has  to  be impartial  to  all  parties  if  the 
agreement is to be kept by rational agents. A form of the Lockean Proviso is inserted in 
the original position to enforce an impartial starting point of interactions. According to 
Gauthier's  restatement,  the  Lockean  Proviso  demands  than  no  one  will  benefit  by 
worsening  another's  situation;  or  put  differently  the  Lockean  Proviso,  “prohibits 
worsening the situation of another person, except to avoid worsening one's own through 
interactions with that person” (Gauthier, 1986: 205). In essence, the use of the Lockean 
provision in MbA ensures that there will be no exploitation when there is no subsequent 
benefit.
The Lockean Proviso is imported as a moral constraint and as a mechanism to 
prevent coercion that serves as an impartial constraint on interaction. However, rational 
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agents  will  accept  this  moral  constraint  on  their  behaviour  in  order  to  maximise. 
Without  an  impartial  starting  point,  an  impartial  and  stable  contract  becomes 
impossible. Since, all bargaining parties are benefited by an agreement, they would all 
accept  an  original  position  characterised  by  the  Lockean  Proviso.  The  Proviso  is 
essential for a fair original bargaining position and a fair eventual agreement. It is made 
clear that the proviso “merely constrains natural interaction…” (Gauthier, 1986: 208) 
and thus leads to a fair initial bargaining position and in turn a fair agreement. It is also 
made  clear  that  it  is  rational  to  accept  the  Proviso.  It  enables  the  stability  of  the 
agreement and makes the fair division of the cooperative surplus possible. Masters will 
not  have  to  bear  the  cost  of  having slaves  should  they  accept  a  constraint  in  their 
maximisation. In return they will share the cooperative surplus that derives from a stable 
agreement. Therefore, it  is both utility maximising and moral to accept the Lockean 
Proviso as a constraint; the moral constraint is also rational.
The proviso is  used to  ensure that  the  agreement  point  is  impartial.  In  the 
context of  rational,  mutually indifferent agents who are free to act as they will,  the 
original bargaining position is crucial in determining the terms of the contract. In order 
for the contract to be accepted by rational agents who find it in their best interest to keep 
their  agreement,  its  terms  have  to  be  impartial  and  mutually  accepted.  In  turn,  an 
impartial contract needs an impartial factor endowment distribution which is assured by 
the Lockean Proviso. The discussion so far has centred around rational bargaining and 
impartiality.  The  ideal  market  model  shows  that  is  plausible  to  assert  that  rational 
interactions  without  constraints  lead  to  an  optimum  equilibrium.  The  principles  of 
minimax relative  concession and the  Lockean Proviso ensure that the final  bargaining 
outcome will be fair and accepted by all.  Compliance with the terms of the  rational 
agreement is thus assured by the rationality of its terms. However, this is only true to an 
extent. Rational agents act in a strategic environment where their maximisation depends 
on others' strategies and behaviour. Therefore, compliance with the terms of the rational 
agreement  is  not  always  realised  without  the  introduction  of  a  further  theoretical 
component. Constrained maximisation shows how it is rational for an individual to only 
cooperate with those similarly disposed and will be discussed next.
2.4 Constrained Maximisation
Minimax relative concession and the Lockean Proviso are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions  for  rational  cooperation.  A  rational  agent  still  has  reasons  to  break  an 
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agreement that is based on rational grounds. A further component needs to be added to 
MbA in order to ensure that it is rational to comply with agreements that meet the above 
mentioned  conditions.  Constrained  maximisation  yields  optimal  outcomes  while 
maximising  individual  utility  within  a  given  environment.  Constraining  one's 
maximisation  is  rational  given  that  others  also  constrain  their  maximisation.  An 
interaction between constrained maximisers yields higher utility for the individuals by 
comparison  to  straightforward  maximisation,  while  at  the  same  time  leading  to  a 
socially  optimal  outcome.  In conjunction  with  minimax relative  concession  and the 
Lockean Proviso they constitute a set of rational conditions that lead to moral outcomes. 
Hobbes’s  Leviathan  forces  individuals  to  keep  their  agreements.  On  the  contrary, 
Gauthier  speaks  of  voluntary  rational  compliance;  the  contractors  should  keep their 
agreement  because  rationality  dictates  it  without  the  need for  external  enforcement. 
Gauthier’s argument on compliance is based on the idea of constrained maximisation. 
A constrained maximiser will choose a  strategy that does not strictly maximise 
her utility if she knows others will behave similarly. This enables her to participate in 
future  interactions  with  constrained  maximisers,  which  increases  the  overall  benefit 
(Gauthier, 1986). A constrained maximiser cooperates as long as she expects others to 
constrain their  maximisation as well and as long she expects that her  behaviour will 
create  a  higher  cooperative  surplus.  In  other  words,  constrained  maximisation  is  a 
strategy of conditional  cooperation.  In addition,  constrained  maximisation is  rational 
behaviour.  According to  Gauthier,  someone who constrains her  maximisation is  still 
rational  but  “reasons  in  a  different  way”  (Gauthier,  1986:  170).  Put  differently,  a 
constrained maximiser is willing to compromise with less than full utility maximisation 
in a given instance, provided that the rational agents she interacts with are willing to do 
the same. Moreover, a constrained maximiser will only accept a small decrease in her 
immediate utility, aiming at long term gains from interactions. Constrained maximisers 
as opposed to straightforward ones will comply with a contract that requires them not to 
maximise their utility, provided they think that the other members in the contract will 
adopt the same  strategy. Therefore,  constrained  maximisation rests on the assumption 
that rational agents adopt joint strategies in order to maximise. The rational behaviour of 
one individual depends on the strategy employed by the other. Thus, it is important to be 
able to predict others' strategies.
The  rationale  of  constrained  maximisation  separates  the  act  from  its 
disposition. Constrained  maximisation relies on  rational agents being able to identify 
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dispositions to act and adjust their own  behaviour. Constrained maximisers choose to 
interact with other agents similarly disposed. Gauthier follows Hobbes in moving “the 
question from whether it be against reason … to keep one's agreement … to whether it 
be against reason to be disposed to keep one's agreement” (Gauthier, 1986: 162). Thus, 
the  rationality  of  the  disposition  to  comply  with  an  agreement  becomes  central  in 
arguing that constrained maximisation is rational.
In  terms  of  a  prisoner's  dilemma  game,  constrained  maximisation  is 
cooperative behaviour. Cooperation in repeated PD games is maximising, provided that 
both players cooperate. Cooperators are more likely to be accepted in an agreement, as 
all  parties  in  the  agreement  will  prefer  to  interact  with agents  who are  disposed to 
cooperate. Since cooperation leads to optimal equilibria, it is rational for all parties to be 
disposed to enter a cooperative agreement. Therefore, a constrained maximising strategy 
gives the advantage of being accepted in a cooperative agreement and hence optimising 
joint strategies. Provided the agents are fully informed, the constrained maximiser does 
better. Thus, constrained maximisation behaviour yields a greater utility over a series of 
interactions.  Hence,  disposition  translucency is vital  for  constrained  maximisation to 
work as a  rational  strategy. If  constrained maximisers cannot identify each other, they 
will be taken advantage of by straightforward maximisers. It is imperative that other 
agents'  strategies  are  known.  More  specifically  constrained  maximisation  is  rational 
only when others' dispositions are known, or can be guessed at a high probability.
The presupposition that the agents’ disposition to cooperate or defect is known 
poses  problems to  the plausibility  of  the  argument  that  constrained  maximisation is 
rational.  In  order  to  have  a  realistic  analysis,  dispositions  can  only  be  known as  a 
probability  in  a  society  which  includes  both  constrained  and  straightforward 
maximisers.  In  this  case,  there  can  be  four  possible  outcomes  from  bargaining: 
non-cooperation,  cooperation,  defection  and  exploitation.  The  ability  to  be  fully 
informed becomes critical. If cooperators can identify each other, then they will commit 
to  agreement among themselves. In this case, straightforward maximisers will not be 
able to maximise their utility through entering agreements. 
Communication  among  constrained  maximisers  thus  makes  constrained 
maximisation  a  rational  strategy.  However,  the  presence  of  communication  and 
information  do  not  solve  the  problem of  compliance.  An  agent  may  pretend  to  be 
disposed to cooperate or defect after cooperating. Disposition  translucency is used by 
Gauthier to face this problem; people are neither opaque nor transparent. Translucency 
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is more plausible than assuming transparency and opaqueness. In reality most people 
cannot completely hide their dispositions and be opaque, nor be transparent and expect 
others  to  trust  them  blindly  and  at  the  same  time  a  transparent  CM  in  a  mixed 
populations risks being exploited. Given that  dispositions are translucent,  constrained 
maximisation  becomes  rational  as  straightforward  maximisers  can  only  limit  their 
interactions to those similarly disposed. An interaction between constrained maximisers 
leads  to  an  optimal  equilibrium  and  is  always  preferred  to  interactions  between 
straightforward maximisers, both in terms of individual utility and social welfare. 
Constrained maximisation is rational provided the other party is also disposed 
to  constrain  his  maximisation.  This  means  that  it  is  essential  that  agents  who  are 
disposed  to  constrain  their  maximisation  can  identify  others'  dispositions  so  as  to 
interact with  constrained maximisers and avoid straightforward maximisers when this 
would lead to being exploited. Therefore, as long as disposition translucency is possible, 
constrained maximisation is a  rational strategy. In addition, the number of constrained 
maximisers also plays a role; the more the constrained maximisers the more likely it is 
they will be able to interact. The more interactions among themselves, the more likely 
that cooperative outcomes will be utility maximising. In a population with a majority of 
constrained maximisers, it is more likely that constrained maximisation will become the 
norm and hence utility maximising.
In conclusion,  constrained  maximisation is a  rational  strategy when others are 
similarly  disposed  to  constrain  their  maximisation,  given  disposition  translucency. 
Constrained  maximisation,  like  the  Lockean  Proviso,  is  a  moral  constraint  that  is 
grounded on rational premises. As such it is in accordance with the principles of rational 
morality that MbA puts forward. However, it is made clear that this does not include all 
moral behaviour or moral institutions. Constrained maximisation is not always rational. 
Constrained maximisers have to recognise and decline interactions with straightforward 
maximisers in order to achieve utility maximisation. 
Constrained  maximisation,  in  combination  with  the  Lockean  Proviso  and 
minimax relative concession make up the core of the argument in MbA. Based on these 
concepts we see how it is possible for a  rational utility maximiser to behave morally. 
Constrained maximisation and minimax relative concession are constraints on rational 
behaviour; however they are constraints of  rational morality and not explicitly moral. 
They  are  derived from  rational  premises  and  hence  rational  agents  can  adopt  them 
without loss of rationality. The same applies for the proviso which is a condition to be 
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accepted by  rational individuals. It is based on rationality but in essence it is a moral 
constraint  on  rational  maximisation.  These  concepts  of  rational  morality  are 
supplemented with a fifth one; the Archimedean Point, which will be examined in the 
following section.
2.5 The Archimedean Point
The Archimedean Point is introduced in Morals by Agreement as a position from which 
a  rational individual can be impartial  about the social  arrangements that will  be the 
result of the social contract. It is similar to Rawls’s veil of ignorance (Rawls, 2005), but 
unlike Rawls's original position, the person at the Archimedean Point is a rational actor 
with  full  knowledge  of  possible  capabilities  and  preferences;  freed  not  from  her 
individuality  but  from the  content  of  any particular  kind  of  individuality  (Gauthier, 
1986:  233).  However,  she is  not aware of her  position in  society,  which makes her 
impartial and unbiased. She has no way of knowing how her choice of an ideal social 
structure will  affect  her  personal  situation  and this  puts  her  in  a  position  to  decide 
impartially about the optimal social arrangement. The introduction of the Archimedean 
Point  is  used  to  show  that  an  impartial  observer  will  make  choices  that  are  in 
accordance with those made by rational agents who adopt minimax relative concession 
and constrained maximisation and accept the proviso. In other words, it is a mechanism 
that confirms that morals by  agreement is a working theory of morality. Hence, “the 
Archimedean Point reveals the coherence of morals by agreement” (Gauthier, 1986: 17). 
The  next  paragraphs  will  describe  the  point  of  impartial  choice  through  the 
characteristics of the rational agent occupying it.
The conditions of rationality are still present at the Archimedean Point. The ideal 
observer  is  an  objective  utility  maximiser.  However,  she  knows which  choices  will 
maximise social  welfare.  In a sense, she is only partially  rational.  Her  rationality is 
limited to her understanding of the type of  society her choices will construct. She is 
ignorant about her own utility function once she becomes a member of that society. This 
premise assures “equal concern” (Gauthier, 1986: 236) for all members of society. By 
being equally concerned, this ideal person is making certain that she – or anyone else in 
her position – will not have a disadvantaged position in the future society. Therefore, the 
main positive characteristic of the person at the  Archimedean Point is equal concern, 
which ensures the fairness of social structures. 
The  Archimedean  Point  is  more  plausible  than  alternative  accounts  of 
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impartiality in that it is occupied by a person who has the same attributes as any other 
individual; “there is no other conception of the person involved” (Gauthier, 1986: 256). 
The ideal actor is unlike other ideal observer paradigms in moral philosophy but it is 
rather  close  to  the  popular  understanding  of  an  impartial  point  of  view (Sidgwick, 
1907). She is not completely disassociated from society, nor is she an ideal sympathiser. 
On one hand, her interest in others’ well-being exists only as long as she is unaware of 
her future position. On the other hand, the typical ideal observer is neither apathetic nor 
empathetic; he is not taking part in social interactions and he will not be a member of 
society eventually. In that respect, to accept him as an impartial observer would mean 
accepting the presence of an external force that decides fairness criteria by which it is 
not  bound. Ideal  observers  of  the type of  the  Rawlsian veil  of  ignorance imply the 
existence  of  impartiality  outside  the  social  realm  disconnected  from  individual 
rationality. Therefore, these alternative impartial observers have to be rejected as their 
account  of  fairness  is  not  as  effective  and  plausible  as  the  one  provided  by  the 
Archimedean Point. The choices of the actor at the  Archimedean Point will affect her 
utility  directly  and  she  is  fully  rational  –  with  the  exception  of  her  impartiality. 
Therefore, she is bound, by reason and not metaphysics, to make impartial choices that 
construct  a  fair  society.  In  other  words,  the  agent  at  the  Archimedean  point  is  not 
restricted  by  idealistic  assumptions  to  the  same extent  as  in  other  models  of  ideal 
observers such as those proposed by Sidgwick  (1907) and Rawls (2005). This means 
that the overall argument that is based on the choices made at the Archimedean point 
can be integrated more easily in a normative theory of social behaviour.
The  analysis  of  the  Archimedean Point  does  not  include  personal  projects. 
This,  in  turn,  shows  how from the  Archimedean  Point  a  rational  actor  can  choose 
morally without abandoning rationality. A rational ideal observer would make choices 
that are maximising for all. Thus we are able to characterise the ideal observer's choices. 
A  rational  actor  will  choose freedom and mutual  benefit  as was shown in the ideal 
market model, mutually beneficial rational interactions and interactions among similarly 
disposed agents. Therefore, from the impartial position she will choose a society where 
there is a cooperative surplus that is distributed impartially. Moreover, she will choose a 
society  where  she  has  the  freedom to  maximise  her  utility  without  exploitation  or 
coercion or  social structures that do not allow bettering one’s position by worsening 
someone else’s. And her choice will involve every contributor to the social outcome 
without exclusions. If she did not, society would be divided in conflicting groups which 
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would result in a sub-optimal equilibrium.
The  above  choices  are  the  same  rational  choices  that  lead  to  justice;  they 
include the conditions of the ideal market, minimax relative concession, the proviso and 
constrained maximisation. The rational impartial observer will select a society defined 
by a completely competitive market, which also produces an optimal outcome and a fair 
distribution of resources. Thus, the rational choice at the Archimedean Point leads to an 
ideal market society. The market is a mechanism that allows the society to maximise its 
cooperative surplus without coercion.  The fair  division of the cooperative surplus is 
then ensured by employing the principle  of  minimax relative  concession.  Gauthier's 
analysis of the  Archimedean Point exhibits how an impartial observer will make the 
same choices as rational agents who pursue their self-interest free of coercion.
The above principles of choosing a social structure comprise an application of 
the theory of  Morals by Agreement. The ideal observer at the Archimedean Point will 
choose a society defined by a free market, the proviso and minimax relative concession. 
The Archimedean Point confirms the validity of Gauthier’s theory. From the impartial 
point the ideal observer will choose the principles of minimax relative concession, the 
Lockean Proviso, and constrained maximisation. Since the ideal impartial observer will 
adopt these principles as fair, anyone in the society will as well. The Archimedean Point 
concludes the theory of the  MbA, by confirming that  rational utility maximisers make 
the same choices as impartial observers.
2.6 Overview of the “Gauthier Project”
It  seems  that  the  most  crucial  and  radical  element  of  Morals  by  Agreement  is 
constrained  maximisation. The other elements of the theory had been used previously 
by other thinkers and Gauthier merely adjusts them to his theory. This means that they 
are more tested against criticism as opposed to the claim that a rational agent should be 
disposed to be a constrained maximiser. In addition, there are several variations of the 
bargaining theory that can be used to replace Zethen's model (Gauthier, 1986: 74) and 
the principle of minimax relative concession. Hence, out of the above discussed five 
elements  of  Gauthier's  theory,  we can argue that  the  four  play a  supportive role  to 
constrained  maximisation.  Constrained  maximisation  refers  to  individuals  adopting 
maximising joint strategies and so its basis lies on individual behaviour more than the 
proviso or minimax relative concession. Since both rationality and moral constraints are 
aimed at the individual, it is reasonable to assert that the core of MbA lies in constrained 
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maximisation.
Overall,  MbA makes a convincing case for  rational constraints on maximising 
behaviour  that  lead  to  moral  outcomes.  All  the  elements  of  the  theory  appeal  to 
individual  rationality  but  at  the  same time  they  are  the  basis  for  moral  behaviour. 
However,  the  extent  to  which  Gauthier  succeeds  in  grounding  moral  behaviour  on 
rationality has been disputed. The criticism of MbA can be put in two categories: first, 
critics claim that Gauthier has not been able to provide a plausible account of rational 
morality, but merely a  rationalised version of morality. A second category of criticism 
focuses  on  the  fact  that  Gauthier's  rational  constraints  are  moralised.  These  two 
categories are closely linked in that they attack morals by  agreement from different 
sides,  but  in  essence  target  the  possibility  of  a  rational  morality.  On the  one  hand, 
minimax  relative  concession  and  constrained  maximisation  have  been  criticised  as 
moral concepts. For Gauthier,  rational agents accept constraints on their maximising 
behaviour,  but  from the  perspective  of  standard  economic  theory  it  is  possible  that 
reasoning differently (as Gauthier puts it) is non-rational. Constraints such as these have 
to be moral in that they require that rational agents should not maximise; therefore, they 
cannot be justified by traditional ways of understanding  rational choice. On the other 
hand, moralists claim that these constraints are indeed moral, but not strong enough to 
lead to a fair outcome.
Understanding the argument  of the critics will  help understanding  Gauthier’s 
contractarian  theory  better  and  its  main  weaknesses.  The  criticism  exposes  the 
implications  of  Gauthier’s  theory  in  new  ways.  Therefore,  criticising  Morals  by 
Agreement is  a very effective method to show its  limitations and the possibility  for 
improvements. The following section will examine the arguments of the two categories 
of critics and, through that, attempt a deeper overall understanding of the theory.
2.6.1 Weak Morality
The main criticism of the theory presented in  MbA  is that it  fails to generate moral 
requirements on the basis of rational agency. Critics accuse Gauthier of merely creating 
a theory of alternative morality, not an original theory of morality. The elements of his  
theory  that  he  claims  are  rational,  are  in  reality  moral  constraints  on  rational 
maximisation. As such, Gauthier has failed in producing a theory of rational morality, in 
which moral behaviour will be explained exclusively by rational premises. The criticism 
of this stream focuses on the fact that  Gauthier's moral constraints in their attempt to 
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seem  rational are too weak to lead to a just outcome. The charge refers to all of the 
elements  of  the  theory,  the  proviso,  minimax  relative  concession  and  constrained 
maximisation.
The Lockean Proviso as described by  Gauthier is unjust as it allows for great 
inequalities and immoral  behaviour. The example of the starving woman who is not 
even allowed to take the crumbs out of the rich person's table is indicative. The wealthy 
man is not required by the Lockean Proviso to help someone who starves, even if it  
would  have  a  very  small  negative  impact  on  his  utility  (Gauthier,  1986). And this 
behaviour is not moral in the general sense of the word. Gauthier does not defend it as 
moral element either and thus it is difficult to accept the Lockean Proviso as a necessary 
condition for a moral state. The implication is that this situation is the outcome of a 
violation of the proviso or  minimax relative  concession in the past (Hausman, 1989). 
But even if this is the case, the theory in MbA does not have with any method to correct 
the situation in the present, but relies on the fact that there have not been violations of 
its premises in the past. In this sense the Lockean Proviso is too weak a moral constraint 
to sustain a moral state of affairs. 
Moreover, the Lockean Proviso does not specify the utility amounts by which 
one can improve his situation. The implication is that, according to the proviso, it is 
acceptable  for  one  to  become marginally  better  off  while  another's  utility  increases 
greatly. Another criticism of the proviso is that it allows one to exploit another provided 
that if one did not, someone else would (Hubin and Lambeth, in Vallentyne 1991). This 
is made explicit through the slave owners’ example: in the absence of a horrible slave 
owner all his slaves would be owned by an even more horrible slave owner. Therefore, 
the slaves are better off since the first slave owner exists. Finally, Gauthier's use of the 
proviso has been criticised because it is seen as an attempt to reduce morality to utility 
maximisation. Although this is not necessarily true in  Gauthier's case, proponents of 
pure moral theory (one that is based on individuals' motives being moral, not rational) 
are sceptical of the inclusion of utility in describing the outcomes of the proviso. In 
sum, Gauthier's use of the proviso has been criticised for not providing a strong enough 
moral  claim;  it  is  arbitrary  and  allows  immoral  situations  thus  making  it  an 
inappropriate condition for justice. 
Gauthier’s  bargaining theory components are weak in terms of their  rational 
justification;  both  minimax  relative  concession  and  constrained  maximisation  are 
introduced as  rational  elements,  but  they contradict  the principles  of  rational choice 
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theory in the sense that they are based on the assumption that “rational” agents will 
forego immediate benefit in order to benefit from future maximisation. The criticism 
against the  minimax relative  concession principle and  constrained  maximisation is in 
the same vein as they are not considered strong enough requirements always to ensure 
an  outcome that  will  be  mutually  beneficial  and  accepted  by  those  worse  off.  The 
bargaining process that Gauthier suggests is problematic and therefore it is likely to lead 
to  an  unjust  outcome.  Minimax  relative  concession  compares  the  concessions  the 
bargainers make in order to agree on a contract. However, the concept of  concessions 
contradicts the definition of  rational, self-regarding utility maximisers; the bargaining 
process entails accepting less than the maximum desirable gain and in this sense can be 
seen as problematic from a rational choice theory perspective.  Gauthier defends this 
because he argues  that  MRC is  the best  one can do compatible  with  others  having 
sufficient incentive to agree to the distribution, but this is not at all clear and indeed in  
his  later  work  Gauthier  adopts  a  bargaining  principle  that  more  closely  resembles 
Nash’s  solution  (Gauthier  &  Sugden  1993).  Therefore,  according  to  this  line  of 
criticism, a more powerful moral constraint is needed; one that will set more specific 
moral limitations on agents’ behaviour.
Constrained maximisation is also problematic from a traditional rational choice 
theory perspective.  It  is  imported as a moral  constraint  but  is  not  strong enough to 
enforce moral  behaviour on self-regarding utility maximisers. In a sense it is a moral 
constraint on rational behaviour but it is not clear whether it applies primarily to rational 
or  moral  agents.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  clear  how constrained maximisation  as  a 
principle  is  transferred  from  rational  choice  theory  to  moral  philosophy.  An 
interpretation is left open that it is a moral constraint that is presented as a rational one. 
Thus,  by  the  use  of  constrained  maximisation,  Gauthier  reduces  a  moral  rule  of 
behaviour  to  a  rational  one  without  adequate  explanation.  He  sees  constrained 
maximisation  as  a  “core  element  in  the  agent's  overarching  life  plan”  (Gauthier  in 
Gauthier & Sugden, 1993:  188),  but this  contradicts  rational agency as accepted by 
economists and game theoreticians. Moreover, instrumental rationality is at odds with 
the principle of constrained maximisation (Hollis 1993: 40). Gauthier's strict assumption 
of  instrumental  rationality  conflicts  with  the  concept  of  rational  morality;  in  the 
economic account of rationality, rational behaviour leads to utility maximisation. On the 
contrary, in Gauthier's account constrained maximisation is rational because it promotes 
utility. Once a constrained maximiser finds himself in an agreement with a similarly 
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disposed agent, it is rational for him to turn into a straightforward maximiser. The only 
way to avoid this gap in Gauthier's theory is to use expressive instead of instrumental 
rationality.  Using instrumentally  rational  maximisers  as  the  actors  in  MbA does  not 
provide a convincing argument for rational constraints on maximising behaviour. Put 
differently, someone who is disposed to cooperate does not have to cooperate all the 
way through a series of interactions. He does not have to keep acting according to his 
disposition once he benefits from others' constrained maximisation behaviour. Practical 
rationality  cannot  provide  a  bargaining  solution  as  disposition  to  behave  morally 
depends on how one expects others to behave. However, wishing that others cooperate 
does not make any difference. Thus, it is unlikely that rational dispositions will lead to 
moral behaviour (Nida-Rumelin, in Gauthier and Sugden 1993). In conclusion, rational 
compliance  in  the  “Gauthier  project”  is  seen  as  problematic  in  that  it  is  not  in 
accordance with the assumptions of practical rationality and rational agency as these are 
perceived by traditional economic theory.
Similarly,  Hampton  (1986)  exposes  the  problem  of  compliance  in  the 
contractarian  approach;  the difficulty  in  keeping one's  promises  without  an external 
enforcer.  She  argues  that  it  is  not  important  whether  individuals  behave  based  on 
rationality  or  passions  since  the  outcome  in  both  cases  will  be  defection  from the 
agreement. If humans are motivated by passions such as fear, they have no reason to 
behave  differently  after  the  contract.  In  this  case,  they  will  not  comply  with  the 
agreement, even if they have agreed to it.  In the case where individuals are  rational 
actors  living  in  a  non-cooperative state  of  nature,  there  is  no incentive  for  them to 
cooperate after they have benefited from a contract. Individuals can neither be forced to 
change their  behaviour by Hobbes’s Leviathan, nor convinced by Gauthier’s argument 
for rational morality. 
The  above  paragraphs  have  looked  at  how  proponents  of  purely  moral 
constraints on rational behaviour have criticised Gauthier's attempt to produce a theory 
of rational morality. Critics have focused on the concepts of constrained maximisation, 
minimax relative  concession and the proviso to show that the  rational constraints  in 
MbA are in reality moral. According to the critics,  Gauthier's attempt to derive moral 
principles from  rational premises fails in that his principles are only pseudo-rational. 
The following section will examine the second stream of criticism for the “Gauthier 
project”; that includes rational choice theorists who claim that Gauthier has “polluted” 
rational constraints with moral principles and thus his project fails.
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2.6.2 Moral Principles
The second category of critics include those who claim that the “Gauthier project” is 
moralised  by  the  inclusion  of  clearly  moral  constraints  on  rational  behaviour.  The 
Lockean Proviso, minimax relative concession principle and constrained maximisation 
are not adequately justified as rational constraints. Therefore, Gauthier’s theory is not a 
purely rational choice theory of moral  behaviour. These constraints will have either to 
be altered so as to fit rational choice theory premises or removed.
The theory of Morals by Agreement does not allow coercion. However, this is 
not justified as rational agents have no reason to avoid coercing others, if by doing so 
they maximise their utility.  On one interpretation, Gauthier’s claim is that coercion is 
ruled out not for (hidden) moral reasons, but because coerced contracts will turn out to 
be unstable. This is because those who are coerced realise that they could have done 
better. However, it is always true that parties to a contract could have done better than 
they  did  if  their  initial  bargaining  position  had  been  stronger.  What  motivates  the 
coerced must be that in some sense their initial position was illegitimate; it is because 
they think they have been treated unfairly that they wish to renegotiate. That, though, is 
a moral claim. 
The  Lockean Proviso is  therefore not effective as a  rational constraint.  The 
same applies for the other constraints in  Gauthier’s theory, the principle of  minimax 
relative concession and constrained maximisation. Gauthier does not offer a convincing 
justification why rational agents should adhere to them. The fact that rational agents will 
benefit  in  the  long  term  by  accepting  constraints  on  their  behaviour  might  be  a 
reasonable assertion, but it is a very weak argument in terms of the theory of  rational 
choice,  which  demands  immediate  utility  maximisation.  Therefore,  the  moral 
constraints  in  Morals  by  Agreement are  not  supported  efficiently  and  remain 
unjustifiable.  They  could  be  an  integral  part  of  the  theory,  should  there  be  a  valid 
justification of how they help us move from rational to moral  behaviour. In sum, this 
line of criticism takes on Gauthier’s theory on the grounds that his rational premises are 
not indeed purely rational; they are moralised as the constraints on behaviour are moral 
and not exclusively  rational.  Gauthier needs to do more in order to explain how the 
conditions he uses are explicitly rational.
The principle of minimax relative concession is Gauthier’s bargaining solution. 
However, it has come under fierce criticism as it probably it is the weakest component 
of the theory from a rational choice theory perspective. Minimax relative concession is 
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unjustified  and  very  difficult to  defend;  especially  from  a  game  theoretical  side. 
Gauthier himself acknowledges that “at most it may have a heuristic value in presenting 
the idea of minimax relative concession as uniting rationality and morality” (Gauthier, 
1993:  178).  The  Nash  bargaining  solution  can  be  as  efficient  as  minimax  relative 
concession – if not a more efficient one. Thus, Gauthier’s theory would have been better 
served by the Nash bargaining solution. The criticism for minimax relative concession 
arises from the fact that it is weak in  game theory terms. Moreover,  Binmore (1993) 
proves how Gauthier has no reason to import his own bargaining solution and ignore the 
Nash solution. In Morals by Agreement there is no convincing argument that minimax 
relative  concession is a more appropriate solution than Nash’s. The fact that  Gauthier 
does not provide a formal proof of  minimax relative  concession makes it  easier for 
game theorists to attack his bargaining theory on mathematical grounds. Nash’s solution 
is bound to be more attractive from a mathematical point of view. 
Moreover, Gauthier’s model for minimax relative concession principle assumes 
a two person interaction. There is no argument for how it would work on a group level.  
Gauthier’s theory refers to how to fairly distribute a social surplus. Therefore, he should 
have provided a  bargaining solution that addresses interaction among more than two 
agents. His minimax relative concession solution could be generalised to N persons, but 
he does not  make any attempt to do so.  Neither does he mention the possibility  of 
applications  to  interactions  among more than  two agents.  A formal  approach to  the 
bargaining problem would be more likely to discuss distribution in groups. Both Nash 
and Kalai-Smorodinsky offer  bargaining solutions that are not limited to two person 
games (Gaertner and Klemish-Ahlert, in Vallentyne 1991). 
In short,  minimax relative  concession as a  bargaining solution is problematic. 
The lack of an axiomatic analysis means there are possibilities that are not addressed. 
An  axiomatic  analysis  would  not  necessarily  make  minimax  relative  concession  a 
sounder solution, but it would provide a stronger argument (Gauthier & Sugden, 1993). 
It  is  a  fact  though  that  the  Nash  formal  bargaining  solution  is  eventually  more 
convincing for Gauthier as well (Gauthier & Sugden 1993). Much of the criticism from 
the side of rational choice theory has focused on minimax relative concession. However, 
a fair amount of criticism also concerns other elements of the theory such as constrained 
maximisation.
An  additional  relevant  criticism  is  that  constrained  maximisation asks  too 
much.  It  is  a  moral  requirement  that  is  very  difficult  to  incorporate in  a  theory  of 
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rational  choice.  Gauthier  assumes  that  agents  are  fully  rational  utility  maximisers. 
However, paradoxically he expects them to constrain their  maximisation. If we accept 
the premises of  rational choice theory,  how are we supposed to accept that in some 
situations,  rational actors will  not maximise?  Gauthier talks about the disposition to 
constrain one’s maximisation, but this disposition has to be converted to action in order 
for his model to work. He does not provide a convincing enough reason for which a 
rational agent will have to act according to his disposition. The fact that a disposition is 
rational does not necessarily mean that the action, even if undertaken, will be rational as 
well.  Holly Smith (in Vallentyne 1991) argues that even in the case that all agents are 
disposed to cooperate it does not follow that they will indeed cooperate. It actually pays 
one more to be disposed to cooperate but do not actually cooperate.  Moreover,  two 
constrained maximisers are not certain to always cooperate: it is impossible for each of 
them to know that the disposition of the other will be translated into cooperative action. 
Therefore,  interaction  between  constrained  maximisers  does  not  always  lead  to  the 
cooperative surplus. A rational agreement does not always ensure that cooperation will 
be the utility maximising response. It is “quite implausible to assume that any intention 
of  mine  inevitably  causes  my subsequent  carrying  out  of  that  intention”  (Smith  in 
Vallentyne, 1991: 236). 
Dispositions to act do not always lead to acting:  “Covenants are but words…
having no force to oblige, contain, constrain or protect…” (Hobbes 1962: 146). There is 
a weak link between being disposed to act morally and actually acting morally. Kavka 
(1983) presented this criticism as the  toxin puzzle;  an eccentric billionaire pays one 
million dollars to anyone who will promise to drink a toxin that will make him sick for a 
day, but will have no long term effects. It is rational then to form an intention to drink 
the toxin in order to collect the money. However,  once the money has been paid, a 
rational agent would decide against an action that would make him ill. In other words, a  
rational disposition to act is not always followed by the corresponding rational action. 
Kavka's paradox exhibits how Gauthier's account of the relationship of a disposition to 
action  and  an  actual  action,  can  be  problematic.  In  addition  to  that  criticism,  the 
conditions of constrained maximisation are problematic for rational choice theory.
Transparency  and  translucency  are  essential  conditions  for  cooperation  in 
Gauthier’s  argument.  However,  they  are  not  plausible  as  it  is  very  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  for  an  agent  to  detect  others’  dispositions.  This  does  not  apply  only  to 
empirical claims about the possibility of translucency, but to its theoretical implications 
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as well. Assuming that rational agents have capacities that are super-human weakens the 
theoretical  argument.  Of  course  dispositional  translucency  is  not  an  exclusively 
idealistic characteristic of human nature. People within societies can guess what others 
will do, especially if they know them. However, this is not always the case and it is not 
the case that we only interact with people we do not know. A stranger, just like a friend, 
can  deceive  us  if  there  is  a  strong  enough  incentive  to  do  so.  Sayre-McCord  (in 
Vallentyne, 1991) argues that the translucency assumption makes the applicability of the 
model  impossible.  Fully  informed  individuals  are  assumed  to  engage  in  mutually 
beneficial interaction.  In the real world though, it is virtually impossible to detect a 
disposition for cooperation. Straightforward maximisers may pretend to be disposed to 
cooperate and exploit constrained maximisers. Therefore, transparency “may generate a 
defence for being moral” (Sayre-McCord in Vallentyne, 1991: 188) but it is limited to 
that. Although of course using certain idealised assumptions is not fatal in an argument 
in moral philosophy, it is certainly preferable to use realistic assumptions instead when 
it is possible to do so. Translucency is more realistic but still not plausible and the same 
criticism applies for both transparency and translucency. People can be deceived about 
others’ dispositions and rational actors have reasons to pretend. And being effective in 
deceiving may prove to be more beneficial than cooperating. 
Being opaque should be a burden in order for  Gauthier’s argument to work. 
However,  as  Sayre-McCord argues,  opacity  is  not  always  an  obvious  characteristic. 
Opaque agents may very well appear to be transparent so as to attract cooperation. The 
discussion  revolves  around issues  of  collective  action  then.  A  society  can  make 
deception very costly, so as that agents will have to appear in their true colours before 
the bargain. Societies however have failed to create institutions that make free-riding or 
parasitic behaviour too costly. On the contrary it usually pays one to act as a cooperator, 
while in reality being a defector. In conclusion, Sayre-McCord's main line of criticism 
for  Gauthier’s  theory is  the realism of the  translucency and transparency of  rational 
agents. Since cooperation is vital for Morals by Agreement, showing that it is unlikely 
for  rational  agents  to  be  disposed  to  cooperate  reveals  a  major  disadvantage  in 
Gauthier’s theory. 
The criticism for  morals  by  agreement  coming from  rational  choice  theory 
focuses on the premises of the theory that are not exclusively  rational, and especially 
minimax relative  concession and constrained maximisation. However, the spirit of the 
criticism  is  the  same  and  applies  to  the  “Gauthier  project”  as  a  whole;  Gauthier 
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introduces moral claims within rational premises. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The  “Gauthier  project”  aims  at  creating  a  theory  of  morals  based  on  rationality.  If 
successful, the incentive of  moral  behaviour will be  rational and the question of why 
one ought to be good becomes irrelevant.  Gauthier starts from showing how an ideal 
market would be a  morally free zone. In an ideal  market all persons are affected by 
interaction  in  the  same  way  and  hence  the  market  is  impartial.  And  for  Gauthier 
impartiality coincides with morality. However, there are no ideal markets. Markets fail 
by creating externalities and we need cooperative interaction to correct these failures. In 
order  for  rational  cooperation  to  be  optimal  and  fair,  there  is  a  need  for  moral 
constraints on  behaviour. The  Lockean Proviso ensures  justice, by not allowing more 
powerful actors to take advantage of weaker ones. Minimax relative concession sets the 
rules for a fair  bargaining procedure which is essential for the construction of a fair 
society.  Gauthier’s  contract  theory  describes  how it  would  be  possible  to  reach  an 
agreement about social interactions. It starts from a natural state and through bargaining 
reaches a fair social contract. The social contract is based on moral norms arising from 
rational bargaining. Moral norms are the product of rational bargaining and compliance 
with  them  depends  on  individual  rationality.  In  that  respect,  Gauthier  shows  that 
compliance with the terms of a  rational  agreement is beneficial and leads to optimal 
outcomes. Morals by Agreement has come under a lot of criticism for failing to derive a 
moral  theory  from  rationality.  The  moral  constraints  Gauthier  introduces  are 
unacceptable for rational choice theorists. Thus, his theory has to be purified in a sense 
so that it  will be a theory of moral philosophy based on  rational choice constraints. 
Binmore, Sugden and Skyrms have contributed in this field. Their starting point though 
is  Economics  and  Social  Science  and  therefore  their  methodology  is  different.  In 
addition, they do not use moral constraints; at least not the way Gauthier does. In this 
sense, they are more successful in following the  conventions of  rationality and using 
them to  create  a  theory  of  rational  morality.  Their  analysis  uses  evolutionary  game 
theory  and,  as  opposed  to  Gauthier,  who  sees  social  contract  as  the  result  of  an 
agreement,  they  see  it  as  having  developed  through  social  interaction.  Their 
evolutionary account of  moral  norms can be used to reinforce  Gauthier's  morals by 
agreement  by  replacing  the  moralised  aspects  of  his  theory.  Their  work  will  be 
examined  in  Chapter  Three.  Moreover,  in  the  following  chapters  an  evolutionary 
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account  of  social  conventions  will  be  used  to  replace  the  need  for  bargaining  and 
constrained maximisation, without loss of rationality or moral outcomes. That account 
will  be  shown to  be  more  realistic  as  it  refers  to  societies  as  well  as  individuals. 
Gauthier's theory is based on assumptions and analysis of individual behaviour used in 
order to examine social interactions. In that sense, it fails to take into account social 
dynamics that can only be analysed when we look at a social group as a whole and not 
exclusively at the behaviour of its members. Additionally, moral norms as the result of 
evolutionary processes of social structures and conventions can be a more efficient type 
of moral  rationality than the one  Gauthier proposes. Morality in this context is not as 
important  as  optimality  in  equilibrium.  A  society  that  has  reached  an  optimal 
equilibrium will be characterised by the  moral  behaviour of its members (Gauthier & 
Sugden, 1993: 150).
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3. Evolutionary Theory in Moral Contractarianism
The  previous  chapter  analysed  the  Gauthier  project  discussing  its  strengths  and 
weaknesses. This chapter will focus on literature including the use of evolutionary and 
game theoretical  models  in  moral  philosophy.  More  specifically,  it  will  discuss  the 
literature of game theoretical models regarding social and cultural evolution. Examining 
the literature in moral philosophy that utilises  evolutionary  game theory should make 
clearer  that  it  is  possible  to  view  moral  behaviour  as  the  outcome  of  rational 
deliberation within dynamic social structures that are described by cultural evolutionary 
models. 
Evolutionary  game  theory  can  explain  and  justify  an  account  of  rational 
constrained utility  maximisation taking into account  evolutionary factors, thus making 
the  concept  of  constrained  maximisation  impervious  to  the  criticisms  related  to 
Gauthier's  use  of  moral  constraints  that  were  examined  in  the  previous  chapter. 
Evolutionary accounts of social explanation propose the use of a  dynamic process of 
repeated interactions in the place of constraints on rational maximisation. Repeated and 
evolving  strategic  interactions  can  show  that  rationality  does  not  have  to  be 
contaminated  with  moral  concepts  in  order  to  lead  to  a  moral  outcome.  Therefore, 
evolutionary  theory  can  be  used  to  advance  the  Gauthier  project  by  reinforcing  his 
argument.  The main  representatives  of  this  “purist”  thinking include  Brian  Skyrms, 
Robert Sugden and Kenneth Binmore. 
Skyrms (2004) and Sugden (2004) attempt to show how evolutionary accounts 
of  the  creation  of  social  structures  and  conventions  account  for  human  behaviour. 
Binmore's (1998) more ambitious attempt is to combine contractarian moral philosophy 
with formal mathematical models and evolutionary game theory,  in order to explain 
theories  of  justice  and  provide  rational  incentives  for  cooperative  behaviour.  By 
comparison  to  the  Gauthier  project  they  are  all  more  focused  on  explaining  moral 
behaviour and social institutions of  justice, rather than offering a normative account. 
However,  explaining  justice  with  rationality  would  also  provide  incentives  for  just 
behaviour. In other words, they try to show that  rational agents have incentives to be 
moral. Therefore under the assumption that humans are  rational, there is no need for 
externally  enforced  cooperation.  Cooperation  would  be  sustained  by  rational 
individuals. 
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Gauthier  follows  the  philosophical  tradition  started  by  Hobbes's  Leviathan, 
asserting that individuals are mutually unconcerned utility maximisers. However,  his 
influences also include  Hume in that he argues that moral responsibility is based on 
rationality  and  Rousseau  in  the  sense  that  they  are  both  moral  contractarians. 
Evolutionary  game theory explanations in moral philosophy follow the philosophical 
tradition  of  Hume  and  Rousseau  by  acknowledging  the  importance  of  reciprocal 
altruism. Evolutionary accounts of human behaviour imply that we can understand the 
whole by understanding its components – more specifically understand social behaviour 
by explaining individual behaviour. 
Combining explanations on group and individual  level  creates tension which 
arises from the fact that social and individual theoretical paradigms are often in conflict. 
In the context of the present analysis the most significant area of conflict has to do with 
the definition of individual  rationality. Evolutionary theory assumes agents of limited 
rationality  whereas  traditional  rational  choice  theory  asserts  hyper-rationality.  The 
following sections will deal with the methodological aspects of combining evolutionary 
game theory with individual  rationality, before moving on to discussing the theory of 
social conventions which will be used to link individual with social behaviour.
3.1 Methodological Aspects 
Using evolutionary accounts of behaviour in conjunction with assumptions of individual 
rationality  causes  methodological  problems.  This  section  will  attempt  to  show how 
these two branches of social explanation can be reconciled through a focus on how these 
seemingly opposing paradigms have been used in the literature. In order to achieve this, 
the first point of analysis will be our understanding of  individual  rationality (Gintis, 
2009). 
Rational choice theory is defined and limited by the premises of methodological 
individualism. In turn, methodological individualism is based on the idea that the whole 
has  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  its  components  (Hollis,  1996).  This  means  that  in 
behavioural  sciences,  society  has  to  be  analysed  in  terms  of  individual  actions. 
Therefore, the model of homo economicus becomes prominent. The assertion that there 
are  radical  differences  between  methodological  individualism  and  holism  is  not  as 
generally accepted as it used to be (Gintis, 2009; Young, 2001). However, it needs to be 
examined  here  in  the  context  of  the  literature  for  two  main  reasons.  First,  holistic 
theories of social evolution incorporate individual action; however, they fail to provide 
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convincing solutions to problems arising from individually rational behaviour within 
social groups. Secondly, the similarities and differences between social and biological 
evolutionary  models  have  to  be examined in order  to  see to  what  extent  biological 
evolution can be used as a pattern for cultural  evolution. These three factors will be 
examined shortly in the following paragraphs.
First, paradigms of  evolutionary  game theory such as  Sugden's and  Skyrms's 
make reference to social  evolution which means that social  action is viewed from a 
holistic perspective as well. More specifically,  Sugden’s use of  conventions, examines 
how individuals in societies behave differently than they would outside society. Agents 
do follow the social conventions even when by doing so, they do not strictly maximise 
their utility. This account bypasses a line of criticism similar to the one used against 
Gauthier's claim that constrained maximisation is not a moral principle, since agents are 
not assumed to be perfectly rational (according to the economic paradigm), and their 
behaviour is  assessed at  the end of a series of interactions.  A conventional agent is 
rational in that she participates in a convention that maximises her utility in the long 
term as opposed to expecting a maximising outcome out of every single interaction. 
Individual maximisation comes as a result of social norms being created and observed. 
Therefore,  for  Sugden,  individual  maximisation  and  conventional  behaviour  are 
interdependent and one feeds off the other. 
Similarly,  Skyrms  discusses  the  evolution  of  social  structures  and  group 
selection. Behaviour is imitated at the level of the individual but evolves within social 
groups.  Arguably,  the account presented in  The Stag Hunt  and the Evolution of the  
Social  Contract  (Skyrms,  2004) relies  more  on  collective  explanation  of  social 
evolution and leaves little room for individual rationality. However, an integral part of 
Skyrms's theory is that individuals imitate the most efficient strategies and adapt their 
behaviour to their environment. Although not explicitly stated, this can be viewed as an 
inclusion of a concept of limited rationality. 
Finally,  Binmore blurs the lines between holism and individualism. His claim 
that genes affect cultural evolution makes it difficult to see where biological evolution 
concepts stop and the  rational actor model begins. His argument includes rather bold 
assertions  about  genetic  predispositions  for  cooperative  behaviour,  given  certain 
conditions such as the size of the social group. However, the core of his argument is that 
individual action leads to the evolution and creation of social norms that in turn create 
the bounds for the behaviour of rational agents. In that respect, his theory can be seen as 
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complementary to those of Sugden and Skyrms.
The second reason why the combination of holistic and individualistic theories 
of  social  explanation can be problematic  has to do with their  inability  to  deal  with 
collective  action  failures.  In  essence  this  is  related  to  assumptions  of  individual 
rationality within group behaviour. A group of rational individuals does not necessarily 
have to behave rationally. In other words, rational behaviour is different when we look 
at an agent who interacts with another agent than when  behaviour is examined on a 
collective level; on the former case strict individual maximisation is rational whereas in 
the latter, rational behaviour has to lead to maximising group welfare. In the prisoner’s 
dilemma game for instance, maximising  behaviour changes depending on whether we 
are talking about a two person or an n person game and whether we view the game as a 
model for individual maximisation or collective action. In the typical PD game, defect is 
always the rational strategy. However, when the interaction is examined as a collective 
action problem, cooperation yields higher utility.
Finally, the third reason why incorporating the rational choice theory model into 
evolutionary theory is controversial relates to the discrepancies between biological and 
cultural evolution. In biological evolution there is no room for the concept of individual 
actions  that  may change the  course  of  evolution.  In  cultural  evolution  a  claim that 
individual actions have no impact over the final outcome would lead to a type of social 
determinism that  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  literature  examined here.  Biological 
evolution does not select the fittest individual but the fittest gene (Dawkins, 2006). In 
order to be able to transfer  biological  evolution into  behavioural sciences, we have to 
account  for  the  absence  of  gene  selection,  or  even  individual  selection,  in  cultural 
evolution.  Cultural  evolution discusses how specific  social  conventions  or structures 
evolve to become stable over competing social models. In cultural evolution we should 
take into account the concept of memes which are selected, as opposed to individual 
selection  (Binmore,  1998).  The  theories  reviewed  here,  use  evolutionary  theory  to 
examine  strategy  selection  and hence  biological  gene  selection  mechanisms are  not 
needed and do not cause problems for the theory. 
The  problems  arising  from  using  evolutionary  theory  to  describe  social 
behaviour  are  common throughout  the  literature  and constitute  the main similarities 
among the above mentioned theories.  Despite the important similarities, there are also 
differences in the methodology of the work of Sugden, Skyrms and Binmore. All three 
scholars  accept  the premises  of  experimental  economics  and build their  theories  on 
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laboratory results and computer simulations. Sugden’s work is probably the one closest 
to moral and political philosophy. In a nutshell his argument is that the social contract is 
comprised of social conventions that in turn develop from repeated interactions among 
rational individuals. In Sugden's work justice comes about when rational agents freely 
pursue  their  self-interest.  Along  with  Gauthier's,  Sugden's  work  will  be  the  most 
important  in  forming the next  chapters  and providing a  moral  theory framework in 
which Skyrms and Binmore can be understood. 
Skyrms’s work is the most innovative one from a game theoretical perspective. 
He argues that in evolutionary game theory both strategies and game structures evolve 
and affect the  bargaining procedure and the final contract point.  The coevolution of 
strategies  and  structures  makes  his  analysis  more  realistic  in  that  it  approaches  the 
dynamic changes of real societies. In addition, The Stag Hunt and the Evolutions of the  
Social Contract  (2004) uses computer simulations to examine the  behaviour of basic 
biological organisms, such as colonies of bacteria, to study the dynamics of cooperation. 
Although there is  no claim that  bacteria  and societies evolve in  the same way,  this 
analysis offers new insights into individual and group selection in theories of evolution. 
Just like Sugden, Skyrms is forced to discuss more than one game. Although the 
stag hunt can describe social interaction better than the prisoner’s dilemma, it is still 
inadequate  to  account  for  all  kinds  of  social  interaction.  Therefore,  the  prisoner’s 
dilemma is also used as a special case, as well as variations of the stag hunt. Different 
games have different basins of attraction which means that the dominant  strategy in a 
population changes as the number following that  strategy changes; for instance  stag 
hunting has a basin of attraction of 75 percent which means that “[i]f  more that 76 
percent of the population hunts stag, then stag hunters will take over” (Skyrms, 2004: 
11). Therefore, games with different basins of attraction can evolve into distinct social 
structures with different equilibria. 
Binmore’s theory is  the most difficult  to classify methodologically as it  very 
extensive and exceptionally broad. In short,  he proposes an  evolutionary account of 
moral norms. Biological  evolution plays a role in that we are all bound by our genes. 
Furthermore  and  similarly  to  Sugden,  Binmore  also  suggests  that  social  norms  are 
subject  to  evolutionary  forces.  Evolution  plays  a  two-fold  role:  it  affects  human 
behaviour biologically and also affects how human  moral norms evolve. Finally, the 
social contract is viewed as an equilibrium in repeated games and rational agents will 
choose the best  equilibrium for their  social  contract  because “fairness is  evolution's 
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solution to the  equilibrium selection problem” (Binmore 2005: 14).  Binmore, without 
abandoning  the  assumption  of  rational  actors,  constructs  an  evolutionary  theory  of 
justice.
The above paragraphs have been an attempt to  discuss the literature of the 
general field of evolutionary game theory and moral philosophy. The work of Sugden, 
Skyrms and  Binmore has a lot in common and in practice belongs in the same field, 
which is both innovative and difficult to classify.  Sugden is probably the first to have 
written in this field combining the idea of justice with game theory and evolution. His 
work has clear normative implications in addition to its explanatory power. Skyrms on 
the  contrary  focuses  on  describing  the  dynamics  of  interactions  that  can  lead  to 
cooperative equilibria but makes no explicit normative claims. Finally, Binmore offers a 
more ambitious account that aims to explain cultural evolution with a more direct albeit 
complex  normative  account.  It  is  clear  however  that  all  the  above,  and  especially 
Sugden  and  Binmore,  follow the  philosophical  tradition  of  Hume.  In  contrast  with 
Gauthier's clear affiliation with the Hobbesian tradition, the following chapters will use 
key concepts from both the Hobbesian and the Humean traditions.
The next sections will discuss more analytically the work of  Sugden, Skyrms 
and Binmore. First, Sugden's work will be examined through an analysis of his concept 
of social conventions in the next paragraphs.
3.2 Spontaneous order
Spontaneous  order,  a  phrase  first  used  by  Hayek  (Sugden  2004),  describes  very 
adequately  the  main  aim  of  The  Economics  of  Rights,  Cooperation  and  Welfare  
(Sugden,  2004):  to  show  that  social  interactions  can  lead  to  equilibria  of  moral 
behaviour without third party enforcement. The core of the argument is that societies, 
just  like  ideal  markets,  reach  efficient  and optimal  equilibria  should they  be left  to 
operate freely. In this framework, a convention is a “stable equilibrium in a game that 
has two or more stable equilibria” (Sugden, 2004: 32). 
Stable equilibria are evolutionarily stable, which means that they are the result of 
iterated interactions among rational actors and cannot be destabilised by the adoption of 
alternative strategies. Society reaches an  evolutionarily stable  equilibrium when all its 
members,  or  almost  all  of  them,  follow  their  maximising  strategy.  Thus,  an 
overwhelming majority of a population has to adopt the conventional behaviour in order 
for the  convention to become established. The greater the number of individuals that 
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follow a  convention  the  more  likely  it  is  that  this  convention  will  expand,  until  it 
becomes a social  convention that is generally followed. The implication here is that 
conventions arise and become stable randomly and not so much because of individual 
rational deliberation. What matters is the establishment of a convention so as to regulate 
social interactions and avoid conflict and not the selection of a specific convention. In 
conclusion, the type of  convention and the  equilibrium point are not important. What 
matters in this  analysis  is their  becoming established and stable.  There are different 
types of conventions with various structures and equilibrium points.
Sugden  distinguishes  three  categories  of  conventions:  conventions  of 
coordination,  conventions of property and  conventions of reciprocity (Sugden, 2004). 
They are all  seen as equilibria of  repeated games whose purpose is social  peace by 
generating an understanding of justice. The break of conventional behaviour is viewed 
as unjust by those who follow it, as it is the convention in the first place that has created 
a sense of what is just. The breaking of a  convention for whatever reason, either by 
mistake or weaknesses of will or because it is deemed irrational, creates a feeling of 
injustice  to  others,  as  established  conventions  serve  as  social  behaviour  regulators. 
Since it is  rational to keep conventions as long as others keep them, it follows that is 
also rational for one to want others to keep the convention (Sugden, 2004).
Conventions  are  characterised  as  moral  and  rational:  “...conventions  are 
normally maintained by both interest and morality...” (Sugden, 2004: 155). They come 
about as the result of rational interaction, but rationality alone cannot sustain them. In a 
sense,  in  Sugden's  work  our  sense  of  morality  is  being  informed  by  established 
conventions, which are also the outcome of rational interactions. Moreover, since there 
is  no  equilibrium  selection  mechanism  provided,  an  established  convention  while 
maximising  for  its  members  may very  well  be  random,  not  moral.  In  other  words, 
rationality leads to conventions of justice through an arbitrary evolutionary path. In this 
respect, Sugden is close to Gauthier. They both justify a constrained rational behaviour 
that is not always maximising, based on interactions with other rational agents who are 
disposed to behave in the same way in Morals by Agreement, or have been behaving in 
the same way in  The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare  (2004). Sugden 
uses game theory more formally and extensively than Gauthier. This has an impact on 
his use of the idea of morality which is evidently more difficult to incorporate in formal 
analysis. Justice for Sugden is a side effect of the interactions between rational agents in 
an  evolutionary context. Thus  moral  behaviour is the outcome of  rationality and does 
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serve as its constraint. Morality is the result of spontaneous order that arises in the form 
of natural, and not designed, conventions. Sugden manages to show that it is plausible 
to assert that social order does not depend on an external enforcer and that conventions 
of justice are self-enforced once they become established. 
Although very plausible, the theory of  conventions proposed by Sugden does 
not offer an account of how conventions become established in the first place. However, 
Skyrms’s The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of the Social Contract (2004) focuses on the 
characteristics of the games and their  dynamic structure in attempting to explain how 
evolutionary equilibria develop. The following section will discuss  Skyrms's work by 
looking at his version of the stag hunt game and the subsequent importance of location, 
communication, association and coevolution.
3.3 The Stag Hunt 
Although The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of the Social Structure (Skyrms 2004) is not 
directly linked to Morals by Agreement or moral contractarianism in general, it can be 
used  to  advance  Gauthier’s  theory.  As  we  have  seen,  constrained  maximisation  is 
rational provided interactions occur between similarly disposed agents. In other words it 
is  rational for one to be disposed to behave as a constrained maximiser if one is in a  
group  of  constrained  maximisers.  Skyrms's  analysis  describes  a  similar  concept  of 
equilibria  that  depend  on  the  behaviour  of  a  critical  mass  of  agents  and  utility 
maximisation as a function of his neighbours' strategies.
In The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of the Social Contract (2004) the concepts 
of  morality  and  justice  that  are  central  in  MbA  are  replaced  by  cooperation  and 
cooperative equilibria.  Skyrms's main aim is not to show how morality can arise from 
rational premises but to argue that social  cooperative equilibria incorporate individual 
maximisation. The two theories have similar objectives, as Gauthier’s notion of morality 
is  closely  related  with  cooperation.  However,  the  cooperative  social  structure  in 
Skyrms’s case is the result of  evolutionary processes. For  Skyrms  rationality “is not 
necessary  for  solving  the  social  contract”  (Skyrms  2004:  xii),  but  on  the  contrary 
cooperative equilibria are the result of the correlated dynamics between social structures 
and  individual  strategies.  Despite  having  similar  aims  to  Gauthier,  Skyrms  adopts 
naturalistic  premises  about  individual  rationality,  social  interactions  and  the  social 
contract.
Social  contracts  are  present  in  the  animal  world  as  well.  Skyrms,  just  like 
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Aristotle and Hobbes before him, accepts that animal societies have solved the problem 
of peaceful coexistence by adhering to natural  social contracts, that is  social contracts 
that  are  defined  and  bound  by  the  natural  characteristics  of  each  species.  On  the 
contrary, human  social contracts are artificial and in conflict with human  nature since 
humans  are  naturally  rational  and  outside  family  and  social  circles  mutually 
unconcerned.  As  a  result,  they  realise  that  their  self-interest  is  threatened  by  the 
collective benefit and as Hobbes (1976) argued human social contracts fail because of 
rationality. In this respect, rationality threatens the stability of the social contract, which 
is sustained by the  dynamics of  social  structures.  Therefore, the use of  evolutionary 
theory  to  describe  human  interactions  and  the  social  contract  can  be  problematic, 
especially in context of rational choice theory. In addition, the prisoner’s dilemma game 
which is commonly used to describe social interactions, is not as effective in describing 
dynamic interactions within social groups as the stag hunt game.
 Unlike most  contractarians,  Skyrms uses the  stag hunt game in his analysis 
instead  of  the  prisoner’s  dilemma.  The  stag  hunt,  originally  an  allegory  used  by 
Rousseau,  is  “a  prototype of  the  social  contract”  (Skyrms,  2004:  1).  A tribe has  to 
decide  whether  they  should  hunt  stag  or  hare.  Stag  hunting  requires  everybody  to 
participate and is therefore a joint decision. If the tribe decides to hunt stag collectively, 
they  will  need  all  the  available  hunters  to  participate,  but  collective  action  is  not 
necessary  for  hare  hunting;  on  the  contrary  hare  hunting  implies  collective  action 
failure. Unlike the typical PD analysis, the stag hunt discusses a group of people thus 
making it easier to examine issues regarding collective and individual maximisation.
The  stag  hunt  example  shows  how  individual  rationality  contradicts  social 
welfare  and is  more  directly  linked  to  issues  of  free-riding.  The  cooperative  social 
contract is sustained if the tribe collectively hunts for stags. A stag hunt equilibrium can 
be destabilised by a large enough number of hare hunters. In a more realistic stag hunt 
one or very few defectors do not affect the success of the stag hunt, or in other words 
the stability of the social contract. The critical number of stag hunters needed depends 
on the formal representation of the game. However, the implication is that in order for a 
cooperative  social structure to be sustained, it is essential that a majority agrees and 
behaves according to the agreement. In this respect the stag hunt is a more appropriate 
type of game to be used in social explanation as it takes into account  populations and 
not just individuals. However, their differences are not as great as they seem at first. 
Repeated  interactions  between  two  individuals  can  be  described  by  the  PD  game 
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structure. Although, strictly speaking the PD game is not iterated, its pay-off structure 
can  be  used  to  examine  repeated  interactions.  In  this  case  benefit  from  future 
interactions becomes important. 
The term “shadow of the future” (Skyrms, 2004: 4) refers to the importance 
attributed to future interactions. Agents who believe it is important to maximise pay-offs 
in future interactions, are more likely to cooperate in the present. Those who perceive 
interactions as repeated will see the obvious advantage of participating in cooperative 
interactions.  Also known as  “future  discount  factor”,  the  shadow of  the  future  is  a 
central idea in repeated games. The smaller the future discount factor, the greater the 
importance of future interactions for the players. In the prisoners’ dilemma for instance, 
if the two prisoners expect to be arrested and to be offered the same deal again, it is 
more likely that they will  keep silent.  When taking into account  the shadow of the 
future, cooperation seems a more rational strategy and the games of the stag hunt and 
the prisoner's dilemma are similar. However, “[t]he shadow of the future has not solved 
the problem of  cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma; it  has transformed it  into the 
problem of cooperation in the stag hunt” (Skyrms, 2004: 6). 
Drawing  connecting  lines  between  the  two  games  is  important  because  it 
shows firstly that cooperation in a two person game can be examined in a group context 
and secondly that the premises underlying game theoretical models are more important 
than their formal description. By extension, individual  behaviour can be examined in 
conjunction with collective  behaviour with the help of a theory of cultural  evolution. 
Evolutionary  game  theory  describes  strategic  interaction  over  generations.  When 
individuals of the original generation cooperate, they will produce cooperators who will 
in turn cooperate eventually reaching a group or society where cooperation is the norm. 
Put differently, social contract games are played over generations. The game played by 
the original generation of a population affects the eventual equilibrium point reached 
after  several  generations.  Whether  this  will  be  a  cooperative  or  a  non-cooperative 
equilibrium  depends  on  whether  the  founding  generation  cooperated  or  defected. 
Therefore, the  stability of the  social contract depends on interactions that took place 
several generations earlier. 
Skyrms analyses how depending on factors that will be discussed later, both 
stag and hare hunting equilibria are possible and will be stable once established. Despite 
the stag hunt equilibrium being optimal, individuals can opt to hunt hare which is also 
an  equilibrium. In an  evolutionary context either  equilibrium is acceptable since they 
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are both stable.  Gauthier offers reasons for which constrained maximisation is rational 
but Skyrms's limits his argument to explaining how equilibria evolve. Although they are 
very similar in that they distinguish between two types of behaviour whose rationality 
depends on one's  neighbours,  the  evolutionary  account  focuses  on explaining  social 
structures.  Moreover,  Skyrms's  explanatory  model  is  based  on  the  coevolution  of 
strategies  and  social  structures  which  in  turn  depend  on  the  relative  location  of 
cooperators  and  defectors,  the  possibility  of  communication  and  the  subsequent 
association. These concepts will be discussed in the following sections.
3.3.1 Location 
The importance of “spatial structure, location and local interaction” (Skyrms, 2004: 15) 
is paramount for the theory presented in The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of the Social  
Structure (Skyrms, 2004). The relative location of stag or hare hunters in the stag hunt, 
changes the probability of reaching a stag hunt or a hare hunt equilibrium. A stag hunter 
whose neighbours are hare hunters will be forced to change behaviour and similarly a 
hare hunter will have to convert to  stag hunting in an environment dominated by stag 
hunters.  Individual  maximising  behaviour  depends  on  one's  environment  and  varies 
according to one's neighbours.
In  that  respect  we  can  distinguish  between  two  types  of  interactions: 
interactions  with  neighbours  and  interactions  with  strangers.  In  the  former  case  an 
individual adjusts her strategies by imitating successful strategies in her neighbourhood. 
In the latter case, interactions occur between individuals selected randomly from a large 
population.  In both cases there is a convergence of strategies towards those that are 
maximising; those who maximised in the first iteration will follow the same strategy in 
the future, whereas those who did not will change their strategy.
In  the  divide  the  dollar  game that  was  used  to  examine the  importance  of 
location in  equilibria selection, both types of interaction eventually lead to a  division 
that is near the fifty-fifty mark. The game consists of two players who have to divide a 
dollar, but they will only get a share if they agree on how much each should get. Being 
rational,  any  alternative  would  be  preferable  to  disagreement.  Rational  agents  will 
cooperate,  as long as they prefer the  cooperation outcome to the current status. The 
current status is the point of disagreement. Therefore, an agreement will be reached if 
the  bargainers’ utility  is  greater  after  the  agreement  than  before.  Interactions  with 
neighbours converge faster whereas interactions with strangers depend on the original 
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spatial arrangements. When interacting with strangers almost 60 percent of simulations 
lead  to  a  fifty-fifty  division  while  “[f]air  division  becomes  the  unique  answer  in 
bargaining with strangers if we change the question to that of stochastic stability in the 
ultra long run (Skyrms, 2004: 28). The divide the dollar game shows how the relative 
position of individuals provides significant insights into the evolution of equilibria.
Similar principles apply for the stag hunt game. The evolution of a stable social 
equilibrium depends on the spatial dynamics of stag and hare hunters. If the majority in 
the neighbourhood hunts hare then the few stag hunters will be converted, whereas in a 
neighbourhood or a population of  stag hunters, a single hare hunter will  change the 
equilibrium from all hunt stag to all hunt hare. Hare hunting is a risk free strategy as it 
does not require cooperation and thus it pays off irrespective of the behaviour of others. 
A hare hunter surrounded by  stag hunters will  change his  behaviour next  time they 
bargain. His close neighbours though, will also change to hare hunting. Therefore, after 
several  interactions,  hare  hunting  will  be  the  equilibrium.  In  terms  of  interactions 
between strangers hare hunting has a replication effect on the whole population. “Hare 
hunting is  contagious” (Skyrms, 2004: 36) and eventually  a single hare hunter  may 
change  the  social  equilibrium.  The  evolutionary  process  in  this  case  leads  to  a 
suboptimal social contract, which is however a sustainable equilibrium.
The  unambiguous  conclusion  is  that  “local  interaction  makes  a  difference” 
(Skyrms,  2004:  40)  in  equilibrium  selection.  In  addition,  equilibrium  selection  is 
affected by whether strategies are being imitated within a neighbourhood or replicated 
in a population. The cornerstone of the above spatial analysis is that social structure and 
repeated interactions matter more than individual rationality. Individuals imitate the best 
available  strategy not because of  rational deliberation but because of the  evolutionary 
dynamics in a given population. In any case, there is individual utility  maximisation 
even through an evolutionary analysis. In that respect, location can be seen in relation to 
Gauthier's disposition translucency. For  Gauthier it is  rational for one to constrain her 
maximisation  provided  others  are  disposed  to  do  the  same;  the  likelihood  that  a 
constrained maximiser will interact with others similarly disposed increases in a social 
group  that  consists  mostly  of  constrained  maximisers.  The  similarities  between 
disposition  translucency  and  the  rationality  of  constrained  maximisation  and  the 
evolutionary  dynamics  in  Skyrms's  analysis  should  become clearer  in  the following 
section discussing communication.
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3.3.2 Communication
Communication before the interactions is vital for the structure and the equilibrium of 
the game. Provided that pre-play communication was possible, a group of cooperators 
could invade and eventually take over a population of defectors, since communication 
in  this  context  ensures that  future  behaviour  can be agreed upon within a  group of 
co-operators. Communication does not solve the problem of compliance in a PD game, 
but in a stag hunt game – as described by Skyrms (2004) – it does make a cooperative 
equilibrium a more likely outcome. Since  cooperation is maximising in the long term 
and individuals can know that  others  cooperate,  it  is  in  everybody's  best  interest  to 
cooperate.  Therefore,  costless  pre-play  communication  is  important  in  evolutionary 
games. However, costless communication can only have an effect if the cooperators can 
signal  each  other  using  “a  secret  handshake”  (Skyrms,  2004:  66)  in  order  to  avoid 
misinformation.  In  other  words,  defectors  should  not  be  able  to  pretend  they  are 
cooperators. In this context, non-cooperative equilibria can shift to cooperative ones. 
Thus, the secret handshake is a type of behaviour the precedes interactions and shows 
that an agent is disposed to cooperate and also that she has cooperated in the past and as 
a result is aware of the secret handshake. By comparison to the account of disposition 
translucency presented  in  MbA,  the  secret  handshake does  not  require  an  ability  to 
predict the future or others' dispositions; in this respect it is a stronger argument for the 
possibility of identifying cooperators.
A non-cooperator can pretend to be willing to cooperate so as to take advantage 
of honest cooperators. There is no efficient way to detect liars and punishment can only 
take place after the fact.  Cheap talk can therefore be advantageous for those who are 
able  to  use  it  effectively  to  misrepresent  their  intentions.  Especially,  when 
communication is costless, their work is made easier. Therefore, the effectiveness of the 
secret handshake becomes essential for the establishment of cooperative equilibria. The 
original  claim  is  then  used  as  an  indication  of  one's  intentions  or,  put  differently, 
“disposition”. When players have the choice between demanding ½ or ,  they will⅔  
choose ½, as this will increase their chances of interacting. Demanding ½ means that 
they  will  be  more  attractive  than  those  demanding   in  an  interaction.  In  a  way,⅔  
cooperators advertise their intention to cooperate, which serves as the secret handshake 
mechanism (Skyrms, 2004). This is based on the same rationale as the MRC in Morals 
by Agreement, but the emphasis here lies on the importance of communication between 
the interacting agents.
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The  possibility  of  communication  before  the  game,  just  like  the  relative 
location of the players, makes a great difference in the outcome. Skyrms (2004) shows 
how  low  or  no  cost  communication  can  be  central  in  sustaining  a  cooperative 
equilibrium provided there is an effective secret handshake. Therefore, communication 
is  as  important  as  location  in  achieving  a  maximising  equilibrium.  A  stag  hunter 
surrounded by hare hunters will not attempt to cooperate, provided there is efficient 
communication. If both the provisions of location and communication are met, it is very 
likely that there will be an increasing number of stag hunters. This in turn will lead to a 
cooperative equilibrium. 
Again communication can be seen as an alternative to  Gauthier's disposition 
translucency. In Morals by Agreement it is asserted that rational agents are able to see 
others'  dispositions.  Skyrms replaces the need for  translucency with special signalling 
between agents, offering a more realistic solution to misinformation and dishonesty. The 
difference between the two analyses is that Skyrms takes into account social and group 
dynamics  whereas  in  Morals  by  Agreement the  focus  is  on  the  individual  and two 
person interactions. In this respect it seems more plausible to argue that agents within a 
group have developed a subtle code of communication that is known only to members 
of a group, rather than that they have the ability to know strangers' dispositions. 
In  Gauthier's  analysis  the  assumption  of  disposition  translucency  becomes 
more realistic if we take into account that constrained maximisers will rationally choose 
to interact repeatedly with other constrained maximisers. In other words they will form 
groups where constrained maximisation is generally adopted. In  Skyrms this notion is 
viewed through the concept of association which will  be described in the following 
paragraphs.
3.3.3 Association
Association refers to network formation. Stag hunters who communicate and are located 
close  to  each  other  will  create  networks  of  stag  hunting  equilibria.  Therefore, 
association is based on  location and communication which are essential requirements 
for successful network formation. In addition, association requires agents with learning 
abilities;  successful  interactions  are  repeated.  Skyrms examines association using an 
example of ten strangers in  a new  location visiting each other  (Skyrms, 2004).  The 
greater the pleasure derived from each interaction, the more likely it is that the visit will 
be repeated. This leads to certain individuals exchanging visits and making friends and 
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enemies  depending on the  pleasure  they derive  from each visit.  A visit  resulting  in 
higher pleasure – or utility – is more likely to be repeated. The contrary applies for a  
visit that is not pleasant. 
Moreover, a pleasant visit reinforces both individuals and makes it even more 
probable that the interaction will be repeated. Adding the concept of memories makes 
the example more realistic and plausible as it brings the ideal agent of the model closer 
to the characteristics of real persons and thus makes it easier for the model to be applied 
in, and become relevant to, real life situations. When an agent has a good memory of 
past interactions, she will be able to choose who she visits based on previous success. 
Even in the case where memory fades relatively quickly or interactions occurred a long 
time ago, we assume that individuals can have an account of their history of interactions 
and whether it has been mostly pleasant or not. Although not directly acknowledged, the 
example  with  strangers  exchanging  visits  is  reminiscent  of  the  Robinson  Crusoe 
allegory discussed by Gauthier, which shows how the rationale behind each analysis is 
to an extent similar. With it,  Skyrms shows how individuals with no history and free 
from outside constraints, form bonds as a result of repeated interactions. The stag hunt 
game  also  embodies  a  form of  reinforcement  of  behaviour;  stag  and  hare  hunters' 
behaviour  is  reinforced  when  they  interact  with  individuals  following  respective 
strategies.
Each  agent  has  the  opportunity  to  “look  around  and  if  another  strategy  is 
getting a better pay-off than his, then he imitates that one” (Skyrms, 2004: 106). This 
sentence encompasses the central point of the concept of association. The player has the 
option to imitate more successful strategies and strategies developed in different groups 
of interaction. The main argument here is that different strategies will lead to different 
equilibria and eventually different  social contracts. All interactions start from similar 
initial positions, but the final social contract depends on the agents’ choice of strategies, 
their  relative  position  and  the  ability  to  identify  each  other's  intentions  accurately. 
Location, communication and association all play a central role in the evolution of the 
social  contract  as  presented  by  Skyrms.  A  final  element  of  the  theory  is  their 
coevolution;  each one develops  in  parallel  with the  other  and affects  it;  as  a  result 
evolutionarily  stable  strategies  also  change  in  time.  With  each  new  iteration,  or 
generation  in  evolutionary  context,  the  parameters  have  changed  and  therefore  the 
maximising  strategies  have  to  adapt.  Coevolution  will  be  analysed  in  the  next,  last 
section on Skyrms's theory.
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3.3.4 Coevolution
Individuals who choose their strategy and the agents with whom they will interact, also 
affect the structure of the game. Therefore, there is a simultaneous evolutionary process 
by which maximising strategies develop in parallel with structural changes in social 
groups.  Association is paramount for the theory developed in  The Stag Hunt and the  
Evolution of the Social Structure (Skyrms, 2004) because it deals directly with strategy 
revisions and learning during the game.  Coevolution of structure and  strategy adds to 
association the fact that now agents are able to imitate  behaviour that is observed in 
their social group, even if they have not encountered it; “a player looks around, and if 
another  strategy is getting a better payoff that his is,  he imitates that one” (Skyrms, 
2006: 106). 
Coevolution  encompasses  the  previous  elements  of  the  theory  making  it  a 
plausible model  for actual social  interactions; individuals do change their  behaviour 
when they see someone else doing better or realise that interacting with new individuals 
will maximise their utility. Humans make friends and enemies based on the pleasure of 
their  interactions as described in the simulations; the more the interactions  continue 
being pleasant, the more the bonds between the interacting agents strengthen, creating 
social  structures  that  support  a  type  of  behaviour.  Location,  communication  and 
association provide a solid description of human  behaviour  that is  put in a realistic 
dynamic context with the concept of their coevolution.
The dynamic analysis of the social contract offered by Skyrms is more realistic 
than the static analyses found in moral contractarianism. Societies are dynamic in that 
individuals  change  behaviour  and  social  structures  shift  accordingly.  Evolutionary 
theory advances the theoretical models of contractarianism since its description of social 
structures  approximates  real  life  societies  more  accurately  than  normative  theories. 
Coevolution exhibits how the equilibrium in a stag hunt game depends on a variety of 
factors that have to be examined in conjunction in order to be meaningful.
The  stag  hunt  story  is  a  close  analogy  of  reality  although  it  still  is  an 
oversimplification of actual social contracts. In reality, one hare hunter (or defectors in 
the PD game) in a society of stag hunters (or cooperators), will not cause the breakdown 
of the  social structure. However, a critical number of defectors in the population can 
affect  the  stability  of  the  social  contract.  If  a  stag  hunting  social  contract  has  been 
established as an evolutionarily stable equilibrium it cannot be affected by a minority of 
defectors. However, contagion or free-riding is a problem. When all, or most hunt stag, 
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it pays to free ride by not hunting but participating in the distribution of the successful 
hunt. 
Free-riding behaviour in the long run is “fatal” (Skyrms, 2004: 121). Eventually 
it can cause the collapse of cooperative equilibria and lead to an all-hunt-hare situation. 
In a model such as Skyrms's, where social structure and its evolution are central for the 
argument, free-riding is a maximising strategy if the secret handshake safety mechanism 
can be bypassed.  However,  the same applies when the analysis  rests  exclusively on 
individual  rationality.  It is  rational for one to benefit  from the social  output without 
participating if he can get away with it. Thus, free-riding is central to any discussion of 
individual  rationality  in  the  context  of  social  interactions  and  poses  a  significant 
challenge to the possibility of a  rational morality, as it has been exhibited by Hobbes, 
Hume and  Gauthier.  Gauthier's  constrained  maximisation,  should it  be effective, can 
provide  a  more  convincing  answer  to  the  free-riding  problem  as  it  calls  for  an 
internalisation of cooperative behaviour (Gauthier, 1986). However, as was discussed in 
the  previous  chapter,  the  concept  of  internalisation  of  constrained  maximisation  is 
problematic. Free-riding and the possible  rational incentives against it will have to be 
analysed in Chapter Six where there will be an attempt to show how it is not rational in 
a repeated interactions framework.
The  theory  presented  in  The  Stag  Hunt  and  the  Evolution  of  the  Social  
Structure  (Skyrms, 2004) advances the  social  contract  tradition by enriching it  with 
evolutionary concepts. It is essential that its components, location, communication and 
association,  are  examined in  conjunction so that  it  becomes clear  how  evolutionary 
game theory can lead to cooperative social structures. The main conclusion is that there 
can be a society at a stag hunt evolutionary equilibrium, given enough time and repeated 
interactions.
Overall,  there  are  two significant  methodological  contributions  of  Skyrms's 
work in the contractarian tradition: first, by examining the stag hunt and the PD game he 
shows how games' structures and pay-offs are not as distinct as they seem at first and 
game theoretical premises can be used to explain social  behaviour without the need to 
refer  to  a  specific  game.  Secondly,  his  theory  shows  how  it  is  possible  to  use 
evolutionary  game  theory  to  describe  efficient  social  contracts.  Typically, 
contractarianism is based on individual rationality but in The Stag Hunt and the Social  
Contract (2004) it is shown that an  evolutionary account can be used to complement 
assumptions  of  rationality  without  necessarily  negating  them.  Implicitly,  agents  are 
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assumed to be boundedly  rational  since they can learn  and imitate  more successful 
strategies while participating in utility maximising interactions. Bounded rationality will 
be discussed more analytically in the following section and especially Chapters Four 
and Five as a tool of reconciling rational choice theory with evolutionary game theory in 
a contractarian framework.
Despite  being an innovative step in  evolutionary  contractarianism,  Skyrms's 
work is limited in that although it is an effective description of social structures, it does 
not  make  normative  suggestions.  By  comparison  to  Sugden's  analysis  of  social 
conventions which was discussed previously,  it  is  a more detailed account  of social 
behaviour but at the same time more limited in scope. An intellectual synthesis of these 
analyses could provide a deeper understanding of the social contract while at the same 
time  offering  normative  suggestions  about  individual  and  collective  behaviour. 
Binmore's work, which attempted to achieve just that in  Game Theory and the Social  
Contract (1998), will be examined in the following section.
3.4 Game Theory and the Social Contract
Binmore  advances  the  work of  Sugden and  Skyrms by examining social  behaviour 
through  evolutionary theory.  However,  his  work is much broader than  Sugden's  and 
more  complex that  Skyrms's.  He is  not  limited in  a  naturalistic  account  of  fairness 
conventions like Sugden, or simulation models like Skyrms's, but attempts to create an 
evolutionary  account  of  the  social  contract  theory,  following  mostly  the  tradition 
reinvented by  Rawls (Rawls, 2005). As a result  Binmore's is a naturalised normative 
theory of justice and not simply an explanatory model of cultural  evolution and social 
conventions.
Despite  the  fact  that  he  concedes  that  “…justice  is  an  exclusively  human 
phenomenon” (Binmore 2005: 11), many of the arguments are grounded on biological 
and  not  only  cultural  evolution.  For  Binmore,  human  genetic  identity  forces  us  to 
behave in certain ways which give rise to  conventions  of  behaviour that bound our 
social behaviour. Game Theory and the Social Contract (1998) is an attempt to create an 
evolutionary theory of  justice with cultural  evolution as part of  biological  evolution. 
Naturalists, like  Binmore, argue that natural sciences can be a valuable tool in social 
sciences and moral philosophy by offering significant insights into how social structures 
evolve. However, naturalism is the starting point as the final aim is the creation of a 
contractarian theory of justice.
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Binmore distinguishes between two kinds of games: the game of life which “is 
beyond our power to alter its rules at will” (Binmore, 1998: 4) and the game of morals  
which  refers  to  the  artificial  laws  of  morality.  The game of  life  is  modelled  as  an 
infinitely  repeated  interaction  between  two  players,  which  makes  it  likely  that 
reciprocity will emerge. The rational agents interacting in the game of life, in a state of 
nature similar to the one described in Leviathan (Hobbes, 1976), are indifferent between 
the game's multiple equilibria. The game of morals includes the moral principles that 
provide the mechanism to distinguish among the many equilibria of the game of life 
based on principles of fairness. Therefore, the game of morals is an extension of the 
game of life  whose players  have the ability  to  choose from additional  strategy sets 
(Binmore,  2005).  The moral  rules  are  decided behind a  Rawlsian veil  of  ignorance 
which ensures their fairness and these rules cannot contradict the natural laws of the 
game of life. In summary Binmore's games of life and morals include the following 
steps: two hypothetical rational agents interact in a state of nature in the game of life 
that has infinite iterations; the two agents bargain about the moral rules of their ideal 
society without knowing their identities in that society; the rules they will agree on are 
fair.  Using these steps,  Binmore introduces  evolutionary  game theory in a  Rawlsian 
framework that he argues ensures a fair social contract.
The original position is used as a mechanism to select a fair equilibrium. It is a 
useful tool to analyse bargaining but only because it is the result of combined biological 
and social evolution (Binmore, 1998). Therefore, although Binmore accepts the original 
position as the centrepiece of  contractarian theory, he does not see it from a Kantian 
perspective in contrast to  Rawls who also bases his theory on a similar concept and 
Harsanyi's  utilitarian  approach.  For  Rawls  and  Harsanyi  individuals  at  the  original 
position are behind a veil of ignorance, although their respective assumptions about the 
thickness of the veil are different. Since they do not know their position in the future 
society,  they  will  agree  on  a  fair  social  contract  (Rawls,  2005;  Binmore,  1989). 
However, for Binmore this means that they import necessary metaphysical claims in the 
theory.  For  him  the  perceived  fairness  of  original  position  mechanism lies  on  our 
common  evolutionary  history.  Moreover,  in  Binmore’s  original  position  the  veil  of 
ignorance  is  thinner.  Players  do  not  know  their  identities  but  they  do  know  their 
preferences. In this sense,  Binmore uses a  contractarian mechanism to derive rules of 
fairness that he has naturalised and justified as a mechanism of biological evolution.
The starting point for Binmore’s theory is a state of nature that is different from 
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Hobbes’s war of all against all or Locke’s more benign original state. We cannot and 
should not choose an ideal starting point when constructing a  social contract and we 
have to be realistic when considering the current status: “Like it or not, we are what 
history has made of us” (Binmore 2005: 25). Binmore's original position is the current 
state of society which makes his theory less controversial and more easily applicable to 
contemporary societies since it bypasses the criticism linked to the idea of an original 
position in contractarian theories.
Game Theory and the Social Contract (1998) describes a fair  social contract 
based on a theory of  rational  bargaining.  Thus,  game theory and  bargaining broadly 
perceived are central for  Binmore’s argument. Defining “[a] game is any situation in 
which people or animals interact.” (Binmore, 1998: 3) shows how game theory can be 
applied to almost  every aspect  of social  interaction irrespectively of assumptions of 
rationality or evolutionary stability. Again, this broad definition of game theory offers a 
more realistic and plausible account of human interactions as opposed to models of 
homo economicus or strictly evolutionary theory.
Game theory  and  bargaining  are  based  on  the  Nash programme:  the  Nash 
bargaining problem and the Nash solution. These can be illustrated with the use of the 
divide the dollar game which was discussed earlier. In this game, the disagreement point 
also defines the possible  bargaining outcomes.  Put differently,  if  the utilities  of two 
players A and B are respectively UA (XA, YA) and UB (XB, YB) at the disagreement point, 
then the bargaining should yield an outcome where their utilities will be UA*(XA*, YA*) 
and  UB (XB*,  YB*),  where  UA> UA*,  UB> UB*.  When  player  A’s  demand is  the  best 
response to player B’s, we have a Nash equilibrium point. Furthermore, rational agents 
will  always reach an  agreement that is  Pareto efficient.  A  Pareto optimal  agreement 
means that it  is impossible to reach a new  agreement without anyone’s utility being 
reduced. In a stable  contract  the  agreement  point is  a Nash  equilibrium that  is  also 
Pareto efficient.
Another  essential  feature of the Nash game is  that  both players make their 
demands  simultaneously.  This  means  that  they  will  have  to  make  sure  that  their 
demands lie in the bargaining set defined by UA* and Ub*. Failure to do so will result in 
the game breaking down and each player having to compromise with the status-quo or 
look for outside options, that is utility points that are outside the  bargaining set and 
therefore  suboptimal.  In  this  light,  commitment  is  central  to  the  Nash  bargaining 
programme. Players are assumed to select the best response and commit to it because it 
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is utility maximising. However, simultaneous demands imply that it is not possible to 
make counter offers.  Binmore argues that an alternating offers game variation of the 
Nash programme is  more realistic  where players  make their  offers  consecutively as 
times  passes  until  an  agreement  is  reached.  The  agreement  point  is  again  Nash 
equilibrium. Obviously, bargaining with consecutive offers occurs over time; after each 
offer, there is a time lapse before it is accepted or rejected. Therefore, in the Rubinstein 
model that has just been described, time and bargaining skills have a role. Patience, or 
in other words a small time discount factor, and efficient  bargaining skills will yield 
better long term results for a player. The weighted Nash equilibrium is thus identical to 
the  equilibrium  of  the  alternating  offers  game.  The  Nash  programmes  deals  with 
interactions between fully rational agents that reach a mutually beneficial  equilibrium. 
However, in repeated games the most significant problem is the selection of one optimal 
Nash equilibrium; in the literature this is solved with the folk theorem (Binmore, 1998).
The folk theorem shows that cooperation is sustainable in repeated games; “all 
interesting  outcomes  in  the  cooperative  payoff  region  of  a  one-shot  game are  also 
available as equilibria in an indefinitely repeated version of the game” (Binmore, 1998: 
265). Self-interested agents will cooperate in order to maximise their utility. Therefore, 
in repeated games reciprocity can substitute a central enforcing authority and sustain a 
stable social contract through individuals' rationality. Hence, reciprocal altruism can be 
sustained in large groups in the long term. In this context, reciprocal  behaviour can 
spread to the whole population when it  has been established as an  equilibrium in a 
group within  the  population.  When the  social  contract  is  seen  as  a  super-game,  its 
equilibrium is affected by the sub-game equilibria by means of transmission of efficient 
strategies. A meme is any  behaviour that is imitated and spreads from a group to the 
population. It is introduced by Binmore in order to explain how cooperation can become 
the  social  norm.  Memes  replicate  themselves  just  like  genes.  In  The  Selfish  Gene 
(2006), Richard Dawkins argued that evolution of species is based on the survival and 
evolution of the genes.  The analogy to social  science is that  social  contracts  evolve 
based on replicating cultural memes, that is types of behaviours that are more efficient.
Summing up, for Binmore biological evolutionary forces set the framework for 
cultural evolution. Humans are biologically programmed to live in small groups. This is 
why  moral  behaviour  is  a  rational  equilibrium when we are  faced with  small  scale 
coordination problems such as when we wait for an old lady to pass first from a short 
passage (Binmore, 2005). Game theory can show that the same applies on a large scale. 
65
Biological and cultural evolution are related to the social conventions we follow and the 
social  contracts  we use.  Biological  evolution made it  possible  for humans to  create 
societies and social contracts that manage social interaction. The rules of these contracts 
in primitive societies were very closely linked to the rules humans adhered to because of 
their biological needs. In time, more complex social contracts evolved to deal with the 
complexities of bigger societies. The two kinds of  evolution are interdependent. Any 
kind of cultural activity has to depend on our biological capabilities and limitations. The 
paths  and  limits  of  cultural  evolution  are  predefined  by  biological  evolution.  The 
relationship between biological and cultural evolution is examined through the games of 
life and morals.
The game of life is determined by our human nature. We cannot escape its rules 
any more that we can change our genes. The game of morals is used to help us select an 
equilibrium,  which  is  also  an  equilibrium in  the  game  of  life.  In  other  words,  the 
bargaining set of the game of morals is a subset of the bargaining set of the game of life. 
Our  genes  determine  the  bargaining  set  from  which  we  choose  a  social  contract. 
Therefore in a sense,  they set  the  bargaining limits.  Within those limits  we select a 
social contract that does not have to be fair. However, a fair social contract will always 
be in the bargaining set defined by the game of life. Within these bargaining sets, we use 
the bargaining procedure to move from one Nash equilibrium point to the next. Every 
consecutive point is Pareto superior to the previous one. Therefore, we move from the 
status-quo to a Nash equilibrium – Pareto optimal point. The social contract at that point 
should be a fair social contract. 
In other words, Binmore's core argument is that we are able to solve every day 
small scale coordination problems using norms of fairness, because these norms are part 
of our genetic heritage. If it were not, every simple interaction would result in conflict 
or  at  least  in  costly  bargaining.  The  issue  here  is  how  to  move  from  one-to-one 
coordination to large group coordination. Evolution has not equipped the human race 
with a mechanism for this. And this is where rational choice theory can be most useful 
to moral philosophy. If it can be shown that it is rational to cooperate on a large scale 
the same way as we cooperate in small groups, then moral norms can be generalised. In 
conclusion, cultural evolution leads to a fair social contract, which is supported both by 
the  rationality  of  the  contractors  and  the  evolutionary  stability  of  the  biological 
evolution. Binmore bases his argument on the theories of cultural evolution introduced 
by Sugden and Skyrms and expands by introducing a contractarian framework as it was 
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used by Rawls. However, his argument also incorporates the weak points of the theories 
he uses in addition to the inherent complexity of his work. In the following section the 
main points of criticism for the inclusion of evolutionary concepts in moral philosophy 
will be examined, attempting to show the limitations of the approach and set the scene 
for  the  next  chapter  that  will  discuss  a  possible  alternative  of  a  convention  based 
evolutionary contractarianism.
3.5 Criticism
The three theories presented above can be examined as a whole since they share many 
common concepts.  The main idea is that  social  contract theory can be grounded on 
evolutionary  game theory  with  naturalistic  elements.  Moreover,  there  is  a  common 
underlying principle that conventions and norms evolve as a result of social interaction. 
Sugden, Skyrms and Binmore represent a distinct field of synthesis of moral philosophy 
and  evolutionary theory. In this light, criticisms of each author often apply to a great 
extent to the work of the others as well. The following review of the criticism will be 
organised  per  author;  however,  it  will  become clear  that  most  of  the  problems  are 
common to all three theories. 
Sugden has been criticised for not making explicit references to any form of 
government (Hamlin, 1987) as there is no external enforcer in his theory. But this line of 
criticism seems to be missing the point of The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and  
Welfare  (Sugden, 2004) and to a certain extent of the literature on  evolutionary  social 
contract  theory.  Sugden’s  intention  was  to  construct  a  theory  with  no  need  for  an 
external enforcer, or at least a theory where government is a secondary factor. Rational 
conventions  for  Sugden  sustain  themselves,  simply  because  they  evolve  and  are 
followed by rational individuals. Moreover, Sugden claims that we follow conventions 
because we are expected to do so. We behave morally because we care about what 
others think of us which is what sustains conventions and turns them into norms. From a 
rational  choice  theory  perspective,  the  argument  can  be  problematic.  There  is  no 
justification as to why we would care about what others would think if we broke a 
convention. The explanation given lies in psychology and its justification “is about the 
psychology of morals” (Sugden, 2004: 153). However, this is an apparent weakness. 
Sugden was the first to apply ideas of  biological  evolution in social theory. This has 
drawn criticism of the plausibility of his ground-breaking theory and the possibility of 
using  evolutionary accounts in a normative theory. The main problem, common to all 
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theories examined here, is the conflict between rational agents who are responsible for 
their  behaviour  and  individuals  who  follow  conventional  rules  that  are  explained 
through  evolutionary  game  theory.  Sugden's  theory  focuses  on  groups  following  a 
convention  and  there  is  no  explanation  about  how  conventions  of  different  groups 
converge to one social norm. The same criticism applies to Skyrms's work as well. The 
premises of their theories are very similar in that their focus is individual  behaviour 
within groups and how social equilibria affect it. 
Simpson (2004) provides the most comprehensive criticism of The Stag Hunt  
and the Evolution of the Social Structure (Skyrms, 2004). He argues that Skyrms does 
not provide a model of how cooperation was initiated that is convincing enough. For 
Skyrms (2004), a group of people decided to hunt stag, and once it became obvious stag 
hunting  yields  a  higher  pay-off,  it  became  the  norm.  However,  Skyrms  does  not 
examine how the group came to hunting stag in the first place; the given social group 
may  have turned  to  hare  hunting  just  as  easily.  The  stag  hunt  is  probably  a  better 
example  than  the  prisoner's  dilemma  when  we  think  about  cooperation  in  society. 
However, in a realistic setting it is not always straightforward to decide who actually 
participated in the hunt. In other words, Skyrms’s model does not deal with free-riding 
and collective action issues effectively. 
Similarly, although in evolutionary models such as Skyrms's, stag hunting is 
contagious, the same does not have to apply in human societies where individuals have 
the capacity to deliberate and reflect before deciding on a strategy. Both stag hunt and 
hare hunt are Nash equilibria; the optimal outcome is to hunt hare if everybody hunts 
hare and hunt stag if everybody else hunts stag. However in reality, where individuals 
are at least reasonable, it is best to hunt hare when everybody else hunts stag, or put 
differently “the chances of a successful deer hunt go up sharply with the number of 
hunters” (Skyrms, 2004: 1). A hare hunter can be a recipient of the stag distribution and 
thus maximise his utility. This line of criticism is a significant drawback given that 
Skyrms's theory aspires to describe social life in general and not just small group 
behaviour. The models in The Stag Hunt and Evolution of the Social Contract (2004) 
are based on computer simulations of the evolution of bacteria. These are then used to 
derive conclusions about the evolution of the social structure in human societies, 
assuming that human individual behaviour is similar to the evolutionary behaviour of 
mindless agents. Even if this holds true in most cases, once more there is no discussion 
about the side effects of human rationality and egotistic behaviour. In sum, Skyrms's 
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evolutionary models fail to provide convincing arguments about how human 
individuality can be incorporated in evolutionary accounts of behaviour.
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of the Social Structure (Skyrms, 2004) offers 
a robust explanation of how social structure evolves to reach a stable  social contract. 
Moreover,  it  analyses  how  behaviour  observed  locally  can  influence  the  eventual 
equilibrium and how the strategies adopted by one individual can have an effect on the 
group.  Skyrms's analysis, unlike  Sugden's, relies heavily on laboratory experiments as 
opposed to  Sugden's however it is clear that they lie in the same intellectual tradition. 
Therefore,  they  are  open  to  similar  criticism whose  main  point  has  to  do  with  the 
assumption  of  rationality  in  evolutionary  accounts  of  the  social  contract.  In  both 
theories agents of limited  rationality are implied or assumed as opposed to the more 
traditional assumption of  rationality that is adopted by  Gauthier. In that respect, there 
has to be an examination of how a more realistic account of individual rationality can fit 
in the evolutionary model. Binmore has advanced the evolutionary account of the social 
contract tradition in that respect, but his theory has also been heavily criticised. This 
criticism will be reviewed in the following paragraphs, where the main lines of criticism 
will be listed.
The  theory  of  Game Theory  and  the  Social  Contract  (1998)  has  not  been 
extensively reviewed. Its most analytical criticism comes from Sugden (2001). The first 
criticism is of the organisation of the content in Game Theory and the Social Contract  
(1998).  There are many repetitions and it  is especially difficult  to follow  Binmore’s 
argument.  As  Sugden notes  “[t]he problem for  the conscientious reader  is  to  find a 
canonical  statement  of  Binmore's  core  argument.”  (Sugden,  2001:  F215).  Binmore 
addresses a complicated issue and his writing makes it  even more complicated.  His 
argument lacks “clarity, brevity, sensitivity” (Sugden, 2001: F214) and often it becomes 
incomprehensible. 
Furthermore, “Binmore practices social science as a branch of mathematics” 
(Sugden, 2001: F219) as he argues as if there is one absolute truth in political theory, in 
the same way as there is one correct solution for each mathematical problem. However, 
he does not, and possibly cannot, use mathematical formulas to establish a theory of 
fairness that is generally accepted, without using solid philosophical arguments at the 
same time. Binmore is a naturalist. He therefore has to naturalise rational choice theory 
but he fails to do so convincingly. His arguments for showing that the outcomes of 
evolution and rational deliberation of individuals will be the same are at best confusing. 
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The introduction of cultural memes is heavily criticised by  Sugden (2001) as well as 
Riley (2006), as he does not explain how memes replicate and how much room they 
leave for individual  rationality. Probably, memes work similarly to  social  conventions 
but this is not discussed by Binmore. But, just like conventions, memes are products of 
cultural evolution, which are selected by societies of rational individuals. 
As opposed to Gauthier who in Morals by Agreement goes to great lengths in 
discussing how he perceives rationality, before laying out his theory, Binmore does not 
explain  his  views  on  rationality  and  its  connection  with  evolutionary  theory  in  an 
unambiguous way. Furthermore, in  Binmore's analysis it is not made clear how much 
each person is free to act at will and how much otherwise rational agents are constrained 
by memes and biology. While the theory uses rational choice premises, there is a strong 
naturalistic and deterministic aspect to it. We are either guided by our  rational utility 
maximisation,  or  we  are  slaves  of  our  genes  and  the  memes  that  guide  our  social 
behaviour. It seems that the implication is that the two can be reconciled. But they are 
not in a clear and effective way, which adds to the confusion. 
The  folk  theorem,  which  has  a  central  role  in  Binmore’s  game  theoretical 
argument, requires people to have a long term horizon for their behaviour. It is only 
when individuals have a small future discount factor that there will be Nash equilibria in 
repeated games, but there is no explicit justification to be found in Binmore's argument 
as  to  why  rational  agents  would  have  a  small  future  discount  factor.  An  implied 
response could be that, humans care about the survival of their genes. Therefore they 
care about  their  offspring surviving in  a  similar  relationship they care about  family 
members. But then this poses questions about the rational choice theory premises of the 
argument. Binmore argues that we solve everyday coordination problems using fairness 
norms. Yet, he does not provide any evidence for this. Apparently we do so in some 
cases, but there is no solid empirical evidence provided to support this claim (Gintis, 
2000).  Use of  anthropological  evidence for  fairness  norms from primitive societies, 
although useful cannot always be transferred to modern, more populous societies and in 
addition it is not always possible to show that specific topical norms are not the result of 
specific topical conditions. There are as many examples showing that we do not use 
fairness norms in minor  coordination problems of everyday life. Strangers have silly 
arguments  and  rudeness  in  public  spaces  is  a  common phenomenon.  Binmore  uses 
examples that are anecdotal and intuitive to promote very bold arguments about the 
relationship of biology and rationality. 
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Similarly, Binmore dismisses Kantian normative philosophy because it is based 
on intuition. He accuses  Harsanyi and  Rawls of basing their theories on metaphysical 
claims  as  they  do not  propose  a  mechanism that  will  enforce  the  agreement  at  the 
original position. However,  Binmore's naturalistic approach to morality is not any less 
contradicting. Our genes are important and determine our  behaviour, but it cannot be 
shown to what extent this is true. In addition, even more paradoxically Binmore uses the 
original position and a veil of ignorance to derive principles of  fairness. Therefore, it 
seems that Binmore criticises the Kantian tradition only to borrow some of its aspects 
that he sees as useful, without further explanation.
Moreover,  in  Game  Theory  and  the  Social  Contract (1998)  there  are  many 
appeals to anthropological evidence, specifically from primitive societies. However, the 
use of actual anthropological evidence is limited despite many references to primitive 
societies'  fairness norms. According to  Binmore,  primitive,  small  scale  societies can 
allow us to see how  fairness is perceived when social interaction is basic, before the 
development of complex production and property relationships. But anthropology can 
be useful in more ways. There is a wealth of anthropological and historical data that 
allows us to have a very good understanding of past societies and their social contracts. 
In fact there is no reason why we cannot use this instead of experiments on human 
behaviour (Kitcher, 2011). This would allow us to see the evolution of social contracts 
in  the  very  long  term,  in  realistic  historical  circumstances,  as  opposed  to  in  the 
laboratory environment used in social science experiments.
Moreover,  laboratory  experiments  examining  human  behaviour  in  a  social 
context cannot be trusted. Individuals in the laboratory will not behave naturally since 
they know they are being watched and we cannot be certain they will not alter their 
behaviour. Natural scientists control for the effect light has on particles, so as to have 
unbiased results. For social scientists it is not as straightforward to control external to 
the  experiment  factors  as  human  are  immensely  more  complicated;  Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle (Hilgevoord & Uffink, 2012) holds in the social science laboratory 
as well.  Unlike natural sciences,  social  science has not yet come up with a way to 
control for behaviour changes.  Individuals being observed in the laboratory will  not 
necessarily behave the same way as in society. Laboratory results do not provide a long 
enough time frame or a big enough population. 
A typical experiment may take at most several days. However, people change 
over  the  course  of  their  lives  and  their  behaviour  depends  on  their  circumstances. 
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Experiments cannot test for behaviour changes over time and under different personal 
circumstances.  Moreover,  laboratory experiments  are  difficult  to  test  how behaviour 
changes when group size increases since collective action problems have a central place 
in  social  science.  Evolutionary  game  theory  is  not  as  experiment-based  as  other 
branches of game theory. If we could use historical and anthropological evidence as a 
laboratory for cultural  evolution, we would be able to have some rough idea on how 
social evolution works in the long term and in the real world.
Part of the criticism for the use of game theory in moral philosophy is similar to 
the criticism of game theory in general. The mathematical field of game theory is still 
developing and as of now there is no single game to describe all types of social 
interaction. Sugden proposes three categories of games that include most social activity. 
Skyrms (2004) suggests that the stag hunt is most appropriate without dismissing the 
prisoners’ dilemma. Binmore finally, examines a range of games. This is not necessarily 
a criticism. However, a simplified all-encompassing game theoretical model would be 
much easier to accept and work with. If more than one game is needed to describe 
human behaviour then it follows than more than one theory is required to cover all 
aspects of social interaction, which in turn can mean that the theories can be in tension. 
Game theory has not developed sufficient tools so that a single game will be able to 
represent all versions of the social contract. This is probably the greatest shortcoming of 
using game theory in moral philosophy. Although it is not necessarily true that the sole 
aim of game theory and its use in the humanities is to provide a unified model of social 
interactions, to a large extent a single commonly accepted game theoretical paradigm 
would make game theory a more prominent method of discussing social interactions. In 
addition, despite its restrictions and limitations, a game theoretical model can be used 
across all social science sub-fields and seems more promising in unifying social science 
than any alternative (Varoufakis, 2008; Gintis, 2009). Game theory tools are not 
advanced enough to describe complicated social interactions. The majority of game 
theoretical models discuss interactions between two agents for simplicity. However, 
game theory does not provide us with sufficient tools to discuss collective action and 
coalition building.
The evolutionary accounts of social interaction offered by Sugden, Skyrms and 
Binmore  –  despite  the  innovation  and  the  advances  they  can  offer  to  contractarian 
theories  such  as  Gauthier's  –  are  problematic  in  respect  to  the  reconciliation  of 
collective  and  individual  rationality.  Sugden  and  Skyrms  allow  for  low  rationality 
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agents,  which  is  incompatible  with  Gauthier's  theory.  Binmore  attempts  a  more 
ambitious  synthesis  with  mixed  results,  which  is  however  an  extremely  significant 
advance in the field and can be used as a sign post to the right direction.
3.6 Conclusion
Evolutionary contractarianism can be viewed as a new field within political and moral 
philosophy. So far it has not solved any problems of social organisation. However the 
combination of mathematics, economics and political philosophy is promising. Valuable 
insights  can  be  gained  by  the  use  of  other  sciences  concepts,  such  as  psychology, 
anthropology and history. All three scholars discussed here aim at creating a theory of 
fairness based on interdisciplinary premises. They employ different methods, but they 
all accept similar premises. In Binmore’s words “the science of fairness has hardly been 
born” (Binmore, 2005: 197). Although Binmore apparently refers to axiomatic analysis 
of social interaction, the science of  fairness can also be taken as a method to derive 
morality out of rationality. In this respect the science of fairness was born with Morals 
by Agreement.
An effective synthesis of traditional  contractarianism with  evolutionary  game 
theory can provide a more plausible account of social interaction. Binmore has made the 
boldest steps towards this direction, but not necessarily the most the successful one. His 
theory is not easy to follow and has no clear normative conclusion despite his claims. 
There are valuable innovations in rational contractarianism though that can be used in 
the future. Therefore, it seems that, if  Gauthier’s theory is enriched with the work of 
Sugden,  Skyrms and  Binmore it will be able to give a realistic explanation of  social 
contracts.  Our  better  understanding  of  this  field  can  then  lead  to  a  normative  and 
explanatory science of rational choice. 
In the field of  evolutionary moral philosophy, we can say that all games are 
infinitely repeated.  Every single interaction can be seen as a  sub-game of a  greater 
game, which is played over the generations and in groups within the population. In this 
context, similarly to  biological  evolution that does not stop, cultural  evolution can be 
seen as  an  infinitely  iterated process.  A  Pareto  efficient,  Nash  equilibrium does  not 
necessarily have to be a permanent  equilibrium. Put differently,  cooperative equilibria 
can be seen as  evolutionary steps towards a superior  equilibrium. Equilibria may be 
destabilised by factors outside the game and in these cases, there is a need for selecting 
a new agreement point.
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Within  this  evolutionary  context  describing  social  structures  and  group 
behaviour,  individual  rationality  becomes  paramount  in  selecting  equilibria  and  the 
direction of social evolution. The next chapters will focus on the discrepancies between 
individual  rationality  and collective action and the means with they can be used in 
conjunction. To that end, heterodox economics represented by authors such as  Young 
(2001),  Gintis  (2009) and Bowles (2011) offer  a  more realistic  account  of bounded 
rationality  that  can  be  used  in  evolutionary  theory  without  loss  of  individuality.  A 
conventional  account  of  boundedly  rational  individuals  within  a  framework  of 
evolutionary dynamics can incorporate concepts from Gauthier's moral contractarianism 
– such as  constrained  maximisation – with  evolutionary  game theory as it  has been 
developed by Sugden, Skyrms and Binmore.
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4. Rationality and Evolutionary Theory
The aim of this chapter is to show how constrained maximisation in Gauthier’s theory 
can be reformulated using concepts from evolutionary theory.  Gauthier, in  Morals by  
Agreement  (1986), attempted to create a theory of  moral  behaviour based on  rational 
premises. The extent to which he has been successful is debatable. Many of his critics, 
especially those coming from Economics, accuse him of polluting rational choice theory 
with moral principles in order to construct a theory that is only ostensibly a theory of 
rational morality. His theory could have been more coherent and consistent in terms of 
its  rational choice premises, if it did not use any pseudo-rational elements that are in 
effect moral. One of the concepts of the theory that has been criticised as importing 
moral consideration into rational deliberation is constrained maximisation.
Constrained  maximisation  constitutes  the  cornerstone  of  the  Gauthier 
programme.  By  introducing  it  he  attempts  to  show  that  moral  behaviour  can  be 
grounded on rationality. The rest of the theory in Morals by Agreement is based on the 
plausibility and effectiveness of  constrained maximisation.  Gauthier's argument is that 
mutual constrained maximisation is rational in that it maximises individual utility while 
maximising social welfare at the same time. An interaction between two  constrained 
maximisers (CMs) is rational. However, the trouble with it is that it is not convincing to 
argue  that  it  is  always  rational  for  a  self-interested  individual  to  constrain  her 
maximisation. The  rationality of the  behaviour of a CM is problematic on two counts 
that are evident in  Gauthier's definition of a constrained maximiser: “a person who is 
disposed to comply with mutually advantageous moral constraints, provided he expects 
similar compliance from others” (Gauthier 1986: 15). The first problem has to do with 
the  plausibility  of  disposition  translucency  which  is  an  essential  requirement  for 
constrained maximisation being rational. The second problem stems from the fact that 
constrained  maximisation requires agents to comply with constraints that can only be 
characterised as moral, which attracts criticism from proponents of a theory of morals 
exclusively based on rational premises. 
In the following section, constrained maximisation will be discussed in light of 
evolutionary dynamics and there will be an attempt to show how an evolutionary theory 
of  conventional  behaviour  can  smooth the  moral  edges  in  the  theory  of  Morals  by  
Agreement. 
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4.1 Why evolutionary theory
Evolutionary theory can offer significant insights and strengthen moral contractarianism 
by inserting a holistic  approach into the traditionally individualistic  approach of the 
paradigm. Specifically, in  Morals by Agreement,  at least implicitly, there is a strong 
relationship  between  individual  rationality  and  social  structures.  This  relationship 
becomes  clearer  when  discussing  the  rationality  of  constrained  maximisation.  The 
rationality of  constrained  maximisation  depends on agents employing a joint  strategy 
and acting on their  dispositions; merely forming those dispositions is not enough for 
constrained maximisation to be a rational strategy. 
4.1.1 Evolution
The  requirement  for  employing  a  joint  strategy  exhibits  how  the  rationality  of 
constrained maximisation is conditional upon the behaviour of others. It is essential that 
a CM “makes reasonably certain that she is among like-disposed persons before she 
actually constrains her direct pursuit of maximum utility” (Gauthier, 1986: 169). The 
rationality  of  constrained  maximisation  is  affected by an agent's  environment,  or  in 
other words an agent's neighbourhood (Skyrms 2004). Moreover, a CM has to form a 
disposition to act and actually act upon it. Perhaps more realistically, this means that 
rational  individuals will  not form  dispositions unless they are certain that it  will  be 
rational  for  them  to  act  accordingly.  However,  the  real  problem  with  Gauthier's 
emphasis  on  dispositions  is  related  to  their  supposed  translucency.  Constrained 
maximisation is based on the assumption that agents’ dispositions will be visible and 
that rational agents will only constrain their  maximisation when interacting with those 
similarly  disposed.  Although  not  explicitly  acknowledged  in  Morals  by  Agreement,  
constrained maximisation implies repeated interactions and requires the occurrence of a 
network or a social structure of CMs. Repeated interactions and social group dynamics 
are better studied by evolutionary theory.
Embedded in the concept  of  constrained  maximisation is  the idea of a small 
future  discount  factor.  CMs  must  have  a  small  discount  factor  so  as  that  their 
constraining  maximisation  behaviour  can  be  defensible  from  a  traditional  rational 
choice perspective; rational agency as described by economic theory and game theory 
cannot  allow  for  a  rational  agent  to  limit  her  maximisation  and,  in  this  respect, 
Gauthier's  account  of  constrained  maximisation  is  not  rational.  Together  with  joint 
strategy, another key component of constrained maximisation, they can be used in the 
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context of  repeated games. A rational agent will cooperate with someone who is also 
disposed to  cooperate  in  order  to  share  a  cooperative  surplus.  The dividend of  this 
surplus has to be greater than the outcome of non-cooperative  behaviour. When two 
agents expect to interact again in the future, cooperation becomes more likely and future 
maximisation is a  rational choice. In conclusion, the traditional  rational choice theory 
paradigm calls  for  immediate  maximisation  while  it  does  not  take  into  account  the 
dynamics of repeated interactions. If we allow for repeated non-random interactions, the 
rationality of constrained maximisation in a prisoner's dilemma game is defensible.
An  evolutionary analysis of individual  behaviour can replace  Gauthier's moral 
constraints with a more plausible account of why  rational agents become  constrained 
maximisers; individuals act within certain social constraints and are influenced by them, 
similarly to agents restricted by evolutionary forces. Rational agents’ behaviour can be 
shown to be bounded by social conventions which are the result of repeated interactions. 
The  dynamics  of  the  development  and  sustainability  of  social  conventions  are  best 
explained with the use of  evolutionary  game theory. The analysis of  conventions and 
social structures is central in Sugden's work (Sugden, 2004), and very important for the 
arguments made by Skyrms (Skyrms, 2004) and Binmore (Binmore, 1998), which were 
discussed in Chapter Three.  Moreover,  it  needs to be clarified that the evolutionary 
convention  analysis  presented  here  serves  as  complementary  and  reinforcing  of 
Gauthier's moral contractarianism and not as its replacement, as it might seem at first 
sight. Despite the use of evolutionary theory, individual  rationality remains the main 
assumption of the analysis and the basis for the argument.
The  social contract and its  bargaining process can be seen in an  evolutionary 
context of repeated interactions that generate social dynamics. In Game Theory and the  
Social Contract (1998) Binmore explains how pre-play bargaining is in essence part of 
the  game and therefore the  bargaining process  and the game itself  can  be analysed 
together as a single game. In addition, the secret handshake mechanism analysed in The 
Stag  Hunt  and  the  Evolution  of  the  Social  Contract  (Skyrms,  2004)  exhibits  how 
pre-play  communication  can  have  the  form  of  actions  as  well  as  claims  during 
bargaining.  Therefore,  in  the  evolutionary  account,  bargaining  in  the  context  of 
contractarianism occurs as agents' actions. For instance, the disposition for cooperation 
is known from an agent's history and her verbal commitment is irrelevant once her past 
interactions  are  known.  In  conclusion,  evolutionary  game  theory  can  reinforce 
contractarian arguments such as Gauthier's and justify moral  behaviour with explicitly 
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rational premises that derive from the dynamics of social structures.
4.1.2 Evolutionary game theory
The problem with incorporating evolutionary concepts in a rational choice framework is 
that evolutionary game theory assumes agents of limited rationality or organisms with 
no  capacity  for  reason.  Evolutionary  game  theory  studies  populations  and  not 
individuals and this makes it difficult to fit into the traditional rational choice paradigm. 
However, assuming that an action is considered rational when it leads to maximisation, 
individuals  maximise  –  and  thus  are  assumed  to  be  rational  –  when  they  adopt  a 
maximising  strategy, irrespective of whether  their  behaviour  is  the result  of  rational 
deliberation or imitation.  In this sense therefore,  they are being  rational by learning 
through a trial and error process and imitating more successful strategies. Moreover, the 
traditional expected utility model is not essential for the account of rational agents used 
here. Agents look back in past interactions when deciding their future behaviour, instead 
of trying to adopt maximising strategies for the future based on complete information 
and perfect rationality. 
Agents are neither hyper-rational nor mindless cyphers and this does not have to 
mean  rational  choice  theory  or  evolutionary  game theory  (EGT)  cannot  be  used  to 
examine their  behaviour;  “they gather information and the act fairly sensible on the 
basis of their information most of the time” (Young, 2001). Furthermore, rational agents 
reflect on the outcomes of different evolutionary processes and select the best, based on 
rational calculations. Finally, rational agents can select to participate in an evolutionary 
process, when this maximises their utility; they realise that participating in this process 
will  eventually  maximise  their  pay-off.  Alternatively,  they  can  abstain  from  social 
interactions  or  not  follow what  is  deemed rational  behaviour  by  most;  for  instance 
defecting in a society of cooperators. In this sense, it is possible to use the evolutionary 
paradigm without abolishing rationality. 
An additional feature of the rational agents described here is that individuals in 
the first generation (or during the first iteration of a repeated interaction) analyse their 
strategy  and  try  to  maximise  their  utility  by  trying  new  strategies  until  a  stable 
equilibrium  is  reached.  Individuals  who  are  part  of  a  population  described  by 
evolutionary  game  theory  remain  conditionally  rational.  If  they  realise  that  the 
evolutionary  strategy in which they participate is not stable or maximising, they have 
the  rational  capability  to  start  interacting  with  new  agents  using  new  strategies. 
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Initiating new interactions means of course that the past behaviour of individuals will 
not be known for a time; however, the absence of information at the beginning of a 
series of interactions is mutual and therefore does create a disadvantage for any one 
party. The assumption of repeated interactions ensures that complete, or near complete 
information  is  a  more  plausible  assertion.  Individuals  can  have  knowledge  of  their 
group's history and hence know who has cooperated in the past. In repeated interactions, 
especially within small groups, individuals get to know each other’s behaviour and form 
expectations accordingly. Cooperators will choose to interact with other cooperators or 
not participate in interactions. Similarly, groups develop a reputation of cooperative or 
non-cooperative equilibria; this adds new force to  Gauthier's above quoted stipulation 
that a CM will know that he is among other CMs.
Importing  rationality in an  evolutionary model is at best controversial.  Sugden 
(Sugden, 2001) has been very critical of the approach used by both Binmore and Young 
who  attempted  to  combine  classical  with  evolutionary  game  theory.  With  these 
exemptions, EGT has been used formally to examine economic and social  behaviour 
without  dealing  with  foundational  issues  of  its  application  in  social  behaviour.  For 
Sugden EGT remains as theoretical as classical game theory, being unable to take into 
account the empirical reality of human  behaviour.  Sugden's  central  point  is  that  the 
assumption of rationality has not been dropped in the evolutionary account but instead 
is being smuggled in. Thus, the use of EGT is being based on mistaken presuppositions. 
Sugden does not criticise the use of  EGT but the way it is being used;  evolution has 
been adjusted to economic theory and not vice versa. 
Sugden proposes an account of  evolutionary history, which is much closer to 
biology and therefore more accurate from an evolutionary standpoint, to help us make 
sense  of  social  behaviour;  “a  crucial  feature  of  evolutionary  explanation  [is]  that 
historical  contingencies  are  important”  (Sugden,  2001:  10).  Cultural  EGT has  to  be 
empirical  as  well  as  theoretical  and  in  order  to  achieve  this;  it  has  to  take  into 
consideration actual historical facts just like biology takes into consideration empirical 
evidence.  “A  genuinely  evolutionary  approach  to  economic  explanation  has  an 
enormous  amount  to  offer”  (Sugden,  2001:  16),  should  it  be  used  sensibly  with 
reference to its premises and not just its formal models.
4.1.3 Conclusion
The  paragraphs  above  attempted  to  explain  why  EGT can  be  used  as  a  tool  for 
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Gauthier's  constrained  maximisation  and  looked  at  some  of  the  problems  with 
incorporating evolutionary ideas in moral contractarianism. The following sections will 
expand on this analysis in order to show how  evolutionary  game theory and holistic 
explanations of human behaviour can be incorporated in a contractarian framework that 
is based on individual rationality. Rationality and evolutionary game theory have to be 
shown to be complementary (at least in some respects). The next section will discuss the 
concept  of  rationality  and  how  relaxing  some  of  the  assumptions  of  economic 
rationality  and  accepting  a  more  realistic  account  of  bounded  rationality  can  allow 
individual rationality to be examined in an evolutionary framework.
4.2 Rationality
The  following  paragraphs  will  examine  an  alternative  concept  of  rationality  to  the 
traditional  rationality of  homo economicus (Heath 2011). The main conditions remain 
the same, however some of the unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical economics are 
relaxed. By doing this, one of the main problems of neoclassical economics – namely 
that  it  uses  an  unrealistic  model  to  draw  conclusions  for  the  real  world  –  can  be 
bypassed. A rational individual is still one who has a consistent order of preferences 
over a set of alternatives and will always look to maximise her utility. The content of the 
preferences is  not  examined in assessing the  rationality  of one's  behaviour.  In other 
words, “[w]e do not know what [the rational man] wants...but we know his indifference 
curves  are  concave  to  the  origin.”  (Hollis  1975:  75).  Or  in  Gauthier's  spirit,  the 
behaviour of both the grasshopper and the ant are rational (Gauthier, 1986). They both 
maximise  their  utility,  or  else  their  enjoyment,  by  being  heedless  and  prudent 
respectively. Provided that imprudence is the result of reflective thinking and its long 
term  implications  are  being  appreciated,  then  there  is  no  reason  to  classify  it  as 
irrational. The present discussion will rely on this broad understanding of  rationality 
which is  more realistic and plausible than an economic  rationality that assumes full 
information and infinite predictive power. More specifically, the following paragraphs 
will  include  a  discussion  of  constrained  maximisation  as  rational  behaviour  in  a 
framework of repeated interactions.
In  Morals  by  Agreement rational  agents  are  expected  to  constrain  their 
maximisation in order to “enjoy opportunities for cooperation which others [SMs] lack” 
(Gauthier, 1986: 15); put differently, rational agents have the opportunity participate in 
cooperative ventures that will maximise their utility through the cooperative surplus. 
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Thus,  for  Gauthier  rational maximisers become  constrained maximisers.  Constrained 
maximisation is therefore a way of transferring maximisation into the future; a CM will 
choose to waive a smaller immediate pay-off in order to benefit from a larger future 
cooperative surplus. Given that the future pay-off for a CM is higher than the present 
one for a straightforward maximiser, constrained maximisation is still justifiable from a 
rational choice theory perspective. And in this sense constrained maximisation does not 
have to be considered a non-rational principle or a moral constraint; “[t]he constrained 
maximiser...reasons in  a  different  way” (Gauthier  1986:  170).  However,  constrained 
maximisation  is  a  weak  principle  from  a  rational  choice  perspective.  The  rational 
incentives  for  someone  to  comply  with  mutual  constraints  and  accept  a  smaller 
immediate pay-off are not strong and if we adhere to the rigid assumption of economic 
rationality the behaviour of CMs can be seen as irrational. 
In games with the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma,  cooperating when the 
other party defects yields a smaller pay-off than defection; it pays more to defect when 
the other party's disposition is not known. This is true when the game is not (infinitely) 
repeated. A small discount factor means that agents value future pay-offs highly and in 
any case not much less than present pay-offs. Therefore, given that the future pay-off is 
higher, they will choose to maximise at the end of a series of interactions in a repeated 
game. Another essential condition for the rationality of cooperation is that all games are 
infinitely repeated or more realistically,  players perceive them as infinitely repeated. 
When A interacts with B, playing a game such as the prisoner’s dilemma, and at the 
same time interacts with C, playing a game such as hawk-dove, his experience from one 
game is transferred to the other. Therefore A is a link between the two games or among 
all the games she plays at any given time and the strategies employed in these games. 
A’s behaviour is affected by the outcome of each interaction and by the behaviour of B, 
C and so on.  If  A and B are strangers and they do not expect  to  meet again,  their  
interaction history will affect their behaviour in their interaction. Hence, the game they 
play is affected by the games they had played before they met. Or in other words, the 
game played between A and B is a  sub-game of all the games A and B play and their 
choices are affected by their history. In this context, A and B never interact in a one-off 
game, as they perceive every game they play as part of one single large game. All these 
sub-games are repeated and consequently,  mutual  cooperation in prisoners’ dilemma 
type of games yields the highest pay-off. This can be best described using concepts of 
cultural evolution and evolutionary game theory.
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The  previous  discussion  focused  on  describing  an  alternative  account  of 
rationality that is generally in accordance with the one used in Morals by Agreement and 
whose  emphasis  lies  on  the  repetitiveness  of  interactions.  A  type  of  constrained 
maximisation  is  rational  when  agents  expect  to  interact  again  in  the  future.  The 
following paragraphs will examine how this concept of rationality is affected by one's 
environment – mainly one's history of interactions.
A person who does not maximise her utility immediately, does not necessarily 
behave irrationally. She still behaves  rationally provided that based on the knowledge 
and information she has, she believes her actions will maximise her utility. Her actions 
or set of strategies are confined by environmental parameters that cannot be influenced 
by her. Therefore, when evaluating an agent's behaviour, we must take these restrictions 
into account. But even then the predictability of her behaviour cannot be a given. The 
amount of information she possess and her perception of the  strategy restrictions in 
place,  makes  accurate  prediction  of  her  behaviour  unlikely.  The  homo  economicus 
model  of  neoclassical  economics  is  an  approximation  and  simplification  of  human 
behaviour and as such it can only be used under certain conditions for the construction 
of theoretical models. Therefore, a realistic account of human behaviour would have to 
include a relaxation of the strict assumptions of economic rationality. 
Predicting a rational individual's behaviour at a high probability is possible and 
when we know her interaction history successful prediction becomes even more likely. 
However, we have to bear in mind that rationality and maximisation depend primarily 
on  the  agent's  perception  of  the  available  strategies  and  environmental  limitations, 
which in turn depend on available information.  What we can say is  that we expect 
rational agents acting in the same environment to make the same decisions. There is no 
full information in this respect, but there is access to roughly equal information. Each 
rational agent has access to the same amount of information and therefore should adopt 
the same strategy in order to maximise her utility. Rational individuals with access to 
similar  information should make similar decisions and adopt similar  strategies.  This 
does not assume that preferences will have to converge for a convention to be formed; 
rather  it  refers  to  a  common understanding  of  the  principles  of  social  interactions. 
Individuals do not have to have similar preferences and it is likely that they will have 
conflicting  interests.  However,  equal  rationality  should  lead  to  a  decision  making 
process that leads to an optimal outcome. Put differently there is equal rationality within 
a social group or convention, as opposed to the neoclassical models which assume equal 
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rationality for all. 
Furthermore,  it  is  realistic  to  assert  that  each  agent  has  roughly  the  same 
memory. It does not have to be full memory of every decision in the game's history, but 
“each individual remembers a general experience of the game but not how he fared 
against  particular  opponents”  (Sugden 2004:  60),  so  that  each  player  has  a  general 
understanding  of  how  agents  with  whom  he  has  interacted  behave.  And  this 
understanding creates a disposition to act accordingly in the future. If the player has 
interacted mostly with cooperators (or he believes he has), then it is more likely he will  
expect his future interactions to be with cooperators. 
The most important  environmental parameter is other individuals with whom 
interactions are possible. Therefore, maximising  behaviour depends on what the other 
player is expected to do. When the other player's strategies are not known or are only 
known at  a  probability,  rational  behaviour  is  not  as  straightforward  a  process.  The 
longer the history of an interaction, the more likely it is that the other agent's strategies 
will be perceived as known. Again however, in a more realistic setting we will have to 
take into account that each agent participates in a number of interactions with different 
agents.  These  interactions  affect  her  conception  of  others'  strategies  and  thus  her 
behaviour. In this context, a  rational agent is expected to be able to form an opinion 
about her environment, that means a rational agent should be able to tell whether she is 
surrounded  by  constrained  or  straightforward  maximisers  and  adapt  her  strategy 
accordingly. 
Not  all  interactions  bear  the  same  weight  in  rational  deliberation.  Each 
interaction has a degree of salience; interactions with many repetitions or high pay-offs 
are  more  important  than  interactions  that  are  short-lived  or  have  low  pay-offs 
respectively. When an agent's interaction collapses after many iterations, she will be 
more cautious in her new interactions. By doing so, she minimises possible loses from 
her interactions. Also, when the proportion and gravity of interactions that collapse is 
high, then a rational agent will be more cautious in her new interactions. For instance, 
when a short series of interactions collapses, it will not affect old series that have lasted 
longer. However, the collapse of many interactions, even if they have been short-lived, 
will  have  an  effect  on  the  agent's  perception  of  her  environment  and  thus  her 
disposition.  Repeated  interactions  within  a  population  highlight  the  importance  of 
optimal equilibria in relation to individual  rationality. To conclude, a  rational agent as 
described above is  assumed to have  access  to  roughly  the same information as  her 
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neighbours,  a  similar  capacity  to  remember  past  interactions  and  evaluate  her 
environment  which  leads  to  developing  similar  maximising  strategies  for  a  given 
environment.  Thus,  the  definition  of  rational  behaviour  depends  on  an  agent's 
environment and maximising strategies are bounded by environmental limitations.
The above conversation of rationality does not necessarily dismiss the premises 
of strategic interaction between  rational utility maximisers. It is impossible to discuss 
strategic interaction in a game theoretical context without referring to the concept of a 
Nash equilibrium. Two interacting individuals behave rationally when the outcome for 
each one is the best she could have achieved. The Nash equilibrium point is therefore a 
deterministic outcome if we accept the basic conditions of rationality and others being 
equal.  Put  differently  it  is  “as  if  the  players’ thought  process  has  converged  to  an 
equilibrium,  just  as  surely  as  a  rock  tumbling  down  a  hill  eventually  reaches  an 
equilibrium (a state of rest) at the foot of the hill” (Varoufakis 2008: 1259). Thus, once 
we accept  that  the  interacting  agents  are  rational  within  the  same  environment,  the 
outcome of their  interaction is  known. The Nash  equilibrium is  a point from which 
neither player has a rational incentive to move away. In one-shot and finitely repeated 
prisoner's dilemma games, defection is the only Nash equilibrium. However, when the 
number of iterations is high and the future discount factor low, the sum of the outcomes 
of cooperative rounds can exceed the loss incurred at  the last  round. The benefit  of 
cooperation times the number of iterations is possible to be greater than the cost from 
cooperating with a defector once. And this is more likely in a population of pairwise 
interactions and full information. On the other hand, when the number of iterations is 
finite and known,  rational individuals will be able to predict that their opponent will 
defect at the last round. As a result, both will defect in the first round. It becomes clear  
therefore,  that  whether  it  is  rational  to  cooperate  depends  on  the  game's  specific 
parameters. If the cooperation benefits are high and the number of iterations high, it can 
be shown to be  rational  to  cooperate.  Hence,  the  rationality  of  cooperation even in 
games where the Nash equilibrium is defect, depends on the number of iterations and 
the related information that the players possess.
In the real world every interaction includes a cost of  rational deliberation and 
information  gathering,  and  our  decisions  are  usually  about  long  term  behaviour 
strategies rather than one-off interactions with strangers. The decisions we have to make 
are not so often about eating a pear or an apple. Rather we have to decide whether 
planting an apple or a pear tree will be more profitable in the long run. A farmer who 
84
has to make a rational decision about whether he should grow apples or pears will have 
to take into account a large amount of information such as: consumers' preferences, how 
these preferences may change in the future, whether the local climate favours apple or 
pear trees, the price of each fruit and how they are likely to evolve. It is of course 
impossible to have all the information required, but it is completely rational for one to 
try to gather as much information as possible before making a decision such as this 
which is a costly and time consuming process. Less important decisions can be based on 
quick deliberation or “just do what most others do”. For similarly important decisions it 
is also rational to use others experience if the information costs are deemed too high. If 
apple growers make a bigger profit, then it is rational for a farmer to grow apple trees 
even without taking into account the marginal cost of the apple market for instance. It 
all depends on the cost of information needed for a decision. 
We can estimate how the apple market marginal cost will be in the future, but we 
cannot  predict  it.  The  estimation  error  probability  and  the  level  of  the  proposed 
investment may make it worthwhile to undertake the information cost. In this context, it 
is  rational to just do what others do and plant apple trees when information is very 
expensive  and  the  future  very  uncertain.  Therefore,  for  everyday  decisions  where 
consequences are not important, it is obviously rational to follow the established norm. 
However,  the  same  applies  for  important  decisions  when  future  is  deemed  very 
uncertain or the available information very scarce. In conclusion,  rational agents have 
incentives to follow established norms of social  behaviour as opposed to undertaking 
the costs of rational deliberation. This results in a sort of uniform social behaviour that 
may seem irrational, but it is nevertheless grounded on rational premises. 
This  section  attempted  to  describe  the  premises  of  rationality  in  realistic 
settings. Individuals are reasonably rational; they want to maximise and try to make the 
best  decisions  with  the  information  available.  However,  they  cannot  have  full 
information or complete memory and predictive power. Just like human beings, rational 
actors adapt to their environment and try to make the best out of the situation. They are 
in this sense, boundedly rational. The point of the above analysis was to set the scene 
for  discussing  individual  rationality  in  social  groups.  The  following  section  will 
continue the examination of bounded rationality in relation to the dynamics that develop 
from social interactions.
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4.3 Functionalism and conventional behaviour
Functionalism  refers  to  the  fact  that  an  action  may  have  implied  and  unintended 
functions for a given  society (Martin & McIntyre,  1994). The following section is an 
examination  of  the  extent  to  which  functional  analysis  of  social  structures  can  be 
incorporated  in  the  rational  choice  theory  framework  presented  earlier.  Functional 
explanation  will  serve  as  a  stepping  stone  in  reconciling  the  methodological 
individualism of game theory with the holism of evolutionary theory. 
4.3.1 Functional analysis
The typical example by which functionalism is usually discussed in the literature is the 
rain dance.  Although it does not bring rain, it  serves as a mechanism of reinforcing 
social cohesion (Martin and McIntyre, 1994). More crudely, Hollis (1994) uses a termite 
colony  to  discuss  functionalism;  each  termite  behaves  in  a  certain  way  because 
otherwise the colony would collapse. The focus of attention in functional analysis of 
social behaviour is the society as a whole. Society needs the rain dancer and the termite 
colony  needs  the  termites  to  keep  behaving  as  they  do  in  order  to  be  sustainable. 
Functionalism is therefore a methodologically holistic approach to the examination of 
human behaviour. 
The actions of the individuals in a  society are explained through the purpose 
they serve for  society and not in terms of individual benefit. Thus, functionalism and 
rationality are found at opposite sides of the spectrum in terms of individualistic and 
holistic approaches to social explanation. However, given the flexible understanding of 
rationality presented in the previous section,  individual  rationality can be reconciled 
with functionalism. The rain dancer behaves  rationally whether he believes his dance 
will bring rain or he realises he merely behaves as society expects him to; by fulfilling 
his social role, he also maximises his utility. In other words, he behaves according to an 
established  social  convention  of  behaviour  in  order  to  retain  his  role  in  the  social 
structure that maximises his share of the cooperative surplus. In that respect, functional 
analysis can be used in conjunction with rational behaviour and game theory to analyse 
interactions in a dynamic environment (Martin and McIntyre, 1994).
Functional behaviour supports conventions of behaviour, in a similar way to that 
in which the termites support the sustainability of their colony. Individuals do not need 
to act intentionally for the stability of a convention but their actions are essential for its 
stability. Social  conventions arise from repeated pairwise interactions between rational 
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agents  and  over  time  acquire  force  similar  to  the  force  of  the  rain  dance.  Hence, 
conventions are dynamic and depend on agents' strategies that adapt to changes in their 
environment. According to this understanding, a  convention does not always need to 
satisfy a specific goal in society; it may be the result of unintended actions, serving an 
implied function for social cohesion.
4.3.2 Rational conventions
As in real life, people's behaviour and beliefs change. In game theory agents' strategies 
are subject to change. A  strategy shift  can occur when the amount of information a 
player possesses changes or when a player's history changes as the game evolves. A 
player's history is being enriched continuously as the players interact in a game. And 
thus, her strategies and objectives change accordingly. In that respect rational behaviour 
is  not  set.  In  a  dynamic context  strategies  and  behaviour  depend on or  at  least  are 
affected by environmental parameters. 
In the classic example of Robinson Crusoe, his strategies change when he meets 
man  Friday.  From  a  game  theoretical  perspective,  when  man  Friday  appears  the 
interaction analysis becomes strategic. Crusoe's strategies change as his  environment 
changes (Hollis 1994). As the number and the disposition of the players in the game 
change, rational players' strategies have to adapt to the changing environment. An agent 
therefore  has  to  shift  her  behaviour  depending  on  whom  she  interacts  with,  the 
frequency,  and  the  salience  of  her  interactions.  In  a  group  of  non-cooperators,  the 
rational  response  would  be  non-cooperation  whereas  in  a  group  of  cooperators, 
cooperation will maximise a player's utility. Therefore, a  rational response is always 
dependent on the expected  behaviour of others. From these premises it is safe also to 
conclude that when  environmental parameters remain stable,  rational agents have no 
reason to alter their strategies. 
Therefore, environmental parameters such as the number of interacting agents 
and their history are central to the present understanding of  rationality. The strategies 
dictated by rationality depend on the game parameters. In this respect, rationality is still 
central to the argument and the basic premises of traditional  game theory remain the 
same.  Individuals want to maximise their  utility and are able  to learn and adjust  to 
changes. Furthermore, a player's  environment becomes a central concept in analysing 
rational behaviour. The interactions between Crusoe and man Friday are the first of their 
kind, given that they live on an isolated island. Their repeated interactions will give rise 
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to habits of behaviour. These habits will replace rational analysis of the possible choices 
at  each decision node.  Therefore,  without abandoning  rationality,  Crusoe and Friday 
will  stop  behaving  strategically  in  their  set  environment.  Their  behaviour  will  be 
determined by the  rational decisions they made at the beginning of their interaction. 
They will be based on their interaction history and follow patterns of behaviour, without 
deliberating  rationally.  Social  conventions,  developed  as  a  result  of  their  repeated 
interactions in a stable environment, will replace their rational decision making process. 
Over the course of infinitely repeated interactions, they behave so as to serve a social 
function which is essential for the continuation of interactions. But this does not mean 
they lose their capacity to think rationally. Rational agents have the option to follow the 
– rationally established – convention or to defect. Conventions are dynamic in that they 
are affected by the  environmental parameters. Therefore, when the number of players 
change, convention equilibria will have to shift.
If there is a new arrival on the island, he will also seek to maximise his utility 
and make the most of the situation. In essence however he has two options: follow the 
established  convention or abstain and interact according to traditional  rational choice 
theory.  The maximising  behaviour  would be to  take advantage  of  the achievements 
made by the two original inhabitants. In this context where the island's limited resources 
can be divided among a small group of individuals, if the new arrival decided not to 
follow the established convention but instead managed to interact following new rules 
dictated  by  his  rationality,  the  outcome  would  be  similar  to  the  outcome  of  the 
interactions within the  convention. Since the  environment is set,  rational interactions 
would  lead  to  the  same  outcome  –  the  establishment  of  similar  conventions  of 
behaviour. Maximising strategies are similar since the  environmental parameters have 
not changed.
Newcomers on the island will follow the  established  conventions unless they 
find a new way to achieve the same maximising outcome. The conventions established 
by  the  interactions  of  a  first  generation  of  rational  individuals  will  hold  for  the 
following  generations.  In  this  view,  social  conventions  are  the  result  of  a  Nash 
equilibrium point. Those who decide that it is in their best interest not to adhere to the 
existing rules will bear two different costs: First the cost of  rationally analysing their 
best strategy. The more complicated the society in which they live, the higher this cost. 
Second, the cost of finding agents who would be willing to interact with them and pay 
the cost of being excluded from the established convention. It might seem that there are 
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two kinds  of  rationality.  One pointing towards  behaving  conventionally and another 
dictating  defection.  However,  what  differs  is  the  amount  of  information  and  the 
perception of the  environment. Provided the  environmental parameters are the same, 
both behaviours will lead to a Nash equilibrium. The non- behaviour however, will be 
more costly and time consuming. 
Crusoe and Friday have not entered into a contract in the traditional way. Their 
common understanding of what should be done and their common aim (to maximise 
their utility) implicitly bind them. This  agreement however does not have the form of 
mutual  obligation  but  of  egoistic  maximisation,  as  one  needs  the  other  in  order  to 
survive. This informal contract then takes the form of the convention that is adhered to 
by new arrivals (or future generations), whose behaviour is described by their structural 
roles: they behave according to the role they occupy in  society and by doing so, they 
maximise their utility without necessarily intending to do so. This however does not 
presuppose rational deliberation; agents behaving like that can fit in with the concept of 
rationality  as  presented  above.  By  fulfilling  her  social  role  responsibilities  she 
maximises her utility. Rational deliberation reinforces the behaviour that is promoted by 
society. Agents maximise in the long term and not in each decision node. What matters 
is that there is maximisation at the end of each interaction or set of interactions. In this 
context,  homo sociologicus  (Rescorla,  2011)  is  a  rational  agent  taking into  account 
environmental parameters and how they change.
Following Sugden (2004), whether we drive on the left or right is a matter of 
habit  and a  result  of  an  evolutionary  process.  Rational  deliberation shows that  it  is 
rational  to  conform  with  the  established  convention.  And  the  convention  has  been 
established  in  the  first  place  as  the  result  of  pairwise  interactions  between  rational 
agents. This applies not only to dove-hawk type of games; in a prisoner's dilemma game 
cooperation is the only Pareto efficient solution. But the Nash equilibrium depends on 
what the other player is disposed to do. In a repeated prisoners' dilemma game between 
Crusoe and Man Friday, the Nash equilibrium will be cooperation. The same applies for 
small groups where free-riders are known. Therefore, in small groups where complete 
information and memory of the history of the game are known, cooperative conventions 
will be established. Even in cases when the opponent is not known, it pays to cooperate 
as it is more probable that the opponent will follow the  convention as well. Rational 
individuals will choose to interact with agents within their group. When they interact 
with agents outside their group, they will be able to know the reputation of the group. 
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And if they come across a free-rider, his behaviour will become known in both groups, 
making the cost of free-riding even higher. Therefore, small groups do not necessarily 
restrict the number of interactions of the possible agents one can interact with.
The above shows how evolution of interactions and social structures lead to the 
creation  of  conventions.  Therefore,  we  have  an  evolutionary  story  of  how  social 
conventions arise and are sustained. In this story individual rationality does not play a 
central  role;  agents  follow  the  conventions  as  they  have  evolved  through  repeated 
interactions. Before that, social structures define strategy sets. In order to show that this 
evolutionary story can complement the account of rationality used by Gauthier, we will 
have to show how agents who accept  conventions that are the result of  evolutionary 
processes  are  also  rational.  Skyrms  shows  how  the  creation  of  a  cooperative  or 
non-cooperative structure depends on one's neighbours and their predispositions. In this 
framework, it is rational to be cooperative when you are surrounded by cooperators. A 
free-rider will be punished by social exclusion and his gains from defecting are much 
smaller than the costs of social exclusion. Non-cooperative interactions do not produce 
a  cooperative  surplus.  Groups  of  non  cooperators  then  do  worse  than  groups  of 
cooperators. The rational agent in a group of cooperators will choose to participate in 
cooperative interactions in order to increase her pay-off. Non-cooperative groups will 
thus  mutate  into  cooperative  groups.  When  we  allow  for  rational  deliberation,  in 
Skyrms's story, cooperation is the rational strategy.
4.3.3 Conclusion
The  above  understanding  of  functional  and  conventional  rationality  emphasizes 
instrumental  rationality  without  departing  significantly  from  traditional  definitions. 
Rational individuals still deliberate on how to maximise. However, they also follow the 
established conventions for a great proportion of their decisions. Since this maximises 
their utility and they have the rational capability to adhere to the predefined rules or not, 
they  are  still  rational  maximisers.  Furthermore,  rational  agents  have the capacity  to 
reflect and apply backward induction on their strategies and their behaviour in relation 
to social conventions. They have the capacity to compare the outcome of conventional 
and non-conventional behaviour at the end of a set of interactions.
In a sense rational, utility maximising individuals have reasons to behave like 
the termites to an extent; do as they are expected by  social  conventions but without 
abandoning rational deliberation about whether their behaviour yields the best possible 
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outcome. Individual rational behaviour can have long term unintended implications and 
showing that individual rationality can coexist with explanations of collective behaviour 
is  essential  before  discussing  how  rational  behaviour  can  be  examined  within  an 
evolutionary context. The following section will look at evolutionary game theory and 
its relationship with individual rationality.
4.4 Evolutionary game theory and constrained maximisation
Evolutionary game theory uses aspects of traditional game theory in combination with 
evolutionary theory from biology. Its use in social science and political philosophy is 
therefore not a straightforward step. However, the theory of evolution is not as far away 
from  social  theory  as  it  might  seem  originally.  Darwin  formulated  his  concept  of 
evolution being influenced, among others, by Malthus's theory on population (Gould 
2008).  We could say that  in  Darwin's  mind the  biological  evolution of a  species  is 
related to the evolution of social life in human populations.  Evolutionary game theory 
refers  to  the  evolution  of  social  life:  changes  in  social  behaviour,  norms  and  the 
understanding of rationality. Therefore, with evolutionary game theory we use concepts 
of  biological  evolution  to  describe  cultural  evolution.  Assuming  that  biological 
evolution can be applied as is to social life implies that we consider societies to behave 
like living organisations. And this is beyond the interests and the capabilities of political 
philosophy. 
In addition,  despite the fact that the selfishness of the gene (Dawkins,  2006) 
makes sense in biology, there is no need or method to use this as a model of analysis in 
social  science.  The  most  basic  level  of  human  behaviour  analysis  has  to  be  the 
individual  and there  is  no method of  extending the  rationale  of  the  selfish  gene  to 
humans in a meaningful way. The selfish gene rationale entails that successful genes 
will replicate at the expense of others; maximising human behaviour may attract more 
individuals over time given individual rational deliberation. Human individuals decide 
on a strategy based on their personal circumstances and calculations and do not blindly 
accept  the  most  successful  strategy  available.  Despite  the  similarities  between  the 
selfish  gene  paradigm  and  the  behaviour  of  human  populations,  their  underlying 
principles  differ.  However,  the great  strength  of  evolutionary  game theory  is  that  it 
makes  use of  indisputable  biological  concepts  that  examine population  dynamics  to 
describe the dynamics of human societies and individual behaviour. And biology can, in 
some respects,  be more appropriate than traditional social  science to explain human 
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behaviour.  Despite  the  fact  that  available  strategies  are  genetically  determined  in 
biological  organisms  and  animal  societies  (Skyrms  in  Danielson,  1998),  in  human 
interactions genetic limitations do not play a role (or if they do, it is beyond the scope of 
the  present  discussion).  In  human  interactions  there  are  still  biological  limitations, 
though not necessarily  determination.  These limitations are imposed by social  rules, 
such as laws and norms. Apparently these are not as strict as genetic limits. However, 
they  still  have  to  be  taken  into  account  when  discussing  interactions  in  human 
populations. The following paragraphs will describe the main concepts of evolutionary 
game theory,  before  examining  its  relationship  with  human  behaviour  within  social 
conventions.
4.4.1 Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary  game  theory  describes  repeated  games  played  in  large  populations. 
Therefore  it  is  the  most  realistic  part  of  game theory  when it  comes  to  describing 
behaviour within societies. There are three distinct, though not necessarily conflicting, 
mechanisms  within  the  evolutionary  game  theory  paradigm:  (i)  the  more  effective 
individuals (and strategies) are more likely to survive, (ii) agents learn by trial and error, 
and (iii) the best strategies are imitated (Axelrod 1986). These mechanisms work in 
combination or in parallel or subsequently with one another, rather than one replacing 
the other. For instance, the survival of an individual means that she follows an effective 
strategy, which she can abandon once she sees that another agent has adopted a more 
efficient strategy – making her a rational agent in the conventional sense. 
More specifically,  evolutionary game theory is defined by evolutionarily stable 
strategies and replicator dynamics. Evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) describe which 
behaviours will survive evolutionary pressures and competition; in other words, which 
are the best strategies. Therefore, the approach focusing on the ESS is static as it does 
not address how these strategies evolve and change over time. However, ESS is useful 
in helping our understanding of how norms of  behaviour can be stable and successful 
enough  to  attract  new  agents.  Replicator  dynamics  in  the  contrary,  focus  on  how 
strategies change over time and how they are affected by the general behaviour of the 
population as a whole (Weibull, 1995). 
A behaviour strategy adopted by the majority of the population is more likely 
to evolve into being the norm for that population. A strategy that gives a higher pay off, 
is also more likely to be adopted by the population in time. Therefore, the replicator 
92
dynamics approach to evolutionary game theory describes how strategies evolve taking 
into account factors such as population and fitness (Skyrms, 2004). Put differently, in an 
iterated prisoners' dilemma (PD) game the two players' strategies change as the game 
evolves.  Provided  that  the  players  are  part  of  a  population,  the  number  of  agents 
adopting  a  strategy  cause  the  dominant  strategy  to  change.  In  essence,  it  is  the 
population strategies that evolve. With that, the strategies in the two-player sub-game 
change  as  well.  A strategy  that  takes  over  the  population,  or  the  majority  of  the 
population,  as the fittest  one is an evolutionarily stable strategy. And in this  respect 
evolutionarily  stable  strategies  and  replicator  dynamics  are  complementary  in  our 
understanding of  evolutionary  game theory. Evolutionarily stable strategies develop in 
populations where opponents' strategies are known. They are an equilibrium point that 
is in everybody's best interest to support. In different terminology, a social  convention 
can be viewed as the outcome of ESS.
Replicator  dynamics  mean  that  successful  strategies  replicate  themselves.  A 
behaviour  that  yields  higher  pay-off  to  the  agents  involved  will  be  imitated  by 
neighbours. Hence, a population in an evolutionary game theoretical context evolves in 
that  adopted strategies  evolve to  become dominant.  For  instance,  if  a  population of 
cooperators in a PD game change to being defectors, then the dominant  strategy has 
evolved from cooperation to defection. Evolutionary game theory is deterministic in the 
sense that if we know the original population disposition and the structure of the game, 
we can predict  with accuracy what the  equilibrium will  be after a given number of 
interactions. For instance, it is a given that a population consisting of 70% defectors and 
30% cooperators will converge to a non-cooperative equilibrium after a set amount of 
time. If environmental parameters do not change, this equilibrium will be stable. 
In  groups  of  rational  agents,  individuals  have  the  capacity  to  reflect  on  the 
history of the game played and calculate how it could have developed differently. And 
then they are able to analyse how their pay-off would have evolved in the alternative 
scenario.  If  they see that  despite being in a  Nash  equilibrium, the status-quo is  not 
Pareto efficient, they can realise that they could have done better by abstaining from 
social interaction or changing their  location so as to be included in a different group, 
where the current state of affairs is different. However, in stable equilibria this is not 
always feasible. It is not always practical for an individual to change his group. And 
therefore a rational individual is limited by the evolutionary equilibrium.
In large  populations effective strategies  take time to spread,  when we have 
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assumed  rational agents.  A  strategy in a two-player interaction will  be proven to be 
maximising at the end of a series of interactions and not immediately. Therefore, their 
neighbours will only imitate it once they realise it yields higher pay-offs than their own 
strategy. This can only happen after  a number of repetitions.  In a population where 
defection is the dominant strategy in a PD type of game, if cooperation was established 
as  an  equilibrium  in  the  interaction  between  two  agents  and  they  reached  higher 
pay-offs than they would in defection interactions, their  neighbours would pick up on 
that only after the convention became established. And this would only be the case in a 
game  perceived  to  have  infinite  iterations.  Thus,  the  utility  at  the  end  of  the  n-th 
interaction  of  cooperation  would  have  to  be  higher  than  the  respective  defection 
interaction.  In  a  repeated  PD  type  of  game,  pay-off  is  higher  for  cooperators.  In 
conclusion,  cooperation  will  not  establish  itself  as  ESS  when  the  first  cooperating 
couple appears. It will take at least a generation (or iteration) to spread to neighbouring 
groups. Even in this case, whether  cooperation becomes the dominant  strategy in the 
population will depend on the replicator dynamics within that population. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Skyrms (2004) has shown dominant strategies 
within  a  population  are  influenced  by  location,  communication  and  association. 
Evolutionary  game theory  can  be  helpful  in  explaining  social  interaction  in  human 
population  as  it  takes  into  account  the  dynamics  of  social  structures  in  repeated 
interactions.  In this  sense  evolutionary  game theory serves  as  a  method to examine 
repeated  interactions  and  how best  strategies  are  affected  by  population  and  social 
structure  dynamics.  The description of  evolutionary  game theory presented above is 
typically used with the assumption of agents of low or no  rationality which makes it 
unsuitable for use in human populations. However, on the condition that individuals are 
reasonably  rational,  that  is  they  can  learn  and  imitate  successful  strategies  while 
deliberating about their  behaviour,  evolutionary  game theory can be used to describe 
human interactions. Thus, it is possible to use EGT in conjunction with assumptions of 
individual rationality.
4.4.2 Rationality in evolutionary context
In  human  populations,  rationality  plays  a  role  in  interactions.  In  his  widely  cited 
example, Hume (Hume, 2008) describes two farmers who agree on helping each other 
with their corn. They do so based on rational egoism; if they help each other, each one's 
personal  profit  will  be  greater.  Therefore,  it  is  in  their  best  interest  to  help  their 
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neighbour. Hume informally describes how in repeated interactions, cooperation is the 
maximising strategy. Since they interact in a stable environment both farmers expect to 
interact again in the future and appreciate their future pay-off as highly, or almost as 
highly as their present pay-off, cooperation is an equilibrium. 
The  importance  agents  attribute  to  future  benefits  can  lead  to  cooperative 
equilibria even when there are more than two interacting agents, provided there is full or 
equal information of the history of interactions and relatively cheap ways to punish 
defectors  (Skyrms,  2004).  When  punishment  takes  the  form  of  social  exclusion 
however, cheap punishment can be achieved when there are not any other agents who 
are  willing  to  cooperate.  Thus,  cooperative  equilibria  are  sustainable  when  there  is 
knowledge of the history of the interactions.  Given that we are talking about social 
interactions in general, iterations are always perceived to be infinite. Also, assuming 
that the two farmers live in a relatively stable  environment, as is most often the case 
with  farmers,  their  game's  environmental  parameters  are  stable.  They  will  be 
cooperating for as long as they live (or, at least for as long as they farm corn in adjacent 
fields). Furthermore, defection in this game would hurt the defector's reputation, thus 
making it impossible for him to cooperate in a new game. Hume's work is probably not 
the  obvious  case  for  a  discussion  of  evolutionary  game  theory.  However,  he  has 
examined how conventions of justice evolve and become established (Sugden 2004) and 
the  analysis  of  the  establishment  of  conventions  is  evolutionary.  This  cooperation 
between the two farmers, provided their  environment does not change, will last for as 
long as they grow their corn. Moreover, their off-spring will have no reason to change 
strategies. Since it is beneficial for both, they will continue helping each other. Over 
generations  or  many  iterations,  this  cooperative  equilibrium will  become the  norm. 
Those  farmers  who  follow  that  norm,  do  not  necessarily  do  so  because  they  have 
rationally analysed their  pay-off in the same ways as did the original farmers. They 
behave  conventionally  because  their  society  is  based  on  a  number  of  similar 
conventions that punish defectors. 
Apparently  Sugden follows the  Humean  rationale in arguing that “...ideas of 
rights,  entitlements  and  justice  may  be  rooted  in  conventions...[that]  have  merely 
evolved.” (Sugden 2004: 8). We need not assume that farmers behave rationally when 
they  follow  an  established  convention.  However,  their  behaviour  is  rational  as  it 
maximises their utility and also sustains a social  equilibrium that is essential for their 
interaction. In this, it is similar to the way termites' work is essential for the their colony 
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and vice versa. Individual termites cannot reap the benefits of their work without the 
collective and the farmers' cooperation on its own would not be enough for their utility 
maximisation  since  their  respective  utilities  would  be  much  greater  if  they  had the 
chance to interact with more than one other person; the farmers would maximise in their 
interaction,  but  a  farmer's  utility  function  includes  more  than  one  interaction.  Each 
interaction depends on a plethora of other interactions that ensure a social environment 
where  rational  interactions  can  be  realised.  These  conventional  rules  evolve  as  the 
population evolves. When an interaction reaches a more efficient interaction equilibrium 
– because of environmental changes such as an increase in the population of cooperators 
– the new  behaviour  can spread and hence lead to a  new  convention.  The pairwise 
repeated interactions example serves as a good example of how interactions can evolve 
and spread but it is a simplification as it does not examine the population dynamics and 
how they are affected by adopting successful strategies.
The main advantage of using  evolutionary  game theory is that it is  dynamic 
and therefore more realistic. Successful strategies self-replicate given the  dynamics of 
the population which makes it a more appropriate model to describe social interaction in 
changing populations. Taylor and Jonker have shown how in the evolutionary version of 
the PD game, defecting is the only stable strategy (Taylor and Jonker, 1978); Alexander 
2000).  However,  this  was  done  using  the  pay-off  matrix  of  the  classic  prisoner’s 
dilemma  game,  which  although  not  very  different  for  a  repeated  game  does  yield 
different results. Depending on the pay-offs in the original game, the outcome can be a 
cooperative equilibrium. The analysis used in one-off games cannot be used in repeated 
and evolutionary games without amending it. Agents’ utility functions are different as 
they have to take into account how the time factor affects maximising strategies and the 
pay-off from repeated interactions and possible punishment. Binmore goes as far as to 
claim that axiomatically a game is a prisoner's dilemma game only when there is  a 
single  iteration.  A multi-iteration  game  is  simply  a  different  game  and  therefore 
cooperation is never rational in the PD game (Binmore, 1998). However, given that the 
analysis here is not formal and that the premises of the game are more important than its 
mathematical background, repeated games with the structure of a PD game can still be 
referred to as PDs. The main point in discussing a PD game in an evolutionary context 
is that there is a coevolution of strategies and population dynamics, which affect all 
games irrespective of their structure.
As we have  seen,  Brian  Skyrms's  (2004) description of  how  social  structure 
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evolves is primarily based on the  stag hunt game which shows how equilibria evolve 
and become stable. For  Skyrms the repeated PD game can be in essence a  stag hunt 
game.  In  both  games  cooperation  yields  higher  group welfare  whereas  defection  is 
maximising  in  the  one-shot  game  or  when  detection  is  unlikely.  Therefore,  the 
conclusion of the analysis is not affected by whether we use the  stag hunt or the PD 
game as a basis. In an evolutionary context what is vital is whether agents are disposed 
to cooperate.  If they are,  then  cooperation is  the maximising  strategy – similarly to 
constrained maximisation. His analysis examines how social structure evolves and how 
it is affected by the population equilibria. Similarly,  Sugden (2004), whose analysis is 
based on a theory of conventions, discusses why social structure equilibria are followed 
and why they are a maximising strategy. Social conventions can be seen as the result of 
Skyrms’ social structures  evolution. Social  interactions that lead to equilibria can be 
represented as conventions. The repeated prisoner’s dilemma and the stag hunt lead to 
social equilibria. Individuals in societies following these conventions do not deliberate 
about how to maximise their utility; they just follow the  convention and by doing so, 
they maximise their utility. 
In  summary,  the  evolution  of  the  social  structure  occurs  by  adopting 
conventions. When these conventions are not maximising or evolutionarily stable, they 
will be replaced through a new evolutionary process by a new convention. Following an 
evolutionarily stable  convention is a maximising  strategy on the individual level. And 
doing so replaces the need for constrained maximisation and translucent dispositions as 
Gauthier uses them. A concept similar to that of constrained maximisation is still to be 
used in the  evolutionary context presented here.  However,  constrained  maximisation 
here  occurs  not  because  rational  agents  have  internalised  it,  but  as  the  outcome of 
repeated interactions that create dynamic social structures.
Individuals do not constrain their  maximisation but follow a convention that in 
the short run does not maximise their utility. Agents acting within the limitations of a 
cooperative convention are a type of constrained maximiser while their  behaviour can 
be  analysed  as  an  evolutionary  game.  They  do  not  constrain  their  maximisation 
expecting  others  to  do  so  and  therefore  cooperate.  They  follow  the  rules  of  the 
established  convention,  knowing that their  utility  will  not be maximised outside the 
convention. The convention calls for constraint maximisation if we only look at one-off 
or short-termed interactions. A cooperative convention consists of cooperators since non 
cooperators have been excluded from interactions. Repeated interactions ensure that all 
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agents’ behaviour is known, not necessarily by the entire population but by each agent’s 
neighbours,  and  those  with  whom  she  interacts.  Social  exclusion,  as  punishment, 
maximises the cost of non- behaviour and in any case this cost is greater than the cost of 
conventional constrained maximisation.
Since  we  have  asserted  that  agents  remain  rational,  when  acting  within  a 
cooperative  convention  an  individual  will  explore  the  possibilities  of  free-riding. 
Rational agents will search for a method by which they will receive their share of the 
cooperative  surplus  without  participating  in  its  creation.  However,  the  benefit  from 
free-riding is short-term.  Repeated interactions in an evolutionary context increase the 
likelihood of a free-rider being detected since in repeated interactions behaviour can be 
known. And reputation is central to an individual's interactions. The cost from having a 
bad reputation in  repeated games is greater than the benefit of a one-off free-ride. In 
general, free-riding is not a maximising  strategy in an evolutionary context. However, 
since we preserve the assumption of individual rationality free-riding will still have to 
be discussed more analytically in the following chapters and especially in Chapter Six. 
However,  it  is  possible  to  assume  individual  rationality  within  the  context  of  an 
evolutionary account of social interactions.
4.4.3 Conclusion
Evolutionary  game theory is used as a tool to describe  rational interactions within a 
population.  Looking  at  interactions  from an  evolutionary  perspective,  allows  us  to 
consider population dynamics that otherwise would be ignored in assessing individual 
behaviour. Group behaviour can be analysed in relation to the behaviour of individuals, 
or more accurately, the interactions between individuals. The two individuals are still 
bound  by  the  same  rules  that  govern  the  evolutionary  game  theoretical  process. 
However, thinking of their interaction as a two person repeated game makes it easier to 
relate it to an interaction between rational agents. 
It is possible to compare interactions between two agents whether they behave 
according to the premises of  rational choice theory or are seen as participants in an 
evolutionary  process.  For  an  outsider,  who  does  not  know  the  incentives  for  their 
behaviour, it would be impossible to tell whether they are being rational or evolutionary 
organisms, if in both cases there is utility  maximisation. If this  maximisation occurs 
immediately or at the end of the series of interactions, it does not make a difference for  
the characterisation of the interaction. 
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In conclusion, evolutionary game theory examines how populations evolve into 
a  state  of  evolutionary  stability.  Whether  these  equilibrium  points  are  cooperative 
utopias,  or  a  war  of  all  against  all,  does  not  make a  difference to  the  evolutionary 
analysis. In a society where war of all against all is the norm, no individual will attempt 
to cooperate in a PD game. From an evolutionary perspective, a cooperator will mutate 
after one iteration. Thus, in a state of stable  equilibrium the  equilibrium bounds each 
agent's choices. A change in the environmental parameters can cause a destabilisation of 
the  equilibrium. For  instance,  when the  proportion  of  cooperators  in  the population 
changes because of individuals relocating,  the ESS will  shift.  And in this  case new 
maximising strategies will arise leading to a new convention. 
Destabilisation  can  also  be  caused  by  contact  with  groups  with  different 
conventions that are more efficient, or in other words from new information becoming 
available. Thus, an evolutionary equilibrium is not infinitely stable as “the evolutionary 
dynamic never settles down completely; it is always in flux” (Young, 2001). However 
the  associations  established  in  each  equilibrium,  play  an  important  role  in  the 
establishment of a new equilibrium. The  relative  location within a population and the 
histories of  local interactions will affect the possible strategies that may be adopted. 
Each  evolutionary  equilibrium, therefore, is to be seen as an  evolutionary step to the 
next. 
In sum,  evolutionary  game theory provides a fluid account of social  behaviour 
where individuals can learn by trial and error and imitate, thus affecting the equilibrium 
selection procedure. The coevolution of  social structures and individual strategies for 
maximisation that  offer  a  realistic  account  of human  behaviour  can only be studied 
through EGT. 
The  following  section  will  emphasise  the  role  of  evolutionary  theory  in 
explaining  conventional  behaviour and justifying  constrained maximisation as  rational 
behaviour in an evolutionary framework.
4.5 Constrained maximisation as conventional rationality
The  evolutionary  approach  can  reinforce  Gauthier's  argument  about  constrained 
maximisation and provide a more realistic account of disposition  translucency. In an 
evolutionary  context,  agents  within  a  social  convention  will  constrain  their 
maximisation  by  behaving  conventionally.  Should  evolutionary  conventions  of 
constrained maximisers yield higher utility, they will spread and replace lower utility 
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alternatives.  Constrained  maximisation  as  introduced  in  Morals  by  Agreement  is 
problematic since it requires disposition translucency which is an unrealistic stipulation. 
Constrained  maximisation  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  dispositions  are 
translucent. When an agent knows that the agent he interacts with is going to constrain 
her  maximisation, then he will form the disposition to constrain his  maximisation as 
well. And in this case, constrained maximisation is rational. Ideally, dispositions would 
be  transparent,  so  that  constrained  maximisers  would  only  interact  with  agents  of 
similar disposition and thus constrained maximisation would be a maximising strategy. 
It is vital then that “the straightforward maximiser and the constrained maximiser both 
appear  in  their  true  colours”  (Gauthier  1986:  173).  Gauthier  rightly  asserts  that 
translucency is more realistic than transparency. It is more realistic to assume that actors 
can guess others' disposition at a high probability than that dispositions are just known. 
However, there is no argument as to how translucency comes about and how it can be 
achieved in the real world. The fact that translucency is more realistic than transparency 
does not necessarily make it realistic enough. “[T]he ability to detect  dispositions of 
others must be well developed in a rational CM” (Gauthier, 1986: 181). It is obviously 
rational for one to practice detecting dispositions, but how is this ability developed? The 
problem of guessing others' disposition remains. 
The visibility of one’s disposition is not, in the evolutionary account, as much 
of a problem as it is in Gauthier’s theory. Accepting that agents can be rational within an 
evolutionary  equilibrium, we will have to give a plausible account of how they trust 
others to constrain their maximisation. Within a convention that defines the boundaries 
of  behaviour everyone acts accordingly.  Everyone behaves as if everybody else will 
behave  conventionally.  Thus,  agents  act  conventionally  and  also  rationally  when 
deliberating about whether to defect. Therefore, dispositions become a secondary issue, 
despite  this  account  being  very  close  conceptually  to  the  rationality  of  constrained 
maximisation  in  a  group  of  constrained  maximisers.  In  an  evolutionary  framework 
individuals  can look at  others'  past  interactions in order to  make an educated guess 
about their future behaviour.
Looking at the  stag hunt game can reinforce the argument. If the pay-off of 
hunting hare is 3 and the pay-off of cooperatively hunting stag is 4, everybody would 
hunt stag when they expect everybody else to do the same. This brings us back to the 
problem of disposition translucency. Assuming that a stag hunt was possible during the 
first interaction, those who decided to hunt hare will not be accepted in the next  stag 
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hunt. After repeated hunts, the individual pay-off from hunting stag will be greater than 
the pay-off from hunting hare. This would result in stag hunting becoming the dominant 
strategy. If  stag hunting were impossible at the beginning, this  society would reach a 
hare hunting  equilibrium. It is up to the  individual  rationality of its members then, to 
imitate  a  more  successful  society  that  has  established  a  stag  hunt.  Similarly,  in  a 
repeated prisoners’ dilemma, if one defects the first time the game is played, then it 
should be expected that the second time both will defect and the game will result in a 
non-cooperative equilibrium. If a cooperative equilibrium had been established instead, 
both would be maximising their utility in a repeated game.
In discussing  constrained  maximisation,  Gauthier says: “The just person […] 
has  internalized  the  idea  of  mutual  benefit”  (Gauthier  1986:  157). The  just  person 
though has been shown to be a  rational  person who complies  with the principle  of 
minimax relative  concession. Constrained maximisation is therefore based on the idea 
that rational agents have made fairness part of their rational deliberation. Put differently, 
Gauthier stipulates that rational agents have made morality part of their decision making 
process when they interact with similarly disposed agents. Similarly,  the just  person 
conforms to conventional rules as she wants to avoid deliberation costs and exclusion 
from the conventions that surround her. Repeated interactions within a small population 
ensure free-riders are found and excluded, and thus knowing each other dispositions is 
not a central condition of constrained maximisation.  Interactions evolve as individuals 
grow, learn and gain experience and this has an impact on the way individuals interact. 
Repeated interactions create dynamics that have an effect on the possible strategies and 
outcomes of a game, such as trust and social bonds.  Gauthier argues that an action is 
rational when the final outcome of a series of interactions is maximising, irrespective of 
the outcome of each single action.  Evolutionary game theory also moves the centre of 
interest from the specific action to the final outcome of the interactions that lead to an 
evolutionarily stable strategy. Constrained maximisation implicitly describes long term 
maximisation, which is more sensible as the result of an evolutionary process.
In an  evolutionary  game theory context, disposition visibility is not essential. 
The  fact  that  cooperators  or  non-cooperators  form  groups  that  follow  certain 
conventions makes it highly unlikely that these  conventions will be broken. What is 
more important, it makes it very costly to break these conventions. Rational reflective 
individuals can see how breaking an equilibrium will only pay in the short term. Within 
their  group  they  will  be  punished  by  being  excluded  from  future  conventions.  A 
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population will  only abandon the status-quo for a  Pareto superior  equilibrium point. 
Therefore, the behaviour inside this population can only change through imitation of a 
more successful interaction structure.
Rationality  as  understood  by  Gauthier,  when  he  discusses  constrained  and 
straightforward maximisation in reference to the dispositions of the population, is very 
close to the understanding of  rationality in  evolutionary context.  Gauthier implicitly 
takes  a  holistic  perspective  when  defending  constrained  maximisation:  “A 
straightforward  maximiser  […]  must  expect  to  be  excluded  from  cooperative 
arrangements...”  (Gauthier  1986:  187).  It  is  rational  and  evolutionarily  stable  to 
constrain  maximisation  in  a  population  of  constrained  maximisers.  And  it  is  also 
rational  to  be  a  straightforward  maximiser  in  a  population  of  straightforward 
maximisers.  Rationality  thus  depends  on  the  strategies  employed  by  the  whole 
population and not just one individual. Therefore, a cooperative  society is not always 
the outcome of rational interactions.
The  evolutionary  game  theory  account  presented  in  this  chapter  does  not 
favour cooperation. This can be only one of the possible outcomes. A non-cooperative 
equilibrium is as likely. This is in  agreement with  Gauthier's argument that  justice is 
only rational in a society of constrained maximisers; “[i]n a world of Fooles, it would 
not  pay  to  be  a  constrained  maximiser”  (Gauthier  1986:  183).  A  society  based  on 
constrained maximisation achieves a higher Pareto efficiency point and therefore groups 
of  constrained  maximisers  do  better.  Through  evolutionary  processes,  these  groups' 
behaviour is imitated and replicated. 
4.6 Conclusion
The central argument of this chapter has been that an evolutionary account of behaviour 
can  replace  the  concept  of  constrained  maximisation  as  presented  in  Morals  by 
Agreement without violating the premises of  rational choice theory. Once we accept a 
realistic account of bounded instead of economic rationality, individual rationality does 
not necessarily conflict with holistic explanations of  behaviour.  A  rational agent can 
preserve her  rationality while behaving according to  conventional rules. Her ability to 
reflect on past interactions makes it possible for her to learn and select future strategies 
and  groups  that  maximise  her  utility.  Given  that  rational  agents  interact  within 
populations,  the  most  appropriate  model  to  examine  their  interactions  is  the  one 
provided by  evolutionary  game theory.  EGT is understood as a model to describe the 
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coevolution of maximising strategies and population  dynamics when interactions are 
repeated.
The  analysis  of  this  chapter  has  to  be  put  into  the  context  of  moral 
contractarianism. There is a bi-directional relationship between  social contract theory 
and evolutionary explanation; a stable social contract stems from, and at the same time 
supports, the established  evolutionary  social  conventions. The following chapter will 
look at how evolutionary theory can be used within a contractarian context and lead to a 
sustainable social contract. Contractarianism will be presented as a theory of  dynamic 
interactions similar to the analysis of conventions. Evolutionary theory will then be used 
to discuss how rational agents, interacting in stable conventions, can solve the equilibria 
selection problem and affect the selection a fair social contract that is also evolutionarily 
stable.
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5. Evolution and the Social Contract 
The previous chapter examined the conditions under which it is possible to reconcile 
methodological individualism with holism. The attempt was to show that it is possible 
to have a  conventional account of  constrained maximisation, by incorporating cultural 
evolutionary dynamics in a rational choice framework. The argument of this chapter is 
closely linked and builds on the analysis of the previous chapter. The focus will shift to 
providing  a  more  general  account  of  moral  contractarianism based  on  conventional 
behaviour  and  social  conventions.  The  emphasis  will  be  on  showing  how  social 
conventions whose structure is described through evolutionary dynamics, can justify a 
type  of  evolutionary  contractarianism.  According  to  the  proposed  evolutionary 
contractarianism,  the  social  contract  consists  of  dynamic  social  conventions,  whose 
structure and development is best described through evolutionary game theory.
In order to set the scene for the discussion on dynamic contractarianism, it will 
be useful to reiterate the main points of moral  contractarianism as well as the rational 
framework in which it was introduced by Gauthier. This should make clearer how the 
social contract theory can be examined as a dynamic process.
Moral  contractarianism refers  to  the  idea  that  the  accepted  moral  rules  in  a 
society are the result of mutual understanding; by participating in a society individuals 
accept the moral principles that govern it (Cudd, 2007). The appeal and great strength of 
contractarian theories is that they show that “even if we cannot agree on common ends, 
we can cooperate for mutual benefit.” (Sugden, 1993: 4). Contractarianism assumes that 
people in a society have implicitly agreed on the terms of their interactions and accepted 
the  established  method  of  dividing  the  cooperative  surplus.  Thus,  especially  moral 
contractarianism is based on the assumption that members of a society have consented, 
at  least  hypothetically,  to  the  established  social  rules.  In  other  words,  moral 
contractarianism holds that social norms of morality are based on the rational agreement 
of all participants in the contract; moral rules are appropriate only if they are agreed by 
those who are expected to follow them. 
Therefore,  contractarianism  is  not  a  method  of  enforcing  a  given  moral 
behaviour, but rather it is a mechanism to help rational individuals in a society decide 
the bounds of acceptable  behaviour.  Hence,  its main strength is that it  bypasses the 
discussion  of  what  is  morally  and  ethically  desirable  and  focuses  on  what  can  be 
achieved within a given society. Contractarianism offers an incentive for self-regarding 
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agents to interact for mutual benefit, even when we accept the premises of  individual 
rationality  and  mutual  unconcern;  mutual  unconcern  refers  to  the  fact  that  rational 
agents do not have reasons to care about others' utility maximisation. In a sense this is a 
requirement  for  rationality;  each  one  should  care  about  her  own  maximisation 
irrespectively of how others fare (Morris in Vallentyne, 1991).
The  Hobbesian  account  of  the  social  contract  theory  calls  for  a  strong 
government that would ensure compliance with the terms of the contract and enforce 
social peace (Hobbes, 1976). However, even in Hobbes's hierarchical understanding of 
social  interactions,  the terms of this  peace were assumed to be a  result  of common 
agreement among the members of the commonwealth. This agreement is a mandatory 
prerequisite, even for a contract based on force such as Hobbes's. Similarly, Hume's 
account of the social contract is based on social interactions regulated by reason and the 
subsequent  establishment  of  social  conventions,  and not  on third  party  enforcement 
(Hume, 2008). In Morals by Agreement Gauthier follows the Hobbesian tradition but at 
the  same  time  he  is  influenced  by  Hume's  understanding  of  conventions  of  moral 
behaviour and empathy.
Traditional  contractarian theories use an original position, a  bargaining process 
and an agreement state to define the social contract. The status-quo of a given society 
constitutes the starting point for bargaining. Before bargaining and possible cooperation, 
each  agent  has  access  only  to  the  outcome  of  her  work.  Therefore,  in  order  for 
bargaining to be meaningful, each agent's share of the cooperative surplus should yield 
higher utility than her pre-bargaining one. Hence, the status-quo defines a set of Pareto 
efficient possible bargaining outcomes. Rawls in Theory of Justice (2005) speaks of the 
original position where individuals are behind a veil of ignorance which makes them 
unaware of their possible future position and present characteristics and thus ensures 
impartiality  during  bargaining.  However,  the  veil  of  ignorance  is  an  unrealistic 
limitation on rationality. 
In  Morals  by  Agreement,  Gauthier  proposes  a  more realistic  alternative.  The 
original bargaining position should be non-coercive in order to achieve a stable rational 
social contract. Gauthier argues that “it is rational to comply with a bargain...only if its 
initial  position is  non-coercive” (Gauthier,  1986:  192).  For  Gauthier,  in  the original 
bargaining position both parties'  bargaining power should be similar enough to ensure 
the absence of coercion.  Gauthier and  Rawls have in common the fact that they both 
stipulate that individuals at the original position will be, in a way, moral. In Gauthier's 
105
account  rational  agents  will  choose  to  constrain  their  maximisation  based  on  the 
principle of minimax relative concession. There is no adequate explanation however as 
to  why  a  rational  maximising  agent  will  choose  to  constrain  her  maximisation  in 
accordance with the MRC and thus forfeit potential greater benefit from the bargain; in 
MbA  agents aim exclusively at maximisation of individual utility not optimisation of 
social welfare. The Lockean Proviso that to an extent is used to justify the MRC, also 
relies  on  moral  and  not  strictly  rational  grounds.  Reflective  rationality  in  repeated 
interactions deals with this issue. Hence, implicit moral constraints in Gauthier's theory 
can be replaced by rational deliberation provided we accept all interactions are repeated 
or perceived as infinitely repeated.
Contractarian thought in all its shades, is comprised of a two-step process: the 
initial  bargaining procedure and the  agreement point (Vallentyne, 1991). As far as the 
original bargaining position is concerned, there is tension as to whether it refers to an 
actual historical time or it is a hypothetical structure. Being a hypothetical point as in 
Gauthier's theory, poses problems in that a hypothetical argument cannot generate actual 
responsibilities (Cudd, 2007). However, a hypothetical thought experiment can be used 
as a method of deriving principles of moral behaviour in a rational choice framework. 
For  Gauthier  the  original  bargaining  position  is  defined  by  the  Lockean  Proviso 
(Gauthier, 1986), which ensures the impartiality of the initial position and therefore the 
fairness of the subsequent contract. Hence, the eventual agreement point depends on the 
original  position  and  the  characterisation  of  the  individuals  which  in  Morals  by  
Agreement are assumed to be rational, mutually-unconcerned agents. 
The previous chapters have examined how the assumptions of contractarianism 
can be problematic through looking at the criticism aimed at  Morals by Agreement. In 
the  following  paragraphs,  evolutionary  social  conventions  will  be  used  to  replace 
traditional  contractarian  concepts  such  as  the  original  position  and  the  bargaining 
process. The original position will still have a hypothetical role, which however will be 
shown to be dynamic. The bargaining process is not essential in an evolutionary account 
of interactions; infinitely repeated interactions render a  bargaining process redundant. 
Contractarianism  is  to  be  thought  of  as  a  dynamic  process  where  changes  in  the 
population cause shifts in the contract and successive generations are not morally bound 
by  the  agreements  made  without  their  consent.  The  following  section  will  analyse 
dynamic  contractarianism and its  relation to  social  conventions.  In order to  do this, 
dynamic  contractarianism  will  be  examined  by  looking  at  its  main  characteristics, 
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namely its dynamic nature, the importance of conventions that evolve, the rationality of 
individuals and a bargaining process whose significance is downgraded by comparison 
to traditional theories of the social contract. The next section will examine the dynamic 
nature of contractarianism and argue that when the social contract paradigm is enriched 
is seen as a dynamic process.
5.1 Dynamic Contractarianism
The  following  paragraphs  will  examine  whether  an  account  of  evolutionary 
contractarianism can be plausible. The discussion will revolve around the assertion that 
contractarianism is a  dynamic process including successive generations of interacting 
agents selecting new equilibria that will serve as the new social contract. A description 
of social conventions and their relationship with the social contract, in conjunction with 
the  dynamics in their structure should show that the  evolutionary account is closer to 
reality  than the static explanation traditionally used.  Showing that  selecting a  social 
contract  is  a  dynamic  process  is  essential  if  we  are  to  accept  a  description  of 
contractarianism that  is  based on  evolutionary  game theory.  Although, not explicitly 
stated in traditional  contractarian theories, they are  dynamic in that the terms of the 
contract are subject to change and the contractors also change as generations replace 
one another.
5.1.1 The social contract dynamics
After the establishment of the  social contract,  contractarian theory does not explicitly 
presuppose  that  this  contract  and  its  rules  cannot  be  changed.  A  social  contract 
determines  the  rules  of  social  behaviour  for  a  variable  period  of  time  with  more 
successful social contracts lasting longer. Therefore, contracts can be changed and take 
effect successively, provided all contractors agree. This understanding of social contract 
theory  can  be  derived  from  the  theory's  basic  principles.  Contractarianism  is  an 
agreement based on common understanding. Unless we assume there is a metaphysical 
truth or that we should aim towards a good life as defined by non-humans or humans 
with superior intellectual capabilities that “play God” (Gauthier & Sugden, 1993: 4), the 
contract is a human construct. As such it changes when individual preferences change. 
To argue otherwise one would have to claim that  human preferences and the social 
environment  remain  unchanged irrespectively  of  population  dynamics,  technological 
and environmental changes. The speed of change can vary and may be incremental, but 
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the fact remains that once we accept the basic premises of  contractarianism we also 
have to accept its dynamic nature. 
A realistic contractarianism should be thought of as a dynamic and subsequently 
an  evolutionary process. Just as organisms evolve to become fitter for survival,  social 
structures evolve so as to adapt to  evolutionary pressures applied by population and 
environmental shifts. Given that established conventions are the components of a social 
contract, conventions also change accordingly. Social contracts and conventions can be 
thought  of  as  super-games  and  sub-games  respectively,  where  the  equilibria  are 
interdependent and a shift in one causes an  equilibrium change to the other. A social 
contract  cannot  evolve  without  its  components  evolving  just  as  a  super-game 
equilibrium cannot change without affecting its sub-game equilibria. At the same time, a 
hypothetical change in the  social  contract that is  not accompanied by change in the 
underlying  conventions,  will  cause the  conventions to change as well,  or lead to an 
unstable social contract.
Contractarianism is a dynamic process since the parties in the contract change as 
generations of individuals change while individuals' preferences change as a result of 
the behaviour dynamics within a population. Thus, the social contract is dynamic; as its 
members or their preferences change, the structure and the terms of the contract change 
accordingly.  Changes do not need to occur in the basic principles of the contract to 
justify talk of dynamic contractarianism; they can be made up of small adjustments as a 
result of local  convention changes. In addition, a single  conventional shift to a higher 
utility  equilibrium does not need to result in the social contract reaching higher social 
welfare. The salience and popularity of each convention is central in the effect it has on 
the social contract. 
According to the evolutionary understanding of contractarianism, for each new 
generation or for new participants the original position is the status-quo when they first 
started interacting within the given social contract. Thus, the original position is merely 
another  equilibrium  point  in  the  dynamic  process  of  contractarian  evolution.  As 
discussed in Chapter Four, an evolutionarily stable equilibrium is only stable for as long 
as the environmental parameters allow and require its existence (Young, 2001). Similar 
to  biological  evolution that does not stop (Ridley, 1994), the  evolution of the  social 
contract is a continuous process of successive equilibria. The most successful ones last 
longer and historically most social contracts last longer than several human generations. 
Therefore,  social contract change is most frequently incremental by human biological 
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standards and only  conventional change can be perceived directly and influenced by 
individuals.
In a more realistic context the original position is the result of a historical and 
cultural  process.  The  moral  and  political  principles  that  govern  our  societies  have 
developed over time to accommodate changed cultural beliefs about what is right. For 
instance,  if  enslavement  of  people  with  different  skin  colour  is  acceptable  at  the 
status-quo,  the  renewed  social  contract  cannot  be  dramatically  different;  people's 
perceptions depend on and were formed by the status-quo. Therefore, an  equilibrium 
change might shift perceptions to accepting that only a specific skin colour justifies 
enslavement before rejecting enslavement all together.
The terms and structure of successive social contracts depend on the respective 
equilibria that serve as original positions. A social contract leads to a new status-quo, 
which in turn affects the terms of the next  social contract. Since a  social contract is 
assumed to consist of social conventions, it is the dynamic structure of conventions that 
direct the changes on the general level of  society. Social  conventions and the  social 
contract  coevolve;  although the  contract  structure  depends on its  social  conventions 
similar to the ways that a super-game depends on its sub-games, a social contract also 
serves  as  the  status-quo  and  therefore,  influences  the  possible  changes  of  the 
conventions as well. Their relationship is bidirectional with the social contract defining 
the bounds for the  social  conventions, whereas  conventional change is essential for a 
change in the social contract.
In that respect, it is essential to look into the structure of conventions as well as 
the dynamics of their changes in order to obtain a better understanding of the dynamics 
of the social contract.
5.1.2 Conventional change
The  evolution of  conventions is influenced by pre-existing  social  contracts. A stable 
social contract implies the previous existence of stable social conventions. As discussed 
previously,  repeated interactions lead to  rational  conventions that in turn lead to the 
establishment  of  a  social  contract.  Thus,  the  stability  of  the  conventions  directly 
influences the stability of the social contract and the absence of – stable – conventions is 
equivalent to the absence of a – stable – social contract. Driving on the left, stopping at 
the red light, signing on a turn, giving priority to an ambulance, are all instances of 
conventional  behaviour that make safe driving possible. If one collapses, it  does not 
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necessarily follow that  the rest  will  also collapse.  But  if  all  are  followed by all,  or 
almost all drivers, then the driving contract will be more stable and efficient. Moreover, 
although these  conventions are not immediately related to  conventions such as slave 
ownership  they  can  be  components  of  the  same  social  contract.  Changes  in  one 
convention will not necessarily lead to changes for very different  social  conventions; 
however, given adequate time in a cultural evolutionary framework they can lead to the 
destabilisation of other  conventions either via a topical change or through a change in 
the social contract.
Successful  conventional change provides incentives for  rational individuals to 
learn new behaviour and adopt new strategies. A successful shift to a new convention is 
more likely to make a greater number of  rational actors willing to abandon their old 
strategies, thus accelerating the shift. Hence, a conventional change can have an effect 
on the strategies employed in a different convention as long as some of the individuals 
participating in the first  convention also participate in the second one. Conventional 
change is contagious and it can lead to a change in the social contract, in ways similar to 
the  ways a  hare  hunter  can  pollute  a  stag hunting population  (Skyrms,  2004).  This 
account of  conventional change also explains its slow pace, which will be discussed 
more analytically and in relation to the real world in Chapters Seven and Eight.
Conventional change is based on individuals' learning process. Individuals learn 
through a trial and error process and by imitating  behaviour that yields higher utility. 
Both mechanisms require information availability and also a trial period for the newly 
adopted  behaviour. Even in cases where information spreading is quick and accurate, 
adopting a new  strategy within a group is costly and time-consuming. Shifting from 
driving on the left to driving on the right includes practical costs and a learning process 
for the drivers; abolishing slavery requires a new understanding and organisation of the 
economy (among other things). Moreover, reaching a point where deliberation about 
change is possible is also part of the changing process. In the driving  convention the 
change may take centuries  (Young,  2001),  whereas  abolishing slave ownership in a 
given society may happen a few years after a long process of perceptions shifting. These 
examples do not mean that conventional change must occur exclusively over very long 
periods  of  time,  but  they  are  supposed  to  show  how  learning  and  the  subsequent 
equilibrium  shift  can  be  very  time-consuming  and  incremental.  Therefore,  social 
contracts need to shift slowly or otherwise their stability will be questionable. In other 
words  swift  changes  of  the  equilibrium  may  lead  to  social  contracts  that  are  not 
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evolutionarily stable (they can be destabilised by intruders) and are not supported by an 
adequate basis of stable topical social conventions. 
A  social  contract  needs  all  or  at  least  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
population to behave according to its rules in order to be effective. In addition, the slow 
process of conventional change discussed above means that there is no effective way to 
enforce an abrupt change in conventional behaviour. Conventions that are the outcome 
of rational interaction are stable because no party has an incentive to abandon them. At 
the same time repeated interactions between rational individuals can only lead to stable 
conventions. Enforced conventions by a third party that are not in accordance with the 
previously established conventions and do not take into account the interaction history 
cannot be stable; since a social convention is the equilibrium at a series of interactions, 
its  stability  and  duration  are  based  on  the  fact  that  these  interactions  were  among 
rational agents and thus cannot include coercion. Therefore, a stable convention must be 
the result of repeated rational interactions and its  stability is ensured by the rationality 
of its members. 
After  having  discussed  the  dynamics  and  the  possible  changes  in  social 
conventions, the focus will shift to how rational agents can affect the equilibrium point 
in a convention and subsequently in the social contract.
5.1.3 Rationality in the social contract 
Contractarianism  is  a  method  to  derive  principles  of  justice  that  will  govern  our 
behaviour.  These  principles  of  justice  do  not  have  to  agree  with  specific  ideals  of 
justice.  Since  they  are  the  outcome  of  a  contract  among  individuals  of  similar 
rationality, we have no reason to denounce them as non-just. A rational agent would not 
accept a contract if she thought it limits her  maximisation. And since all contractors 
would  do the  same,  the  final  contract  will  be  one that  maximises  the  utility  of  all  
contractors given the limitations of social interaction. Hence, it will be in a situation 
where social welfare is Pareto efficient. This understanding of justice does not have to 
be in agreement with any form of cultural understanding of justice. However, this does 
not mean that culture is irrelevant. The history and culture of a society determines the 
culture of individuals who draw the contract. Their rationality is, in a sense, defined by 
their cultural  environment. The ability to deliberate and the availability of information 
are similar in all members of a group and therefore they are all equally rational. 
In  Morals  by Agreement  rationality  and  justice  are  presented in  terms of  a 
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contract.  Gauthier's  is  a  contractarian  theory  of  rational  choice  and  justice. 
Contractarianism plays  a  connecting  role;  the  underlying  idea  of  mutual  agreement 
refers  to  both  rationality  and  justice.  Justice is  however  broadly understood here as 
something that  agents  of roughly equal status would agree on.  On the  contractarian 
account  any  interaction  between  similarly  rational  agents  is  just  (Murray,  1999). 
Contractarianism thus provides a framework where it is possible to combine justice and 
rationality.  Furthermore,  contractarian  theory  is  central  to  the  understanding  of 
evolution  and  rationality  presented  here.  Contractarianism does  not  need  to  play  a 
central role in explaining how rational interactions can be described in the context of 
evolution, but it is ideal in linking rationality with morality and justice. And thus it can 
be used to discuss the relationship between  moral  behaviour and  evolutionary  game 
theory. 
The following subsection discusses the bargaining procedure as it is typically 
used in the contemporary contractarian tradition. Although the evolutionary account of 
the  social contract bypasses the need for  bargaining, the discussion in the following 
paragraphs is useful in examining the advantages of a  conventional explanation of the 
social contract. In addition, a type of  bargaining still takes place in the  conventional 
account;  rational agents' interactions lead to an  equilibrium. These interactions can be 
seen as a bargaining procedure embedded in the game and with no need for a distinction 
between bargaining and game interactions. The next subsection will look more closely 
at the  bargaining procedure in the account of  dynamic  convention that was presented 
earlier.
5.1.4 Bargaining
Although the  dynamic account of the  social  contract and its  component  conventions 
presented above does not require a bargaining process like the one found in traditional 
contractarianism,  the  concept  of  bargaining  is  still  present  and  essential  in 
understanding the  equilibrium selection process. Bargaining is assumed to take place 
between rational individuals who want make the most of the possibilities of cooperation 
and  subsequently  maximise  their  share  of  the  cooperative  surplus.  In  Hobbes's 
Leviathan (Hobbes, 1976) the state of nature is used as the starting point and incentive 
for  bargaining.  Similarly,  in  Morals  by  Agreement bargaining  begins  at  the  original 
position,  which  is  the  status-quo  to  be  compared  with  the  eventual  share  of  the 
cooperative surplus. In the conventional account, the original position will be taken to 
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be the given status-quo which does not need to be idealised or abstract.
A basic  bargaining  procedure  is  defined  by  the  Edgeworth  box  and  Pareto 
optimality  and describes  a  simplified model  of  the  interaction  between two  rational 
individuals. It is valuable because, in its simplicity, it provides a concise description of 
the  possible  outcomes  of  an  interaction.  The  Edgeworth  box  in  its  simplest  form 
exhibits  the  interaction  between two persons  trading with  two goods.  Each player's 
utility is represented by her indifference curves which are tangential when both agents 
maximise. The contract curve is the line connecting all such points and constitutes the 
set of Pareto optimal trading points. Since both agents are rational, the outcome of their 
interaction will be found on this contract curve. At the beginning of their interaction 
each player has a set amount of a good which, on its own, does not maximise her utility. 
As trading proceeds the players move to higher utility levels until they reach a  Pareto 
optimal  trade  point,  where  their  utility  is  the  maximum possible.  There  is  a  single 
optimal point where both players maximise, but there are many points where collective 
welfare is at a maximum. The exact point of  agreement then depends on the players 
bargaining skills.
Bargaining  is  central  to  contractarianism  and  to  the  concept  of  the  social 
contract. In essence, bargaining is an agreement on the responsibilities that derive from 
the contract. Put differently, it sets out the rules of the game. Two agents who interact 
repeatedly will either have to  bargain repeatedly over the rules of their interaction or 
agree that their  first  agreement  will  be binding for all  their  subsequent interactions. 
However, their interactions will be continuously changing their history and therefore 
their maximisation strategies. It is more plausible then to assume that agreement points 
will be more stable when they are decided on a more frequent basis. Each  agreement 
point can be used for a number of interactions. Then a new bargaining procedure can be 
initiated  by  either  agent  when he  believes  the  existing  contract  is  outdated.  In  this 
account  bargaining  is  part  of  the  interaction;  the  agents'  repeated  bargaining  and 
interactions are part of an enlarged game consisting of periods of negotiation and longer 
periods of interaction (Binmore, 1998). Assuming repeated interactions means that the 
interacting  agents  have  similar  histories,  or  at  least  each  agent's  history  is  known. 
Therefore  their  strategy  can  be  predicted.  In  game  theoretical  terms,  repeated 
interactions make that the game played cooperative.
Following  Binmore's  discussion  of  the  Nash  bargaining  solution  –  which 
eventually  was accepted by  Gauthier  as  well  (Gauthier  & Sugden,  1993) -  the  two 
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bargaining  agents  have  roughly  similar  bargaining  skills  (Binmore,  2007).  Their 
bargaining skills are included in the  rationality  function and since they act in similar 
environments their bargaining skill-set will be similar. The bargaining game therefore is 
symmetric as far as the players' rationality and bargaining powers are concerned. Given 
repeated  interactions,  even  in  the  case  where  their  bargaining  skills  are  not  strictly 
symmetric, they will converge to being similar enough to not have an impact on their 
bargaining. Their repeated interactions are a trial and error procedure, where the least 
skilful  player  has  the  opportunity  to  learn  and  improve.  And  by reflecting  on  past 
interactions,  she  will  be  able  to  improve  her  bargaining  skills.  Therefore,  once  we 
assume  repeated,  non-random interactions  bargaining  skills  are  also  assumed  to  be 
similar.
The  bargaining  procedure  changes  once  we  accept  the  repetitiveness  of 
interactions. A bargaining problem has a starting point, break-down point and agreement 
point.  Rational  agents  compare  their  utilities  under  each  and  adopt  maximising 
strategies. In repeated  bargaining games, there cannot be a break-down point. In the 
case where there can be no agreement, the agent will  bargain with someone new who 
will  be  more  willing  to  accept  her  claims.  Rational  reflection  on  the  bargaining 
procedure and the contract point of each interaction results in players choosing whether 
they will interact with the same person in the future. In this sense, the role of rationality 
in the bargaining is two-fold: first, during bargaining players are assumed to be rational. 
Secondly, when  bargaining has reached a likely  agreement point, when the available 
information about the terms of the  agreement can be contrasted with other contracts. 
Thus, salient maximising strategies will develop. Individuals with similar maximising 
strategies  will  tend  to  bargain  with  each  other  giving  rise  to  specific  bargaining 
strategies and solutions. In conclusion, in a repeated interaction framework, bargaining 
strategies converge and over time rational agents adopt similar strategies.
5.1.5 Dynamic contractarianism: Conclusion
In the above paragraphs, it  was argued that  rational agents will look to  bargain and 
interact with agents of similar dispositions and behaviour, as these are revealed by their 
interaction history. Viewing the original bargaining position as a point in historical time 
ensures that it is plausible to assume that agents' past interactions are roughly known 
within a social group. Therefore,  rational agents will seek to interact with those who 
have adopted similar strategies and with whom there are not extreme inequalities in 
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power or bargaining skills. 
A rational agent will not initiate bargaining with another agent when the latter is 
in a position to enforce his claims; if there are not any other options, any interactions 
will be in essence coercive. However, this is not a requirement for complete equality at 
the  original  bargaining  position.  The  two  agents  can  vary  in  their  rationality  and 
bargaining skills as long as this inequality is not so great as to allow unilateral costless 
coercion. In addition, coercion includes application costs which should be taken into 
account  during  bargaining.  When A forces B into agreement,  A's  pay-off  should be 
discounted by the cost of enforcement. This is a cost A does not have to bear when the 
agreement  is  in  B's  best  interest  as  well.  Columbus  would  have  to  enslave  native 
Americans only if the cost of enslavement were smaller than the concession he would 
have to make during bargaining. Thus, coercion is not always the easy solution for the 
more powerful party, as it bears costs that last for the duration of the contract.
Compliance with the terms of the contract is a secondary issue. Each agent's 
history is known and the  bargaining process, being part of the interaction itself,  is a 
repeated game. A rational agent will not continue participating in a game when this does 
not help her maximise her utility.  Therefore the issue of compliance is in essence a 
problem of participation in the repeated interaction. The repeated game that starts with 
bargaining concludes with compliance.
 The  following  section  will  analyse  further  the  understanding  of 
contractarianism in an evolutionary framework. Having shown that contractarianism can 
be seen as a dynamic process, this understanding will have to be linked more explicitly 
to the evolutionary account of social structures.
5.2 Evolutionary Contractarianism
An account of evolutionary contractarianism can be used complementary to the above 
discussion  of  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  social  contract.  Although  evolutionary 
contractarianism  is  in  many  ways  difficult  to  distinguish  from  dynamic 
contractarianism, it is essential to discuss them separately. The following is an analysis 
that is heavily based in the previous section on dynamic contractarianism. However, this 
section attempts to make more explicit the ways that evolutionary theory can work in a 
contractarian framework. The account of  evolutionary contractarianism presented here 
depends  on the  explanation  of  dynamic  contractarianism and they share  a  common 
understanding of conventional change and individual rationality.
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Social contracts are defined by the original position, the  bargaining procedure, 
and the  agreement point reached. In  dynamic  contractarianism, the distinction is not 
clear.  The original position is also the outcome of  bargaining and defines the set of 
possible  outcomes  for  subsequent  bargaining.  The  contract  itself  –  the  agreement 
bargainers reach – is apparently linked and bounded by the procedure and its strength 
lies on the fact that it  is  the result  of repeated interactions between  rational  agents. 
Therefore, dynamic contractarianism does not need to be defined by an original position 
as the previously reached  equilibrium serves as the status-quo for  bargaining; it also 
does not need a bargaining procedure as in a context of repeated interactions claims are 
replaced by actions. Finally, the evolutionarily stable equilibrium constitutes the social 
contract; however, unlike mainstream contractarianism, the dynamic social contract has 
a long-lasting but not permanent status.
Dynamic  contractarianism as understood through  social  conventions views the 
social  contract  as  a  fluid  succession  of  equilibria  points  where  the  more  successful 
social  contracts  are  the most  long-lived ones.  Similarly,  the original  position is  just 
another  equilibrium  point  defined  by  the  previously  established  social  contract. 
Furthermore,  the  agreement  point  does  not  have  to  be  implicitly  or  hypothetically 
agreed upon; it  is  enough that  rational  agents continue behaving in  a way that will 
preserve the equilibrium.
As discussed in the previous section, according to the dynamic understanding of 
contractarianism agreement is implicit and a result of repeated small scale interactions. 
A  common  understanding  of  behaviour  under  certain  circumstances  leads  to  the 
establishment  of  conventions  of  behaviour.  And  as  interactions  multiply,  these 
conventions expand to cover more aspects of social life. The result is social conventions 
that deal with all or almost all aspects of social interaction. These conventions that solve 
problems of  everyday  interaction  provide  the  basis  of  a  commonly  accepted  social 
contract. The  social contract is thus an extension of established  social  conventions. A 
convention that is imported or enforced without the necessary time to evolve cannot be 
effective in dealing with problems of social interaction. For instance, a law by which the 
British should drive on the right would obviously be inefficient; it would lead to traffic 
accidents  and  road  chaos.  A stable  convention  cannot  be  changed  without  being 
destabilised by forces similar to those that lead to its creation. Driving on the right could 
become  the  norm  over  time,  even  if  it  were  enforced;  however,  political  decision 
making  processes  are  also  based  on  social  conventions  that  have  been  established 
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through similar procedures. The point is that a social convention that has to come into 
being and is stable and efficient implies and needs social approval; in a sense this is 
tautological as it is social practices that lead to the creation of conventions in the first 
place.  Thus,  the  social  learning  processes  that  occurred  during  the  creation  of  the 
convention also have to take place during its replacement. If the social convention does 
not pass through stages of trial and error and testing to the specific conditions, it cannot 
be successful.
Binmore argues that a social contract is “the set of all the commonly understood 
coordinating conventions” (Binmore 1998: 5), which is a common account for the social 
contract  of  both  human  and  animal  societies.  Also  for  Binmore,  our  individual 
understanding  of  moral  behaviour  comes  from  our  evolutionary  past.  A  second 
understanding of how evolution can be used to explain social structures and concepts of 
morality,  also  proposed  by  Binmore,  is  that  human  social  structures  follow  an 
evolutionary  pattern.  Similar  to  natural  selection,  human  societies  have  developed 
mechanisms to create and select  social structures that are stable and maximise utility 
and  welfare.  Social  and cultural  evolution  as  discussed  here  refer  to  the  latter;  the 
conventions and norms that are the product of repeated interactions between and among 
individuals  and  groups. The  evolution  of  social  structures  define  societies'  moral 
principles; and as different societies have followed different  evolutionary paths, their 
moral social contract is different.
The  “game  of  morals”  (Binmore  1998:  12)  is  about  the  rules  of  behaviour 
determined by society. It concerns a definition of morality as understood by a society. 
Since  it  is  the  outcome  of  social  interactions  over  extended  periods  of  time  and 
generations, a change in the game of morals would take long periods of time. Therefore, 
even if there is an individual or a group of individuals within a society with the will to 
change the game of morals, it will take a long process to change a behaviour pattern that 
was  established  over  generations.  Each  game  of  morals  consists  of  conventions  of 
behaviour  that  can  be  seen  as  sub-games  of  the  super-game  of  morals.  And  these 
conventions are usually easier to change than the game of morals as a whole. Driving on 
the right or left is such a convention. Helping those in need is another. The aggregation 
of all those  conventions results in a game of morals – a  social contract that defines 
social values. 
A convention – a sub-game equilibrium that is Pareto superior to the feasible 
alternatives – will become established over time as a result of repeated non-random 
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interactions. If for instance two British drivers start driving on the right and for some 
reason this proves to be better for both, more drivers will follow until the convention 
changes. This example shows that it is not always as simple as someone figuring out a 
better way to do things. Many social conventions are impossible to change unless there 
is some environmental change that facilitates or even forces change. If there is some 
improbable technological development that simply makes driving on the left too costly 
or too inconvenient, then the driving convention will change. Conventions and 
convention changes cannot be imposed. A new law requiring that driving rules should 
be changed in Britain is not enough for drivers to get used to driving on the right and to 
abandon long established behaviour. Laws that oppose well-established social 
conventions are too costly to implement because a stable convention can only be 
replaced by another stable convention; and conventional stability depends on topical 
interaction and evolution. For instance, the alcohol prohibition in the U.S.A. from 1920 
to 1933 was unsuccessful to a large extent because it did not take into account 
established behaviours (Thornton, 1991). Similarly, the laws against drunk driving that 
came into force in most western countries from the 1970's were the result of commonly 
accepted scientific evidence and a subsequent public dialogue with little opposition, in 
addition to the fact that it was based on a process that in the U.S.A. had started in 1910 
(Ross, 1994).
Conventions such as the ones described in the previous paragraph can be seen as 
the equilibria of games played between individuals in smaller groups, just like the 
driving convention is an equilibrium for drivers. An equilibrium change to one of the 
sub-games can have an effect on other related sub-games. And changes in the 
equilibrium of several sub-games can cause the super-game equilibrium to shift. All 
these interactions and stable conventions can also complement the contractarian 
approach. From a contractarian point of view, a repeated game that reaches a stable 
equilibrium is a contract binding the interacting agents who with their past actions have 
agreed to the contract terms.
The contractarian approach to conventions can be analysed as an evolutionary 
process. A stable convention is replaced by another over several generations. Even when 
the new equilibrium is apparently superior, there are psychological reasons and special 
interests that will resist change. Given a hypothetical technological development that 
makes driving on the right more effective, it is easy to imagine a situation where car  
manufacturers  oppose  the  change  in  order  to  avoid  extra  costs.  Put  differently, 
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individuals  with  different  levels  of  information  (and  thus  different  maximising 
strategies), will have various opposing goals. Over generations, the rationality of a goal 
can become more obvious, and resistance to change unreasonable. Of course, this is not 
a one-way street; it is not a given that information about a specific issue becomes more 
readily available over generations. 
In the case of information restrictions, provided that an alternative equilibrium 
is superior, change will come from imitating societies that have adopted the change and 
do better,  unless  there  is  a  complete  information  blockage.  Therefore,  neighbouring 
equilibria play an important role in the  evolution of  conventions and the subsequent 
social  contracts.  Evolution to superior equilibria is  balanced by a kind of backward 
evolution. A social contract can collapse if there are no successful conventions to imitate 
or its constitutive conventions have reached an evolutionary dead-end. In historical and 
anthropological terms, societies have been locked in vicious cycles such as a status-quo 
of  a  war  of  all  against  all,  where  the  status-quo  reinforces  the  continuity  of  the 
sub-optimal equilibria.
“Natural selection leads organisms to evolve adaptations – traits that enhance 
their chance of survival and reproduction” (Okasha, 2006: 11). The same is true for the 
evolution of social structures. The social structures that survive and become stable are 
the  ones  that  develop  traits  that  make  them  fitter  that  the  competing  structures. 
Therefore the stable social conventions that have reached an equilibrium and constitute 
the  social contract, are the result of a process similar to natural selection. The less fit 
social contracts do not become extinct as a matter of natural selection though, they are 
being abandoned by individuals when it becomes apparent that there are social contracts 
that are  Pareto superior. This procedure is described by  Skyrms (2004). In the  social 
structure  and  the  social  contract,  Skyrms  describes  how  the  behaviour  of  one's 
neighbours affects one's  rational  strategy. At the level of  society  cooperation is  Pareto 
efficient. In cooperative societies the cooperative surplus is higher and therefore they 
maximise social welfare through  cooperation. In non-cooperative  social contracts, the 
conflict costs are too high for social welfare to be comparable with that of a cooperative 
social contract. In natural  evolution, the fittest species or organisms produce the most 
offspring and thus, have more chances to survive in an evolutionary time frame. In the 
evolutionary approach to the  social contract, it  is the  social structure that maximises 
social welfare that becomes the norm, or that in any case leads to a stable equilibrium
This description of conventions and their evolution is very closely linked to the 
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idea of memes (Dawkins, 1976). Just like memes, conventions can imitate, replicate and 
evolve. More accurately, the individuals participating in a convention can change their 
behaviour  so  as  to  cause  the  conventional  equilibrium  to  change;  individuals  who 
imitate  more  successful  strategies  in  neighbouring  conventions  are  essential  for 
conventional  evolution.  Equilibria  can  be  affected  by  neighbouring  equilibria  in  a 
similar  way that  memes affect  each other;  information  is  easier  and quicker  spread 
between  neighbours  and  hence,  an  individual's  or  a  convention's  neighbourhood  is 
paramount  for  the  local  equilibrium.  Thus,  the  concepts  of  biological  and  cultural 
memes, or else  conventional  behaviour, are very close. However, in biological memes 
there is no room for  individual  rationality and initiative whereas in cultural  evolution 
rational  reflection can explain how certain memes evolve while  others  disappear.  A 
cultural meme will do better in evolutionary terms when the individuals who follow it 
reflect on their actions; simply put, more useful memes are more successful. Thinking 
of conventions as memes gives a better idea of how conventions can evolve in a manner 
that  is  similar  in  many ways  to  the  evolution  of  memes.  Just  as  memes  affect  the 
evolutionary path of a species, cultural memes affect the evolutionary stability of social 
contracts.
The fact that individuals within the evolutionary context are assumed to retain 
a form of rationality that allows them to deliberate about their own history and also to 
gather  and assess  information  about  others'  strategies,  reinforces  the  account  of  the 
evolution of the  social  contract presented above. Individual  rationality operates as a 
periodic steering mechanism that  keeps  evolutionary  dynamics  under  control.  When 
evolutionary forces lead to outcomes that are unacceptable for the  rationality of the 
majority, local rational interaction will alter the evolutionary path.
A two-person  repeated  interaction  that  maximises  both  agents'  utilities  is 
preferable to one that is maximising for just one party of the interaction. In  repeated 
games, the strategy that leads to maximisation of the social welfare also leads to utility 
maximisation.  In  the  repeated  version  of  the  prisoner's  dilemma  cooperation  is 
maximising, just like stag hunting is the maximising strategy in a stag hunt game, and in 
a hawk-dove game hawkish  behaviour is destructive for both. Given these two actors 
are  surrounded by  rational  self-reflecting  individuals,  maximising  behaviour  will  be 
contagious. The result will be a stable maximising social convention that regulates the 
behaviour of the “neighbourhood”. Similarly, this stable, maximising convention will be 
imitated by other rational groups. 
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Individuals who decide to follow a convention or enter a social contract, do so 
because they think it will maximise their utility. Those who think it does not, do not 
participate in the same conventions or  social contracts. Agents with similar history of 
interactions living in similar environments, develop similar rationality. They will expect 
others to behave similarly to them and this makes it possible to have a stable  social 
contract. Therefore agents participating in agreements, develop bonds that reinforce the 
stability of their agreements, without the need to abandon the assumption of rationality. 
They have the capacity to reflect on the terms of the bargain and its outcome and decide 
whether they will continue following the same rules.
This section proposed an account of evolutionary contractarianism that is based 
on  conventions  whose  structure  is  best  explained  through  evolutionary  theory. 
Individualistic  methodology  assumes  that  social  behaviour  can  be  understood  by 
analysing it to its components, that is the actions of individuals. In the  evolutionary 
contractarian  account,  social  behaviour  is  analysed  first  at  the  level  of  the  social 
contract, then at the level of topical social conventions before reaching the examination 
of individual behaviour. The following section will turn to the examination of equilibria 
selection; according to the folk theorem (Binmore, 2007),  repeated games have many 
stable  equilibria.  Therefore  the  same  applies  to  evolutionary  games  that  are  a 
subcategory of repeated games. However, the evolutionary account of human behaviour 
can be problematic because it is indifferent between different stable equilibria.
5.3 Equilibria Selection and Justice
The discussion in the previous section and Chapter Four should have made clear that 
evolutionary  accounts  of  human  behaviour  and  the  social  contract  do  not  pose  a 
problem for methodological individualism and the assumption of individual rationality. 
On the contrary, the two paradigms can be used in conjunction in order to form a more 
plausible theory of human behaviour within societies. However, selecting among stable 
evolutionary  equilibria  is  problematic  when  individuals  are  rational.  In  biological 
evolution it is indifferent which stable equilibrium will be selected. In cultural evolution 
there  are  many stable  equilibria  that  are  not  Pareto  efficient;  rational  agents  would 
prefer  a  Pareto  efficient  status,  but  individual  behaviour  cannot  always  counter 
evolutionary forces. 
Social cooperation in animal societies is essential for species survival. In human 
societies the same is not necessarily true. We have no reason to hope that “a species will  
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learn to cooperate even when the conditions are seemingly favourable” (Binmore 1998: 
204). That is especially true for the human species. Being able to play a game of morals 
in addition to the game of life, does not mean that we are able to overcome natural 
restrictions  and  instincts.  Humans,  just  like  all  species,  are  selfish.  However,  our 
rationality makes it  possible  for us to fit  our selfishness in  a social  context.  Unlike 
social animals like ants and bees, humans can be members of a society and at the same 
time be individualistic.
As was discussed in the previous section, there are many stable equilibria. A 
sub-optimal Pareto equilibrium can be a Nash equilibrium. In such a case, a society is 
trapped in a non-maximising social contract. The theory of evolution does not give an 
account of why a  society would move from a sub-optimal  equilibrium to an optimal 
one.  In  the  evolutionary  contractarian  account  there  is  no  method  by  which  the 
equilibrium can improve to  a  Pareto  superior  point.  Cultural  evolution,  similarly  to 
natural evolution, follows a self-determined path. Cultural  evolution can lead to failed 
social contracts, in which case a new  bargaining procedure begins. Individuals affect 
evolution  by  way  of  affecting  the  equilibrium  in  small  scale  games  that  lead  to 
conventions.  Therefore,  individuals,  and  more  likely  groups,  can  destabilise  an 
equilibrium.  But  given  the  fact  that  cultural  evolution  takes  generations  to  evolve, 
individuals from just one generation cannot alter its course. The main issue is at which 
points  cultural  evolution  pauses;  how the  equilibrium points,  conventions  or  social 
contracts, are decided. 
A Nash equilibrium is reached when both players have made their best possible 
move. Therefore repeated interactions will stop at a Nash equilibrium. Binmore (2004) 
argues that a second necessary condition for a stable social contract is Pareto efficiency. 
Efficiency  is  paramount  and  a  social  contract  that  is  both  stable  and  efficient  is 
obviously preferable. In terms of biological evolution, equilibria that are stable but not 
efficient  still  survive.  However,  in  cultural  evolution  a  stable  and  efficient  social 
contract  will  take  over,  given  long  enough  time;  given  rational  agents  and 
communication between conventions, it is reasonable to claim that individuals within a 
convention will imitate the behaviour of those participating in more successful social 
structures. Since the time needed for a stable only equilibrium to collapse is measured in 
generations, the distinction between stable only and stable and efficient contracts is not 
clear for current generations.
Evolution will therefore lead to a selection among stable equilibria but it will 
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be indifferent about efficiency. Cultural evolution does not have a selection mechanism 
among equilibria that are both stable and efficient. Rational individuals with access to 
reasonable amounts of information cannot always make the distinction; they are able to 
compare their individual utility but not social welfare between different social states. 
However, the choice is not so frequently among  Pareto optimal equilibria but rather 
individuals have to choose among stable equilibria whose effectiveness varies. A more 
efficient  Pareto equilibrium is a fairer  equilibrium given that it has been reached by a 
series of Pareto efficient moves; at least one individual is better off, without anybody 
becoming worse off. Individual  rationality can direct  evolutionary processes towards 
more efficient  equilibria  and thus move to a  more just  social  contract.  Concepts  of 
justice and fairness cannot be adequately discussed with evolutionary theory and this is 
why it is essential that contractarianism is used in conjunction with evolution. Gauthier 
on the one hand, uses the Lockean Proviso to define justice and understands it mainly as 
impartiality. On the other hand, Binmore speaks of fairness as if it were the outcome of 
natural  evolution  and  he  guesses  that  “universal  principles  of  justice...must  be 
presumably written into [our] genes” (Binmore 2005: 15). That may be and even if there 
were evidence from biology to support it, it is not an interesting or useful assertion in 
the context of moral and political philosophy. The main advantage of naturalised justice 
is  that  it  is  free from personal  and cultural  prejudices.  An idea  of  justice  based on 
rationality can achieve the same; rationality, just like biology, can be analysed formally 
and as long as we accept that justice is the outcome of an interaction between rational 
maximisers, we can isolate and objectify it. Thus, it can be free from biased irrational 
characteristics.
Accepting individual rationality as a central characteristic of humans weakens 
the argument for a Kantian morality. The only categorical imperative for rational agents 
is  the  equilibrium that is  the outcome of  rational  interactions.  Therefore,  in  rational 
contractarianism, especially as it is understood in an evolutionary context, there cannot 
be any pre-existing concept of morality which is disconnected from the physical world. 
Rational agents will accept only what maximises their utility given the constraints of 
social  interaction.  Put  differently,  justice  is  what  rational  individuals  of  similar 
bargaining  power  accept  as  an  agreement  point.  Hence,  a  Pareto  optimal  Nash 
equilibrium is fair and a distribution of the cooperative surplus will be fair as long as 
both bargaining parties have agreed to it, provided there has been no coercion. Stability, 
efficiency and fairness of the agreement are secured by the agents' reflective rationality. 
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If one party in the contract decides that the cooperative surplus is not divided in a way 
that  will  maximise  her  utility,  she  will  choose  to  return  to  the  original  bargaining 
position, or in other words abandon the  convention. From her new status, she has the 
chance to initiate a new bargaining procedure. This is a trial and error process which 
leads to the formation of stable, efficient and fair equilibrium points. 
In  Morals by Agreement  just  behaviour is seen as abiding by the principle of 
minimax  relative  concession.  For  Gauthier  then  justice  is  the  ability  to  enter  a 
cooperative  agreement  and  constrain  maximisation.  The  same  rationally  based 
understanding of justice is valid for the evolutionary account. However, the concept of 
rationality  differs  slightly.  Reflective  rationality  in  repeated  interaction  solves  the 
problem of the rationality of constrained maximisation. Two individuals will only agree 
on a contract if their individual utilities are greater after the bargaining. The share of the 
division of the cooperative surplus has to be higher than the individual product in order 
to have an agreement. In conclusion, fairness is not central for a social contract, but it is 
a  side  effect  of  a  rational  bargaining  procedure.  Rational  bargainers,  who  have 
experienced  fairness  –  a  maximising  mutually  advantageous  equilibrium –  will  not 
accept  an arrangement  that is  neither  fair  nor maximising.  Nash  equilibrium,  Pareto 
optimality  and  fairness  are  all  characteristics  of  rational  bargaining.  In  this  context, 
fairness is defined by a Nash  equilibrium that is  Pareto optimal. In other words, two 
rational  agents  who  agree  on  an  interaction  and  its  outcome,  participate  in  a  fair 
interaction.
Deriving  justice from  rational  bargaining largely depends on how  justice is 
defined. In the literature in this area, for example Gauthier, Sugden and Binmore, justice 
is seen as impartiality but this is not necessarily the case. A rational agent who accepts a 
smaller portion of the cooperative surplus does not participate in an unfair interaction. 
Claiming so would mean that we assume that there is a point of  rational deliberation 
that is superior to the agent's. However, in the naturalised account of the social contract 
there can be no room for a point of objectivity outside the physical world. Individual 
rationality as it is exhibited through repeated interactions is the only impartial point of 
view that is feasible as required. 
Justice will be discussed more analytically in Chapter Seven, which will deal 
exclusively with principles of justice in an evolutionary framework and attempt to offer 
a  convincing  solution  to  the  problem  of  including  weaker  persons  in  rational 
interactions.  The above discussion assumed that extreme inequalities are not present 
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which  makes  rational  bargaining  plausible  and  effective  in  leading  to  a  mutually 
accepted outcome. However, accepting that the original position is a point in historical 
time allows the possibility that it is a state of extreme inequalities. A concept of justice 
has to account for these inequalities or offer a method of diminish them to a point where 
rational interactions are possible.
5.4 Conclusion
The above discussion,  continuing the analysis  of  the previous  chapter,  attempted  to 
show how repeated interactions lead to equilibria that are to be seen as conventions of 
social  behaviour.  The  aggregation  of  these  social  conventions  constitutes  the  social 
contract.  The selection  of  conventions  and their  respective  contracts  occurs  through 
evolutionary  dynamics  describing  social  structures.  Social  convention,  the  social 
contract as well as individual strategies constitute the levels of selection (Okasha, 2002) 
in  cultural  evolution.  Therefore,  cultural  evolutionary  equilibria  are  not  always  fair. 
Repeated interactions lead to stable equilibria but in this context there is no way to 
ensure fairness. In this respect Sugden is right to claim that rational bargaining does not 
lead to a fair outcome but to norms of behaviour (Gauthier & Sugden, 1993). 
However it is possible to assert that the strategies adopted by rational individuals 
acting in similar  environments, will converge towards the same  bargaining equilibria. 
Thus, they will lead to stable conventions and social contracts to determine the rules and 
limits of interaction. At the same time, reflective rational agents have the capability to 
compare the equilibrium they are at with neighbouring ones. Skyrms (2004) shows how 
more  efficient  equilibria  will  be  contagious  and  describes  how  cooperative  and 
non-cooperative  equilibria  evolve;  a  stag  hunt  is  likely  to  evolve  and  become  an 
equilibrium as well as a hare hunt depending on the local population  dynamics. This 
account is reinforced by having assumed agents that are boundedly rational. Reflective 
rational  agents  with knowledge of  their  past  and reasonable information about  their 
surroundings will use this knowledge to further their benefit from future interactions.
Evolutionary  theory  cannot  address  free-riding  because  on  this  account 
free-riders cannot survive. The biological evolution of organisms and species that need 
social  interaction  has  rejected  parasitic  behaviour.  However,  in  cultural  evolution 
free-riding poses a more serious problem, especially when  individual  rationality  has 
been preserved. Although the account presented above does not deal explicitly with the 
problem of  free-riding,  it  implies  that  free-riders  will  be  known and excluded  in  a 
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society of non-random interactions. In this sense, parasitic behaviour in an evolutionary 
context  can  be  exposed and punished.  The  evolutionary  explanation  of  conventions 
offers a more realistic argument against  the  rationality of free-riding than  Gauthier's 
moralised account of internalised constrained maximisation.
In the following chapter free-riders within social conventions will be shown to 
be irrational and parasitic behaviour unsustainable. The basis of the argument will still 
be the theory of  Morals by Agreement, in conjunction with the Hobbesian tradition of 
the  Foole  and  the  Humean  understanding  of  conventions.  In  addition,  repeated 
interactions will be shown to be paramount in providing a convincing argument against 
the rationality of free-riding. Evolutionary theory allows for parasitic behaviour and in 
this sense the argument may seem weaker that Gauthier's. However, it also offer a more 
realistic incentive for cooperative social behaviour.
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6. Conventional rationality and collective benefit
This chapter will attempt to show that especially when understanding social interactions 
as  conventions  of  behaviour,  free-riding  is  irrational  and  more  easily  detected  and 
punished than in  mainstream  contractarian  theories.  In  addition,  the response to  the 
problem of free-riding offered here is more realistic than the one proposed by Gauthier, 
who asserted that  rational agents will comply with their agreements by internalising 
constrained  maximisation.  Parasitic  behaviour  can  yield  benefits  but  these  are 
short-lived and smaller than the benefits of  conventional  behaviour, when interactions 
are repeated and interaction history is known.
Free-riding is  not as much of problem for the  conventional and  evolutionary 
account of contractarianism and rationality that was presented in earlier chapters as it is 
for traditional  contractarianism. Within  social  conventions, which are the evolutionary 
outcome of interactions among rational agents, free-riders can be detected and excluded 
from  future  interactions.  In  addition,  the  evolutionary  framework  tells  a  story  of 
evolution of social structures where rational individuals' possible strategies are limited 
by  social  bounds.  Thus,  a  society  that  has  reached  an  equilibrium has  done so  by 
excluding or assimilating non-conforming behaviour, at least to a large extent. This does 
not require the extinction of free-riding behaviour, but it does assume that if there are 
individuals  who  free-ride,  they  are  so  few  that  they  can  neither  destabilise  the 
equilibrium nor  convert  cooperators.  An established cooperative  equilibrium implies 
that  it  has  become  obvious  to  individuals  that  rationality  dictates  cooperation  and 
therefore there is no need for deliberating defection. 
Chapters  Five  and  Six  have  attempted  to  show  that  under  certain  realistic 
conditions,  such  as  bounded  rationality  and  dynamic  interdependence  of  social 
interactions, it is possible to use holistic explanations without abolishing individuality 
and  assumptions  of  individual  rationality.  The  assumption  of  individual  rationality 
leaves  the  analysis  of  conventional  behaviour  open  to  the  criticism  proposed  by 
Hobbes's Foole and the possibility of free-riding being a  rational  strategy. The Foole 
suggested that it is  rational to make agreements but not comply with their terms and 
similarly a free-rider behaves rationally if he manages to receive part of the cooperative 
surplus without having participated in its production.
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The problem of free-riding
According to the rationale of free-riding, rational individuals will free-ride should they 
be  presented  with  the  opportunity.  In  the  conventional  account,  agents  have  been 
assumed to retain their rationality throughout their interactions and their participation in 
conventions.  Individual  rationality is  the basis for the formation of  conventions that 
make  up  the  social  contract  and  rational  deliberation  remains  a  fundamental 
characteristic of human behaviour. Even after the establishment of the most successful 
social  conventions that ensure that agents who behave  conventionally maximise their 
utility, individuals have the capacity to deliberate rationally about their options and their 
conventions.  The  fact  that  individual  rational  deliberation  is  not  essential  for 
maximisation within a convention does not imply that conventional agents have lost the 
capacity for rational deliberation. Therefore, individual rationality is still present and the 
subsequent free-riding behaviour still poses problems for the rationality of compliance. 
Moreover, there is tension between the assertion that rational agents are equally 
rational  and  the  possibility  of  free-riding  being  rational.  The  assumption  of  equal 
rationality makes it imperative to explain why only some agents become free-riders. 
Free-riding arises  as  a  possible  strategy within  a  – mostly  – cooperative  society  or 
group. Hence, for free-riding to take place there has to be an established cooperative 
equilibrium.  A free-rider  is  someone who realises  that  his  cooperating  is  no longer 
rational. In the conventional account a free-rider can also be someone who rejects the 
established convention and decides to maximise his personal benefit with no regard for 
the collective welfare. In terms of the stag hunt game, a hare hunter's behaviour is based 
on the same rationale as a free-rider's; a hare hunter wishes to be a recipient of the stag 
distribution even though he has not participated in its creation.
An alternative conception of reality and a given  environment can lead  rational 
agents to non- conventional behaviour. Free-riding can be a result of better information, 
for instance from a neighbouring convention that achieves higher welfare. In this case, a 
defector or a hare hunter, appears like a free-rider to the rest of the cooperative group 
but once the same information becomes more widely available, a more general strategy 
shift will be realised. Defection here does not have to mean defection in the PD game; 
any agent who takes advantage of the cooperative surplus without previously having 
contributed  to  it,  can  be  referred  to  as  a  defector.  As  mentioned  in  the  previous 
paragraph a free-rider and a hare hunter are motivated by similar reasoning in that they 
both want to take advantage of a surplus to which they have not or will not contribute. 
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In PD type games, a defector also attempts to maximise his benefit from interactions 
without contributing and so his behaviour and reasoning are similar to those of a hare 
hunter or a free-rider.
Hobbes  described  free-riding  informally  by  introducing  the  Foole  to  argue 
against  the  rationality  of  compliance  with  one's  agreements  in  a  contractarian 
framework (Hobbes, 1976).  Gauthier also used the  Hobbesian Foole in his discussion 
about the  rationality of  constrained  maximisation. In  Morals by Agreement, the Foole 
argues that it is  rational to free-ride; agree to comply with the terms of a contract and 
once the other party has fulfilled her side of the  bargain defect from the cooperative 
project. For Hobbes, the Foole's conception of rationality requires a commonwealth to 
enforce the agreement, whereas for Gauthier rational individuals will comply with their 
side of the  bargain once they have accepted the benefits of  constrained maximisation. 
The Foole's argument is that an agent's adopting a joint  strategy is only rational when 
cooperation yields a utility level that is “no less than what he would expect were he to  
violate  his  agreement.”  (Gauthier,  1986:  165).  The  following  discussion  about 
free-riding  will  focus  on  Gauthier's  analysis  of  the  Foole's  arguments  against 
compliance and attempt to show how the repetitiveness of interactions and information 
about an individual's history make free-riding irrational.
The  following  paragraphs  will  include  a  discussion  of  rational  individual 
behaviour in the context of evolutionary conventions. Having examined how rationality 
is  to  be  understood  in  an  evolutionary  context  and  how  conventions  arise  from 
interactions between  rational agents, we will have to show that compliance with the 
terms  of  these  rational  conventions  maximises  individual  utility.  Free-riding  is  a 
problem that is more analytically described in economic theory but poses significant 
questions  in  moral  philosophy.  Therefore  it  seems  appropriate  to  examine  it  in  an 
economic context and in relation to collective action failure. Furthermore, discussing 
free-riding through collective action failure will make it easier to address free-riding as 
a  problem of  conventional  behaviour  within groups and not  solely as a  problem of 
commitment in repeated interactions.
 
6.1 Free-riding and collective action failure
Free-riding in  the context  of  social  interactions  can  be  examined by looking at  the 
theory of collective action failure.  The following paragraphs will  describe collective 
action failure in conjunction with free-riding and look at the circumstances under which 
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free-riding causes a failure of collective action. Free-riding and collective action failure 
are two sides of the same coin; free-riding refers to the individual level and collective 
action  to  the  level  of  society  or  social  group.  In  social  groups  where  free-riding 
behaviour is not constrained or punished and free-riders are allowed to maximise their 
utility at the expense of contributors in the cooperative surplus, the eventual social state 
will be a collective action failure.
6.1.1 Free-riding
Free-riding is generally thought of as the behaviour by which individuals take advantage 
of the social output without having participated in its production. Although the basic 
principle of characterising free-riding is the same, free-riders can be seen as individuals 
who behave in two slightly different ways. Firstly, a free-rider is an agent who enters a 
cooperative convention exclusively in order to take advantage of its cooperative surplus; 
in this understanding a free-rider is a parasite who moves through various social groups 
in  order  to  make the  most  of  his  interactions  while  remaining undetected.  Parasitic 
behaviour is costly in that it requires information about the structure of social structures; 
in  addition,  parasites  participate  only  in  short-term  interactions  that  are  bound  to 
produce less. The second category includes an understanding of a free-rider as someone 
who, although originally disposed to cooperate, realises that it pays more to defect. The 
latter  case  is  more  closely  linked  to  the  rationality  of  compliance  as  discussed  by 
Hobbes and  Gauthier and in general moral philosophy. Compliance with agreements 
and promise keeping is one the possible understandings of free-riding. The evolutionary 
and social groups approach used here makes it essential to refer to both accounts of 
free-riding.
In  both  cases,  free-riding  is  the  maximising  strategy  given  the  established 
behaviour  of  the  group.  So,  free-riders  can  be  seen  as  belonging  in  two  different 
categories  of  rational  individuals:  those  with  a  parasitic  behaviour  who  try  to  take 
advantage of existing cooperative social structures without contributing, and those who 
after having participated in the production of the cooperative surplus realise that it is not 
in their best interest to continue participating. The essence of the free-riding behaviour 
is  the  same  however;  some  individuals'  rational  deliberation  dictates  that  they  can 
benefit from a social good without participating in its creation. In this respect free-riding 
conflicts with the assumption of equal  rationality; if agents are equally  rational, they 
should adopt similar strategies to maximise, and free-riding is rational only when there 
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is a sufficient part of a society cooperating. 
Hence, the fundamental characteristic of the behaviour of free-riders is that they 
benefit  from  conventions  that  have  reached  cooperative  equilibria.  In  a  cooperative 
convention one maximises, at least in the short-term, by reaping the cooperative benefits 
without  contributing,  whereas  in  non-cooperative  conventions  free-riding  is  not  a 
meaningful option since there is no common resource available.  Thus, free-riding is 
individually rational within a group of agents who are disposed to cooperate and have 
established a cooperative equilibrium. Moreover, free-riding is possible only when the 
majority or at least a critical number of individuals are not free-riders.
This short description of free-riding shows that it is a social welfare problem as 
well as an issue related to the concept and understanding of individual  rationality. On 
the individual level, free-riders take advantage of others' contributions and expect that 
others' will not behave in the same way. On the social welfare level, free-riding leads to 
the  lack  of  a  cooperative  surplus  and  in  that  respect  it  coincides  with  a  failure  of 
collective  action;  the  free-riding  of  individuals  is  the  cause  of  social  collapse  as 
collective action failure.
6.1.2 Collective action failure 
Collective  action  failure  describes  a  situation  in  which  there  is  no  social  output 
produced as a result  of generalised free-riding or alternatively  society is  found at  a 
sub-optimal equilibrium. It takes place when most or a large number of the members of 
a group try to benefit from a cooperative product without participating in its production. 
If  a  sufficiently  large  number  of  individuals  free-ride,  there  will  be  no  cooperative 
product  and everybody will  be worse off.  Free-riding and the subsequent  collective 
action  failure  are  the  essence  of  the  conflict  between  individual  maximisation  and 
collective benefit. At the same time, failure of collective action inevitably leads to the 
impossibility of free-riding, since there will be no cooperative surplus. 
Rational behaviour on an individual level results in collective action failure; or 
in other words “...a collective action problem exists when rational individual action can 
lead to a strictly  Pareto inferior outcome”  (Taylor, 1987:  19). The classic example by 
which collective action failure is  examined is  the tragedy of  the commons (Hardin, 
1968),  which  exhibits  how  a  group  of  rational  individuals  will  prefer  short  term 
maximisation over longer term sustainability of a common resource. When agents are 
assumed to be rational according to the economic assumptions of rationality, all social 
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groups where rational agents are not constrained end up with collective action failure. 
The tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), which will be discussed more analytically 
later, originally referred to the over-exploitation of an environmental resource but it also 
applies on the exploitation of any collective output. Its importance lies in the fact that it 
shows how individual rationality is in direct conflict with collective benefit in a static 
environment  of  limited  and  constant  resources  and  that  under  these  conditions 
free-riding is the only rational strategy.
Free-riding  is  a  problem  every  time  collective  behaviour  is  examined  and 
individual  rationality  is  assumed.  When  each  individual's  behaviour  cannot  be 
monitored efficiently,  either  by other  members of  the group or  an external  policing 
mechanism, there will be a rational incentive to defect from a cooperative equilibrium. 
In the discussion in the previous chapters it was assumed that free-riding is not rational 
mainly for two reasons: first because behaviour is or can be known and the cost of being 
found out is too high, and second because it was asserted that  rational agents have a 
small  future discount  factor  so that  they value long term benefits  highly enough to 
accept a smaller immediate pay-off. 
More  realistically,  detection  is  possible  only  in  two  person  interactions  and 
interactions within small groups or in an idealised model of the world. In real world, 
n-person interactions,  there cannot  always be complete  information.  In  addition,  the 
assumption of rationality is not bound to encompass a small future discount factor. The 
objectivity of individual preferences implies an objectivity in the chosen maximising 
strategies. Therefore,  an agent who chooses to maximise immediately as opposed to 
waiting for a bigger benefit in the future cannot be characterised as irrational as long as 
she has taken into account all possible strategies.
Furthermore,  a  cooperative  equilibrium  even  when  it  is  Pareto  optimal  for 
society presents an incentive for individual rational agents to defect; as a matter of fact, 
the existence of a Pareto optimal state makes it rational for one to free-ride in the first 
place.  Individuals'  defection  does  not  necessarily  have  an  effect  on  the  social 
cooperative outcome; social  welfare will  be unaffected provided that  the number of 
defectors is smaller than a critical threshold, which varies depending on the size and the 
dynamics of any given social group. One can expect that his defecting will not affect the 
social  equilibrium, at least in the short-run. And hence, he can still be a recipient of a 
share of the distribution of the cooperative surplus. 
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6.1.3 The rationale of free-riding
Free-riders are not necessarily less or more  rational than cooperators, but apparently 
their rational deliberation leads to different outcomes. However, provided they interact 
in  the  same  environment,  we should  expect  them to  maximise  in  a  similar  way.  A 
rational agent will imitate free-riders when she sees they are doing better than her, in 
similar ways as maximising strategies are replicated in biological evolutionary models 
(Skyrms,  2004).  Similarly,  a  free-rider  will  change  his  behaviour when cooperative 
behaviour in his environment is more beneficial. The critically important assumption is 
that both cooperators and defectors are utility maximisers and as such they will change 
their behaviour when there is information about a different available strategy that yields 
higher  utility.  And  the  maximising  strategy  in  each  case  depends  on  an  agent's 
environment and the history of established equilibria.
In  economic  theory  the  typical  example  of  free-riding  deals  with  avoiding 
paying for a collective good (Mueller, 2003). Assuming that the public good will be 
provided  eventually,  it  is  in  everybody's  best  interest  to  avoid  paying  their  share. 
Therefore, public good provision cannot rely upon voluntary contribution. An institution 
needs to exist that will detect and punish tax evaders. Collective action in a group of 
rational, utility maximising agents will result in failure, unless there are incentives to 
cooperate.  When  detection  and  punishment  occur  at  a  high  probability,  free-riding 
becomes irrational. Especially in the case of large groups, where detection of free-riders 
is impossible or very difficult, individual utility  maximisation is an obstacle to social 
welfare  maximisation. In most real world societies, if it were not for the existence of 
free-riding detection and punishment mechanisms, collective action would have been 
impossible. The size of the group is therefore essential in analysing the  rationality of 
free-riding. 
Competition for the use of a resource is not explicitly what Hobbes (1976) called 
a war of all against all, but this is a similar type of collective action failure.  Hobbes's 
proposal for a strong  government to protect property rights and provide security has 
been one of the most popular solutions to collective action failure and free-riding. In 
large groups like contemporary societies, a government or a similar institution is needed 
to  punish free-riders  and to  ensure  no  one  abuses  the  available  resources.  Realistic 
contemporary  societies  can  usually  be  seen  as  a  “large,  heterogeneous,  mobile 
community”  (Mueller,  2003:  13),  which  makes  free-riding  more  likely  and  more 
unlikely to be detected. 
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The core of the problem of free-riding and collective action failure lies in the 
fact that social welfare  maximisation requires constraints on individual  maximisation. 
Strictly speaking, it is in the rational individual's best interest to take advantage of the 
cooperative  surplus  to  make  a  profit  out  of  it  immediately.  In  a  complementary 
understanding, collective action failure arises when the future discount factor is so small 
that  individuals  prefer  to  maximise  at  the  present  rather  than wait  for  a  potentially 
higher utility in the future. However, free-riding can only occur when a natural resource 
exists already or a public good has been produced in the first place. 
The rationality of free-riding depends on the fact that not everybody free-rides. It 
only pays to free-ride as long as free-riding is not the norm; when it becomes the social 
norm, the first free-rider will have gained more and therefore free-riding becomes a race 
to defect in a PD game. In the classic PD game the only  rational  strategy is defect; 
similarly in a ten iteration PD game, rational players will not reach the ninth iteration, 
but will defect immediately to avoid being taken advantage of. In any case, the absence 
of a central enforcer or of the possibility to detect and punish defectors in interactions 
taking place in small groups means free-riding is generally rational.
A cooperative  surplus  has  to  exist  before  it  can  be  exploited  and thus,  in  a 
Hobbesian state of  nature there can be no meaningful free-riding. The collapse of all 
cooperation comes logically after the creation of a cooperative  society. According to 
Hobbes, rationality will lead to agreement on the formation of a strong government that 
will  lift  humans  from  the  state  of  nature  and  once  the  commonwealth  has  been 
established,  will  punish  free-riders.  So,  in  the  state  of  nature  long-term  rationality 
prevails  and  individuals  are  able  to  see  the  advantages  of  cooperation  and  form 
cooperative structures and eventually a government. An effective government is needed 
then  to  enforce  cooperation;  to  protect  society  from  free-riders  and  to  stop 
over-exploitation of natural resources.
Free-riding follows  cooperation as it can occur only after  rational agents have 
cooperated in the past. Hence, from a rational choice theory perspective in a convention 
where  defection  has  become the  established  behaviour  individual  rationality  cannot 
offer  a  solution;  rational  agents  who free-ride  are  aware  of  the  relative  benefits  of 
cooperation and defection and have chosen to defect. Once free-riding causes a failure 
of collective action,  it  is  irrational for anyone to be the first  to shift  his  strategy to 
cooperation.  Free-riding  conventions  are  locked  in  a  permanent  state  of  war  of  all 
against all unless there is a dramatic  environmental shift or new information becomes 
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available. And in this sense there can be no normative prescription for an individual in 
such a  convention. Obviously it does not pay to be a sucker in a world of nasties; in 
contemporary  moral  philosophy,  any  theory  that  allows  for  reasonable  or  rational 
agents,  there  cannot  be  a  normative  suggestion  for  one  to  cooperate  in  a  world  of 
defectors. 
A cooperator within a group of free-riders cannot cause any real change to the 
structure of the convention or the behaviour of individuals. Therefore, there cannot be 
an argument,  based on any concept of  rationality against  free-riding in a free-riding 
convention. Cooperative interactions may be imitated when they prove that they yield 
higher individual utilities over time; however, in a world of Fooles a rational agent will 
never initiate cooperative behaviour with someone who is a non-cooperator even in the 
case of first performer contracts. In this specific case one will choose to interact with a 
known  cooperator  or  abstain  from any  interaction  rather  than  interact  with  known 
defectors.  Moral  incentives  against  free-riding  would  have  to  assume  agents  of  an 
unrealistically  low  degree  of  self-regard  in  order  to  claim  that  one  should  try  to 
cooperate even when he is surrounded by defectors. For instance, Hume's theory allows 
for empathy and therefore implies that we are not always self-regarding and mutually 
unconcerned but even it does not recommend that we ought to be suckers in a world of 
fools (Hume, 2008). Hence, even normative arguments for cooperation in this context 
can only be very weak.
6.1.4 Conclusion 
Conforming to a norm is assumed to maximise one's utility and thus be  rational. In 
Gauthier's analysis, rational agents internalise constrained maximisation, without loss of 
their  rationality. In both the Gauthier project and the conventional account there is no 
collective  action  failure.  Agents'  behaviour  is  assumed  to  be  consistent  with  their 
original  preference to abide by the normative rules or,  put differently,  to internalise 
constrained  maximisation.  However,  rational agents must remain  rational throughout 
their lives and be able to question their own behaviour. It cannot be assumed that their 
intention to maximise diminishes once they begin participating in a norm or constrain 
their  maximisation. In social groups, and especially in large social groups, prudential 
maximisation  is  not  always  rational.  An  agent  forms  the  intention  to  constrain  her 
maximisation  at  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  interactions,  as  this  behaviour  is 
maximising at that time. It is possible but not certain that this will remain a maximising 
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behaviour for the duration of the interactions. A rational individual will look back in 
order  to evaluate  the interaction outcomes and will  keep being informed about  new 
developments in her environment. 
In conclusion, according to the theory of collective action failure, it is  rational 
for  one  to  free-ride  provided  that  the  cooperative  surplus  will  still  be  produced. 
Free-riding is rational on the condition that the cooperative surplus has been produced 
and will continue being produced, or put differently that not everybody is a free-rider. 
However, having accepted that individuals are  rational and even equally  rational, this 
thinking has to lead to the collapse of any cooperative structure in time. Rational agents 
within a  convention who have access to similar information will eventually reach the 
same  conclusions  about  maximising  behaviour;  hence,  the  assumption  of  equal 
rationality  implies  that  conventions  reach  equilibria  of  some  type,  cooperative, 
non-cooperative or mixed. However, the latter are less likely once there is information 
about the success of cooperative equilibria since moving to a cooperative equilibrium is 
easier  from  a  mixed  than  from  a  non-cooperative  one.  Within  a  convention,  the 
rationality of free-riding is questionable; if free-riders maximise they will be imitated 
which would defeat their purpose. If their past  behaviour is now known, other agents 
will avoid interacting with them. Therefore, the rationality of free-riding contradicts the 
main assumptions of conventional rationality; knowledge of past interactions and equal 
or roughly equal rationality.
The  typical  solution  to  the  free-rider  problem and  the  subsequent  collective 
action failure is the introduction of an enforcing mechanism that will deter and punish 
free-riders,  such  as  Hobbes's  commonwealth  (Hobbes,  1976)  or  a  government  as 
described  in  economic  theory  (Mueller,  2003).  A  strong  government  will  force 
self-interested individuals to keep their agreements and when they do not, it will punish 
them. An alternative solution, coming from a conventional account of rational behaviour 
would suggest that cooperation is self-enforcing from within the convention. In order to 
support  this  argument,  free-riding  will  have  to  be  looked  in  the  context  of 
game-theoretical rationality. The following section consists of an analysis of free-riding 
from an informal game theoretical perspective, attempting to show how cooperation is 
maximising in repeated games between agents of equal rationality.
6.2 The prisoner’s dilemma and the tragedy of the commons
Collective action and the provision of a cooperative surplus can be seen as an n-person 
136
prisoner's dilemma. In the finite iterations two person PDs, the maximising strategy is to 
defect and the Nash equilibrium is always defect. Similarly, in a large group the Nash 
equilibrium is to defect.  Any other  strategy would imply that players do not behave 
rationally, or that their  behaviour is being enforced. In the n-player case, even when 
interactions  are  perceived  as  infinitely  repeated,  the  rational  action  would  be  to 
maximise individual utility by defecting before the other player does. By defecting, the 
rational  individual  can  still  receive  his  share  of  the  cooperative  surplus  without 
contributing to its creation provided he is not caught.
6.2.1 Collective action games
The possibility of adopting a joint  strategy during a game turns any interaction in a 
possible  collective  action  game.  The  PD  game  can  become  a  collective  prisoners' 
dilemma implying that strategy decisions are decided by both agents. In a finite iteration 
PD game it is in each player's best interest to defect. In the context of collective action,  
rational agents maximise their utility when everybody else cooperates; or a sufficient 
number  cooperate  so  as  that  there  will  be  a  cooperative  surplus.  Free-riding  as  an 
n-person PD game was discussed by Garrett Hardin in his  Tragedy of the Commons 
(1968).  In  this  story  a  group of  farmers  use  an  open access  pasture  to  graze  their 
animals. Given that everybody wants to maximise their individual utility, they will keep 
exploiting  the  land  until  it  becomes  useless  for  grazing.  Individual  maximisation 
contradicts collective maximisation; if everyone maximises, the group will be led to a 
Pareto-inferior  equilibrium. The same principle applies when there is just one farmer 
with  a  high  future  discount  rate.  He  will  choose  to  maximise  in  the  present  and 
over-exploit the pasture, even if this means that he will not be able to use the pasture in 
the future (Taylor, 1987). 
In this context, there are two variations of collective action failure. The typical 
one, where most individuals free-ride on the collective good, and the sole exploiter one 
where there is a single fully informed individual over-exploiting a resource, while the 
others continue to use the original allocation of the field. When the cooperators realise 
there is a free-rider they will also convert to free-riding but this requires full information 
for all individuals. Therefore, there can be an equilibrium where free-riding is limited to 
a small proportion of the population provided there is not complete information. 
There  are  two  weaknesses  with  the  tragedy  of  the  commons  allegory.  The 
pasture  is  assumed  to  be  finite  which  is  not  always  the  case.  Human  history  is 
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dominated by expansion and over-exploitation of new territories and inventions that 
make new methods of exploitation possible. A group of rational agents may very well 
decide collectively to exploit the pasture as quickly as possible and then move on to 
another one. Alternatively, there can be expectations for new inventions to replace the 
need for pastures or for more efficient methods of using the land. 
A second criticism of the tragedy of the commons is the exclusive use of the PD 
game to describe collective action. Despite the fact that the tragedy of the commons is 
best described by the PD game, this does not mean that all collective action failure cases 
have the structure of a PD. Different games have different outcome matrices and thus 
different dominant strategies. The game of chicken can also be used to describe a class 
of collective action problems as effectively (Taylor, 1987). There are examples when the 
lack of a public good can be so devastating for a rational agent or a group of agents in  
the population that  they will  prefer  to  produce it  by themselves  and create  positive 
externalities  for  the  rest.  Collective  action  failure  can  be  examined  through  game 
structures such as chicken and assurance and not exclusively PD. The structure of the 
game pay-offs depends on the salience of the cooperative outcome and thus rational 
agents will not always avoid contribution. 
In  the  previous  chapter  and  especially  in  §5.1,  Skyrms's  (Skyrms,  2004) 
approach showed how the  stag hunt can complement the PD game and be used more 
effectively to describe repeated interactions within a population. As he showed, both 
games can be used to describe similar situations and the same applies for collective 
action failures. A group of stag hunters are at risk of being contaminated by individual 
hare hunters, who in time will cause the collapse of the cooperative equilibrium. In the 
present  context,  the  stag hunt  may be  more  appropriate  to  discuss  collective action 
failure as it takes into account the dynamics of a population and contains implications 
about the possible strategy changes over time. For instance, the social move from a stag 
hunt to a hare hunt happens over time and possibly over generations, which gives the 
time to  rational individuals to reflect and evaluate their strategies and maybe adapt to 
the changing  environment. Moreover, collective action can be seen as a hybrid game, 
where a player's strategies are those of a chicken game, and his opponent's strategies are 
those of an assurance game (Taylor, 1987).
It  has  been argued that  in  two person one-shot  and finitely  repeated  games, 
cooperation or conditional cooperation is the maximising strategy, even without external 
enforcers (Taylor, 1987; Axelrod, 2006). Provided that others are disposed to cooperate 
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and have a small  future discount factor, it is  rational for one to cooperate. However, 
even  when  conditional  cooperation  leads  to  a  cooperative  equilibrium,  there  is  no 
convincing explanation as to why, once at  equilibrium, a  rational agent will choose to 
cooperate instead of free-riding. Irrespective of how we choose to model interactions, in 
traditional game theory where individuals are utility maximisers, collective action fails 
unless there is an enforcement and punishment mechanism.
6.2.2 Solutions for collective action failure
There are two types of solutions to collective action failure.  Solutions coming from 
within  the  group  and  solutions  that  are  being  enforced  by  a  commonly  accepted 
institution (Taylor, 1987). There is not much to be said about the latter. A government, 
of any form, is the common solution to most collective action problems. Free-riding 
becomes  too  costly  only  when  there  is  detection  and  punishment  and  in  this  case 
free-riding becomes irrational. Internal solutions to collective action failure are not as 
straightforward to implement or as obviously effective. A group of rational agents that 
can foresee the advantages of cooperation and of the absence of free-riders may agree 
on  the  principle  of  mutual  cooperation.  Especially  in  small  groups,  it  pays  not  to 
free-ride as detection and punishment by the other members of the group are likely and 
cheap;  especially  when  interactions  are  repeated  and  take  place  within  a  small 
population,  behaviour  is  known  and  can  be  punished.  However  the  problem  of 
enforcement  persists  in  larger  groups  such  as  most  modern  societies.  One  possible 
solution is to view large groups as the summation of smaller ones. Most interactions 
take place among individuals who have a history of interactions, have interacted before 
and expect to interact again in the future. In this case free-riding is not a maximising 
strategy. 
The  above  describes  how  existing  social  norms  are  sustained;  most  people 
cooperate  with  their  immediate  social  circle  but  at  the  same  time  are  disposed  to 
free-ride when this will not affect them and their circle, and the likelihood of detection 
is small. As discussed earlier, in smaller groups behaviour is known and free-riders can 
be  punished.  Similarly,  within  given  social  circles  behaviour  can  be  known  and 
free-riders excluded.  Furthermore,  Bergstrom (2002) has shown how in non-random 
interaction  models  such  as  the  haystack,  cooperative  strategies  become  dominant; 
moreover  and more  famously,  Olson (1965) has  shown how smaller  groups sustain 
cooperative equilibria as opposed to larger ones where free-riding is rational. 
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The tragedy of the commons is a good example in exhibiting how individual 
action  and  collective  benefit  are  in  conflict.  At  the  same  time,  however,  it  is  a 
simplifying description of social life and individual rationality. Agents, who play a one 
iteration PD game, reason differently than those who participate in a PD game with 
many  iterations  and  maximise  their  utilities  following  different  strategies.  Real  life 
interactions can be modelled theoretically as a PD game but this does not mean that they 
can always be accurately described by it.  Similarly,  social  life and individual utility 
maximisation are modelled to an extent by the tragedy of the commons, but this does 
not  mean that in  the real world reasonable individuals would necessarily ignore the 
collective good when this is obviously linked to their individual utility. 
These models show that individuals will  prefer to further personal aims than 
collective ones if they are not constrained by exogenous enforcers. But the tragedy of 
the commons example ignores that  individual  rationality is  defined by a plethora of 
parameters. For instance, some of the farmers in the pasture are likely to be neighbours 
that need to work together to drain a meadow (Hume, 2008). Maximising their utility in 
the pasture would have an effect on their utility at home. Even if the two utilities were 
somehow separated, each farmer would want to maximise his aggregate utility. That 
said, it seems more plausible to say though, that a person's utility function is one that 
consists of all the utilities derived from all his interactions.
Sugden (2004) argued that in repeated, n-person PD type games,  behaviour is 
known and therefore free-riding is too costly a strategy to be adopted. Even in this case 
however,  the  maximising  strategy  depends  on  the  strategies  the  majority  of  the 
population adopts; “in a world of nasties, just  as in a world of suckers,  cooperation 
never  pays”  (Sugden 2004:  125).  Multilateral  reciprocity,  similarly  to  the  Rawlsian 
notion of indirect reciprocity, calls for agents to cooperate with those who have a history 
of cooperation and defect when they interact with known defectors. The main premise is 
that all agents will prefer a cooperative to a non-cooperative equilibrium in a PD type 
game. However, the PD game distinction need not be exclusive. The value of Sugden's 
argument lies in the idea that  rational agents look at others' past  behaviour instead of 
guessing their  disposition of relying on idealistic  or metaphysical  human traits;  this 
applies to all human interactions and not just those that are possible to be described by a 
PD  game.  Even  in  the  two  person,  one  iteration  PD  game,  collective  welfare  is 
maximised with  cooperation. Cooperative  behaviour in n-person, n-iteration games, is 
self-reinforcing: the greater  the number of individuals who cooperate,  the better  the 
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outcome. Cooperation, despite being costly, produces a greater amount of cooperative 
surplus, and thus there is more to be distributed. Therefore, it is maximising for most to 
be at a cooperative equilibrium. Provided that there are enough cooperators, cooperation 
will be a stable equilibrium. 
6.2.3 Conclusion
Collective action failure is a solid theoretical paradigm and free-riding is rational once 
we  accept  the  premises  of  economic  rational  choice  theory;  given  economic 
assumptions, collective action failure is a certainty. But theoretical premises in general 
and economic assumptions in particular are limiting when examining human behaviour 
and social structures. The absence of a government or a legal system would not lead to a 
collapse of social structures if these structures were based on pre-existing moral norms 
and conventions. Similarly, given adequate information about cooperative conventions, 
a defection equilibrium can move to cooperative one.
The purpose of the above paragraphs was to give a general description of the 
problem of free-riding and the subsequent collective action failure. Rational agents will 
free-ride if they know they cannot be detected and punished and if they interact in an 
environment where interactions are finite and their history is not known.
6.3 Free-riding within rational conventions
The above sections offered a description of the free-rider problem and the closely linked 
problem of collective action failure, while attempting to show that despite its significant 
strength as a theoretical paradigm it also has weaknesses. Rational agents will try to 
make  the  most  out  of  every  interaction,  but  at  the  same  time  their  behaviour  is 
influenced by established social norms and the behaviour of those around them. Given 
the unrealistic economic definition of rationality, free-riding is the maximising strategy. 
However, past social interactions and non-random repeated interactions within a social 
group, without loss of the assumption of rational agency, lead to different results.
The  issue  with  free-riding  is  not  whether  cooperation  in  finitely  repeated 
interactions  is  rational;  it  is  not  rational  as  long  as  the  other  party's  history  and 
disposition are not known. The question is whether it  is possible to know at a high 
probability what others will do. Since maximising strategies and subsequent  rational 
behaviour depend on the agent's  environment at a given time, it is  rational for one to 
cooperate when in a cooperative group and defect when surrounded by defectors. If 
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cooperation is somehow assured or interactions last for a sufficient number of iterations, 
it pays for one to cooperate. Cooperative interactions last longer and eventually yield a 
higher pay-off than free-riding.  Rational agents who have cooperated in the past and 
expect to interact again in the future will choose to cooperate. Free-riders have to search 
for  new  cooperators  after  every  interaction.  If  interactions  with  strangers  in  stable 
cooperative  equilibria  yield  small  pay-offs,  free-riding  is  not  as  profitable  by 
comparison with even finite cooperative interactions and the stability of the convention 
is reinforced.
Rational agents will follow optimal norms of  behaviour when it minimises the 
costs  of  rational  deliberation  and  bargaining.  However,  since  we accept  that  agents 
within conventions retain their capacity for rational deliberation, we have also to allow 
for the possibility that rational individuals will consider free-riding. There is no reason 
why a rational agent will only deliberate at decision nodes or at specific time intervals.  
Committing  to  follow cooperative  norms,  even for  short  periods  of  time,  is  not  an 
adequate measure against free-riding, as commitments can be broken if there is not an 
insurance mechanism within the rationale of the commitment in the first place. Driving 
on the right when everyone else drives on the left is obviously irrational. But running a 
red light late at night might be seen as rational.
There are two reasons why free-riding might not be  rational when detection is 
unlikely. First the cost of being wrong is enormous. A defector risks not just his share of 
the  cooperative  surplus,  but  an  exclusion  from  all  future  interactions  within  the 
established  convention.  This  would  force  him to  move to  a  new  convention  where 
defection is the norm or in cases of limited information, he can expect to interact with 
cooperators.  Secondly,  free-riding  when in  a  cooperative  convention  requires  costly 
deliberation that  is  avoided when following  conventional  rules.  Rational  agents will 
avoid deliberation about defecting as long as their  current  behaviour yields efficient 
outcomes and they have no reason to believe others will free-ride. Rationality dictates 
that individuals will maximise their utility by keeping their  rational commitments, as 
new information retrieval is costly and the benefits from free-riding only temporary.
The structure of cooperative  conventions can ensure their  stability and enforce 
cooperation.  Stable  conventions  of  social  behaviour  are  the  outcome  of  repeated 
interactions that spread over a long period of time. Agents who have been accepted into 
the  convention have shown their  disposition to  cooperate in a  series of low pay-off 
interactions.  Hence,  they  can  be  trusted  to  participate  in  interactions  with  higher 
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pay-offs. New participants in cooperative  conventions are only allowed to interact in 
low pay-off interactions, free-riders will  either have to spend time in order to reach 
higher  pay-off  interactions  or  settle  for  small  benefits.  The  incremental  increase  of 
pay-offs ensures that possible free-riders are forced to behave conventionally for a given 
period of time so as to make free-riding eventually more costly. A history of successful 
cooperative iterations creates a type of trust and also acts as advertisement for agents' 
dispositions. 
A  convention is a stable  equilibrium when there has been a large number of 
interactions within the  convention and the actors that participate so as to ensure that 
everybody has devoted so much time participating in low pay-off interactions to make 
free-riding irrational. Skyrms has used the concept of the “secret handshake” (Skyrms, 
2004:66) in a similar context. When communication between agents before interactions 
is possible and can be trusted, cooperation in PD type games becomes rational. Provided 
that  cooperators  can  recognise  others  who  are  also  disposed  to  cooperate,  then 
cooperation  becomes  the  equilibrium  strategy.  In  order  for  this  to  be  achieved 
cooperators  use a  secret  handshake so  as  to  exclude  defectors.  If  an  equilibrium is 
evolutionarily stable then even if there are defectors who imitate the secret handshake, 
they will not be able to destabilise it. By definition an evolutionarily stable equilibrium 
cannot be altered by invaders; in a population where a maximising strategy has been 
long established, interactions with agents who behave differently cannot influence the 
established behaviour. An incremental increase of pay-offs achieves the same goals but 
is more rigid. Defectors do not benefit from pretending to be cooperators because the 
number of iterations until a significant pay-off is reached is so high that it pays more to 
change into cooperating. 
Furthermore, the secret handshake mechanism requires that individuals trust the 
signals they receive from potential interacting agents. If these signals are erroneous or 
are  the  result  of  an  attempt  to  trick  cooperators,  then  free-riders  can  maximise. 
However, this danger is minimised when agents choose with whom they will interact on 
the  basis  of  their  past  behaviour.  Therefore,  it  becomes  highly  unlikely  that  an 
individual who is disposed to free-ride by pretending to be a cooperator will be able to 
maximise  in  a  convention  where  many  low  cost  interactions  are  required  before 
individuals  are  allowed  to  participate  in  high  pay-off  interactions.  Therefore,  the 
conventional account of social behaviour makes a disposition to free-ride very costly. 
If an agent who has been behaving conventionally for the duration of his lifetime 
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comes  across  an  interaction  with  huge  pay-off  he  might  still  have  the  incentive  to 
free-ride.  In  that  case  of  course  he  will  be  risking  much  more  than  the  ordinary 
free-rider; he will have spent much more time and he will have missed opportunities to 
free-ride in the past by committing to cooperative behaviour. As difficult as it might be 
for one to change long-term habits which are the outcome of costly rational deliberation 
and interactions, we should allow the possibility that rational agents have the capacity to 
do so.  The argument against  a  behaviour shift  of this sort  is two-fold: the threat of 
detection and punishment has to be plausible enough and secondly the cost of changing 
one's  behaviour will have to include information gathering which again will make the 
shift  more  costly.  These  parameters  reduce  the  benefits  from  free-riding  and  are 
indirectly proportional to the length of previous interactions. 
Individuals who maximise by behaving parasitically will not be able to benefit 
from a population following a cooperative  convention.  In this sense,  straightforward 
maximisers will be excluded by cooperative conventions, even if it takes a number of 
interactions for their behaviour to become known. However, an honest cooperator may 
change his mind about the rationality of his cooperating behaviour. Rational agents who 
maximise by following cooperative conventions can realise that it is more beneficial for 
them to free-ride.  This  change of  behaviour  could  be due to  an “enlightenment”,  a 
change of  the  agent's  rationality.  An endogenous change might  make the individual 
realise that his “new rationality”, the newly adopted strategy, will lead to maximisation 
as opposed to the old one. However, this is only realistic when an agent has perceived a 
change in the  environment that dictates a change in  behaviour;  individual  rationality 
only  changes  when  the  environment  or  information  available  changes.  Changes  in 
preferences  (for  example,  as  a  result  of  illness)  do  not  need  to  mean  a  change  in 
behaviour as the possibility of their realisation can be part of the agent's original life 
plan; although illness cannot be predicted,  one can deliberate  about how she would 
behave in extraordinary circumstances. Just as in  MbA, one decides to become a CM 
because one realises that it is maximising; it is a life-changing decision and one that a 
rational  agent  is  expected  to  follow throughout  her  life  (assuming  the  existence  of 
sufficient numbers of other CMs). In this case, given equal  rationality and access to 
similar information within the convention, others should be expected to follow. Despite 
the fact that this agent may be viewed temporarily as a free-rider, his exclusion will only 
last for the duration of the shift to the new convention.
Detection of free-riders is paramount in the  conventional account as well. Any 
144
rational individual would rather free-ride when he is certain or almost certain that he 
will not be caught. The only assumption needed here in order to ensure detection is that 
free-riding  becomes  known,  even  when  the  free-rider  himself  does  not.  Within  the 
context of  conventions with equal information and repeated interactions amongst the 
same members, it is then plausible then to say that free-riding and free-riders can be 
detected rather easily. Therefore, the important thing is not that the free-rider is detected 
within the  convention, but that his act is. The scenario of a hyper-rational free-rider 
taking  advantage  of  different  cooperators  repeatedly  is  highly  unlikely;  within  the 
convention there is information about the history of interactions and a free-rider will 
eventually be found out by taking into account past interactions.
A stable  equilibrium  that  serves  as  the  status-quo  has  to  have  developed  a 
method of excluding or converting most free-riders. At the same time small numbers of 
free-riders cannot threaten the stability of a convention. Therefore, from an evolutionary 
standpoint, they can still exist within a stable convention consisting of rational agents, 
even when they are predominantly  cooperators.  In  a  rational  choice theory context, 
though,  stable  conventions  have  to  have  established  methods  that  make  free-riding 
irrational. A high rate of detection and a credible threat of punishment would make the 
risk of free-riding too high to take. Information transmission through small groups make 
detection  more  plausible.  Conventions  do  not  have  to  be  limited  in  small  groups; 
information however becomes available  from within small  groups,  where it  is  more 
readily available. For instance, information about a tax evader can become available 
through  other  conventions  in  which  the  tax  evader  participates  and not  exclusively 
through the tax agency. A tax evader will not be trusted by cooperators even if they are 
not  directly  harmed  by  his  behaviour.  It  is  not  necessary  for  cooperators  to  avoid 
interactions  with  the  tax  evader  as  a  form of  punishment;  they  will  do  because  it 
benefits them to avoid interacting with agents who have shown to be disposed to defect. 
Being a rational maximiser, it will be too risky for one to interact with someone 
who is a known defector. Therefore, a free-rider will have to take these possible forms 
of punishment into account and calculate his utility from free-riding. Should these be 
deemed too costly,  and given that  free-riders  are  also utility  maximisers,  he should 
choose  cooperation. It is important to note that the fear of detection in this case is as 
important as the possible punishment itself. As long as there is history of punishment of 
free-riders and detection rates are high, the threat of a punishment itself should be a 
strong enough incentive for cooperation. Rational agents who are disposed to cooperate 
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will  not  interact  again  with  free-riders  as  this  would  not  be  maximising.  By  not 
interacting  with  them again  they  punish  them,  even though  this  might  not  be  their 
primary  intention.  Therefore,  an  independent  punishment  mechanism  may  not  be 
necessary. As long as individuals look to maximise through interactions, free-riders will 
be excluded from cooperative  conventions and thus be punished. Punishment in this 
sense is a side effect of rational behaviour and works both as reward for cooperators and 
threat for potential free-riders.
To conclude,  the availability  of information and knowledge of the history of 
interactions can make free-riding too risky and possibly too costly to be a maximising 
strategy. In this  context therefore,  a  rational individual has the responsibility to stay 
informed and to exclude defectors from future interactions.
6.4 A response to the Foole
The counter-argument to the above understanding of conventional behaviour would be 
that in cases where detection is very unlikely, difficult or costly it still pays to free-ride. 
In  these cases  a  theory  where  moral  behaviour  or  a  version  of  constrained  rational 
behaviour has intrinsic value is superior. A rational agent with parasitic  behaviour can 
take advantage of one cooperative convention for short periods of time before moving 
on to  another one.  Hence,  following a set  of predefined moral principles that make 
free-riding unacceptable would make a stronger case for cooperative behaviour. A social 
arrangement according to which free-riding is always morally wrong is preferable to 
one where individuals ought merely to be  rational.  According to this  understanding, 
arguing for moral behaviour has to include some kind of categorical imperative; a rule 
that is always true and should always be followed. 
The absence of moral rules to regulate behaviour is related to the argument made 
by the  Foole  in  the  Leviathan  (Hobbes,  1976).  The Foole  argues  that  it  cannot  be 
rational to comply with an  agreement once the other party has fulfilled his  duty.  In 
essence, the Foole argues that there is a need for moral principles to regulate social 
interactions  and  that  rationality  alone  is  not  enough.  Thus,  the  Foole  is  purely 
individualistic  and selfish and for  him being  rational  cannot  be reconciled with the 
possibility of adopting a joint strategy (Gauthier, 1986). The Foole would accept that in 
a world where rational agents are disposed to constrain their maximisation, it is rational 
to appear as a constrained maximiser in order to take advantage of them, “[f]or then he 
would not be excluded from the cooperative arrangements of his fellows” (Gauthier, 
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1986: 173). 
The  Foole's  argument,  as  presented  by  Gauthier,  supports  the  rationality  of 
free-riding and moreover proposes that only free-riding behaviour is rational. In Morals 
by  Agreement  Gauthier  introduces  disposition  translucency  to  counter  the  Foole's 
argument; an ideally rational agent “is directly aware of the disposition of his fellows” 
and hence “[d]eception is impossible” (Gauthier, 1986: 174). 
The  problems  with  disposition  translucency  have  been  analysed  in  previous 
chapters.  Here,  it  is  used  so  as  to  show  that  the  free-rider's  argument  is  null  if 
dispositions are known. In the conventional account, dispositions can be known through 
an agent's history and past interactions within a  convention. As a result, an argument 
very similar  to  Gauthier's  can be made,  with the bonus of being more realistic  and 
plausible against the Foole's  rationale. To reiterate, the Foole argues that although it 
might be rational to make agreements it is not always rational to keep them and hence 
compliance  requires  moral  and  not  exclusively  rational  constraints  on  individual 
maximisation (Gauthier, 1990). As discussed previously, even the Foole needs a society 
where compliance is the norm; otherwise he would not be able to maximise. Free-riders 
need a society of cooperators in order to be able to free-ride.
The problem with this approach remains that it has to be based on pre-existing 
ideals  or  circular  arguments.  Suggesting  that  an  agent  who is  disposed to  free-ride 
should act cooperatively because it is the right thing to do has no force, having assumed 
that individuals are  rational. Objective moral rules can only be meaningful when they 
are the outcome of individual  rational deliberation. Anything else would have to limit 
the premises of individuals'  rational capabilities and in general of the assumption of 
rational agency. 
The  conventional account can be seen as a weaker argument against parasitic 
behaviour than the ones offered by  Hobbes and  Gauthier since it  requires explicitly 
rational motivation. But it is an account that allows for rational deliberation and is based 
exclusively on the capabilities of human nature. An agent acting conventionally would 
probably see the benefits of benefiting at the expense of others, once they have kept 
their  side  of  the  agreement.  However,  when  real  life  restrictions  are  taken  into 
consideration,  costs of deliberation and of collecting new information for not acting 
conventionally, would be an incentive for conventional behaviour. 
Even when there is consensus within a social convention or social contract as to 
how one ought to behave, this consensus is based on pre-existing ideas of right and 
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wrong. In this context then, our understanding of morality is biased. It is derived from 
specific cultural,  social  and psychological parameters; or put differently,  pre-existing 
social  conventions.  Thus,  it  is  difficult  to  convince  someone  from  a  different 
background that a certain set of  moral norms is preferable to his and so there is little 
value in arguing over competing accounts of morality. The understanding of morality 
presented here is the outcome of  rational interactions. At some point in history moral 
rules were a solution to problems of social interaction and by adopting them, a given 
society avoided conflict. These moral rules, although not necessarily the most efficient, 
solved more problems than they created. Over time the need for some moral rules may 
have  become  extinct.  However,  information  costs  and/or  limited  availability  of 
information in a given  environment,  may have preserved rules without any practical 
use. 
Moral imperatives can only be objectively justified if they are viewed from a 
rational perspective. The golden rule of helping those in need is no more powerful than 
a law calling for the amputation of a thief's hand unless we can base either one on 
rational  arguments  about  individual  maximisation  and  social  welfare.  Both  these 
conventions of social behaviour have been stable and in this sense are rational given the 
specific environmental parameters. However, in order for different moral conventions to 
be compared they have to be based on notions of  rationality. As has been discussed 
previously,  rationality itself also depends on  environmental parameters. Hence, moral 
conventions that have developed in similar circumstances are more easily reconciled 
than conventions that are fundamentally different.
In  conclusion,  the  Foole's  assertion  that  there  can  be  no  justice  based  on 
rationality (Hobbes, 1976) is to an extent correct; there can only be a justice as the 
outcome of repeated interactions between rational maximisers. Different conventions 
prescribe  different  accounts  of  justice  depending  on  topical  parameters.  Thus,  the 
characterisation  of  principles  of  justice  is  affected  by  local  established  social 
conventions.  Since rational  behaviour  is  bounded by these same  social  conventions, 
principles of justice that are accepted by rational agents are neither static nor universal.
6.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the  rationality of free-riding and discuss the 
contradictions arising from assuming  rational, mutually unconcerned individuals who 
interact in a society that is “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (Rawls, 2005: 
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4). The conventional account in rationality and social interactions addresses some of 
these  issues  more  efficiently  than  contractarian  theories  like  the  one  introduced  in 
Morals by Agreement. In addition, free-riding is less problematic in the context of the 
evolutionary  account  of  social  behaviour  than  it  is  for  theories  that  are  based  on 
individual  rationality without  taking into account  social  dynamics.  In this  respect,  a 
theory of social conventions that are seen as evolutionarily dynamic is better placed to 
deal with problems of collective action.
In the  conventional account,  dispositions are known since agents' histories are 
known. In addition, repeated interactions ensure that free-riders are punished through 
social  exclusion and also that  those who do not  have a  long history of  cooperative 
interactions are only allowed to participate in interactions yielding small benefits. The 
gradual acceptance of agents in cooperative conventions makes it costly for agents with 
parasitic behaviour to take advantage of cooperators. Moreover, long-term cooperators 
who realise that their cooperative behaviour is no longer maximising are bounded by the 
same environmental parameters as their neighbours and thus one should expect that the 
strategy shift  will  eventually  take  over  within  the  convention.  Therefore,  they  only 
free-ride  for  a  transitional  period  until  the  new  strategy  becomes  the  norm.  In  this 
understanding,  social  conventions serve as mechanisms of information sharing, which 
makes detection of free-riders or strategy shifts easier.
Hobbes's Foole is the archetypical free-rider. By arguing that it is impossible to 
argue  that  it  is  rational  to  comply  always  with  one's  agreements,  he  argues  that 
rationality and morality cannot be reconciled and that a  rational agent by definition 
should always make the  most,  disregarding others'  benefit.  Unless  we accept  moral 
constraints  on  rational  maximisation  or  idealised  assumptions  such  as  disposition 
translucency, the Foole is right. However, Hobbes did not take into account that social 
interactions are repeated and free-riders can be found and punished, not necessarily by a 
government but by being excluded from future cooperative ventures. Therefore, rational 
interactions that are repeated, in an  environment where information about individuals' 
history can be known, can lead to a mutually beneficial state. In other words, the Foole 
has rational incentives to cooperate as long as he knows that this action will be known 
and  he  expects  to  interact  with  the  same  people  again  in  the  future.  Thus,  the 
conventional account of social interactions can describe how  rational individuals can 
interact for mutual advantage and reach a just outcome.
Given that rational strategies depend on environmental parameters and within a 
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convention agents have access to roughly similar information, we should expect that 
rational conventions are also conventions of justice. The next chapter will attempt to 
show how rational conventions being conventions of mutual advantage, also ensure the 
presence  of  justice.  The  rationality  of  the  individual  in  combination  with  the 
evolutionary account of the establishment of conventions allows for a more flexible and 
realistic account not only of rationality but also of the subsequent conventions. Within 
evolutionarily  stable,  Pareto-efficient  conventions  a  behaviour  that  is  commonly 
accepted as moral, can be grounded on purely rational premises more efficiently than in 
the account presented in Morals by Agreement. In addition, the next chapter will focus 
on justice as mutual advantage, which requires rational interactions and is based on the 
assumption  of  rational  agents.  However  it  is  problematic  in  respect  to  interactions 
between individuals that are extremely unequal, especially in the context presented in 
this  and  previous  chapters  of  evolutionary  conventions  and  mutually  unconcerned 
agents. Therefore, it is essential to show in the next chapter that there can be a variation 
of the theory of justice as mutual advantage that includes the weak, without abolishing 
the assumption of individual rationality.
150
7. Social conventions and Justice 
The priority of the individual over the collective that has been assumed and implied in 
the previous chapters has direct implications for the importance of individual rationality 
in this thesis. Assuming individual rationality and accepting it as the cornerstone of the 
argument presented here, implies that the only account of a theory of justice that can be 
justified as authoritative in this context is justice as mutual advantage.
The discussion in Chapter Six mostly dealt with the  rationality of free-riding 
behaviour  and  examined  whether  free-riders,  being  rational  agents,  will  accept 
conventional limitations on their behaviour. Individual moral behaviour should lead to a 
just society. In the following sections, rational agents will be shown to have incentives 
to adopt strategies that lead to a just outcome without loss of their rationality.
Rational strategies depend on the given environment – the information available 
and other agents' dispositions. Therefore, justice as mutual advantage, which is based on 
agents'  rationality, will depend on the specific  environment. Given the  environmental 
limitations on agents' rationality there can be variations on the mutually accepted point 
of  agreement.  In  other  words,  the  central  role  rationality  has  in  justice  as  mutual 
agreement makes it possible to have various just outcomes depending on environmental 
variety. Rationality will in a sense serve as the connecting point between conventional 
and  moral  behaviour.  First,  we  will  have  to  look  at  theories  of  justice  as  mutual 
advantage  in  contemporary  political  philosophy.  This  section  will  be followed by a 
discussion of justice in a conventional framework. The final section will examine what 
seems to be most important and challenging aspect of justice as mutual advantage: its 
requirements  for  the weak and the  possibility  of  their  inclusion  in  a  rational  social 
convention and by extension the social contract.
7.1 Rationality and Justice 
The concept of justice within political and moral philosophy has various meanings and 
definitions. Depending on the accepted understanding of  justice there are implications 
for  its  circumstances  and  rules.  Broadly  speaking,  justice  refers  to  constraints  on 
rational  maximising  behaviour  (Barry,  1991).  These  constraints  may  be  externally 
enforced by others or be part of an individual's  rational deliberation, as in  Gauthier's 
theory.  In  the  conventional  account,  social  structures  impose  these  constraints  by 
reinforcing the behaviour that sustains them. Within established social conventions this 
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is in essence a cyclical relationship;  rational  conventions reinforce just  behaviour by 
promoting  conventional  behaviour,  since  agents  who  behave  conventionally  are 
rewarded  through  more  beneficial  interactions  whereas  free-riders  are  punished  by 
exclusion.  Agents  within  maximising  conventions  will  continue  behaving 
conventionally,  thus  reinforcing  the  conventional  structures  that  bound  rational 
behaviour and thus implicitly constraining individual maximisation.
7.1.1 Justice
If we accept the moral priority of the individual over the collective or the outcome and 
the central  role  individual  rationality plays in interactions,  then it  is  imperative that 
justice  at  the  very  least  includes  some  form  of  constrained  maximisation.  The 
assumption that  individual  rationality is the main motivation of  behaviour means that 
there is little room for third party enforcement that violates the individual freedom to 
maximise. 
According to  Hume (2008) the need for justice arises when there is conflict of 
interests, whereas for  Hobbes  justice is keeping an  agreement and also the impartial 
behaviour of a commonly accepted arbitrator or institution (Barry, 1991). Thus, justice 
can be described as a mechanism to resolve conflicts in a commonly accepted manner. 
In  a  situation  where  any  number  of  individuals  cooperate  for  the  production  of  a 
surplus, a common understanding of a just distribution of this surplus is needed in order 
to avoid or resolve conflict. However, the method of deciding on the distribution of the 
surplus has to be accepted by all participants in order to be considered just. In order to 
avoid conflict after its production, all parties have to have agreed on the rules of justice. 
In a  different  understanding, rules  of  justice are required when the existing state  of 
affairs can be seen as disadvantageous to some. In a distribution that is not proportional 
to  the  perceived  contribution  or  that  was  based  on  coercion  for  instance,  the 
disadvantaged can call for  justice, the need for a distribution based on just premises. 
Just rules are to be used to correct any injustices in the status-quo. 
From the  above,  we  can  see  there  are  two,  closely  linked,  uses  of  justice. 
Distributive and corrective justice. Distributive justice refers to the rules that are to be 
used to  agree on a  distribution  of  the cooperative surplus  and the  conditions  under 
which it is produced, and corrective justice to the rules to be used to correct a status-quo 
that was reached by coercion or any other process that can be deemed unfair by one 
party (Alexander, 2007). Rules of  justice can be derived using similar premises and 
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therefore both distributive and corrective  justice can be based on the same principles. 
Hence, it is more important to establish the procedure with which justice is derived than 
the content of just rules. 
Justice can refer to a just outcome of interactions or to a set of rules of justice 
according to which these interactions take place. An allocation of resources may be seen 
as  just  if  it  occurred  in  accordance  with  just  rules  or  if  it  is  considered  just  itself 
(Gauthier & Sugden 1993). Given the importance that has been attributed to individual 
rationality in the previous chapters, the  nature and structure of interactions is central. 
Skyrms (2004) showed how social structure equilibria can be contagious; a maximising 
behaviour  observed  in  a  social  group  can  infect  individuals  and  hence  shift  the 
equilibrium point in a given society. In this manner the cooperative or non-cooperative 
equilibrium in a social group can influence the equilibria in the neighbouring social 
groups, depending on the dynamics of the existing social structures. 
As discussed in Chapters Four (§ 4.4.2) and Five (§ 5.1), social structures on a 
local level are interdependent on the structures that define the social contract as a whole. 
Thus,  a majority of cooperative  social  structures should sustain a cooperative  social 
contract  and  vice  versa  an  established  cooperative  social  contract  supports  the 
circumstances for cooperative equilibria on a topical level. The same principle applies 
for just behaviour and equilibria of justice in social groups. A set of interactions among 
rational individuals that is commonly accepted as just, and therefore mutually beneficial 
in outcome, should lead to just outcomes on the level of the social contract. Rationality 
ensures that the justice of the rules of interactions will lead to a just outcome. 
In this context, there is no need to distinguish between justice and fairness. What 
is accepted by rational agents as fair practice will lead to a just outcome. Interactions 
that  are  deemed  fair,  or  mutually  beneficial  will  be  repeated  and  create  rules  of 
behaviour that are very likely to establish social conventions of behaviour. Therefore, in 
this  sense,  a  stable  social  convention  has  to  be  a  just  social  convention,  or  put 
differently,  a  social  convention  that  is  built  on just  rules.  Interactions  that  leave  all 
participants better off and satisfied with their share of the surplus, have to be repeated 
and will form stable structures of interactions, since we have assumed  rational agents 
whose aim is to maximise their utility. In the same vein, interactions of this type are also 
just; everybody is better off as a result of the interaction and is willing to participate in 
similarly structured interactions in the future. Therefore,  justice could be defined as a 
Nash  equilibrium that is  Pareto efficient (in the absence of coercion).  In addition,  a 
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Nash  equilibrium that is not  Pareto efficient can be a just situation provided that the 
equilibrium is a Pareto improvement over the status-quo. Hence, justice can be seen as a 
comparative  measure  and  not  exclusively  as  an  ideal  state  of  social  affairs.  A just 
situation can be improved by a more just one (Sen 2009) and in this respect, justice can 
be seen a process rather than a single equilibrium point.
Whether we view justice as an ideal point in history, a hypothetical structure to 
help  us  understand social  behaviour,  or  a  process  of  reaching a  better  society,  it  is 
essential  that  there is  no form of  coercion in a  situation of  justice.  The absence of 
coercion is  paramount,  not because coercing someone to  act  against  her  will  seems 
wrong, but  because it  cannot be reconciled with the assumption of equal individual 
rationality. If there is a need for one to be coerced to act in a certain way, then obviously 
her  rational deliberation leads to a disposition to act differently. Rational interactions 
require both parties to be  rational and behave in way that they think maximises their 
utility.  Moreover,  it  is  assumed that  a  rational  agent  would  not  start  an  interaction 
voluntarily if she knew she would be coerced to act in a certain way. Therefore, any just  
situation cannot be derived from or include coercion.  In addition,  when punishment 
takes the form of social exclusion, as is the case in the account presented here, there is 
no need to use coercive force for agents who behave unjustly or do not comply with an 
agreement. However, there has to be a type of coercion at least by way of protecting 
conventional  equilibria  of  rational  individual  action.  In  this  respect,  we  could 
distinguish coercion to force an action from coercive force that protects the possibility 
of an action taking place.
7.1.2 Justice as mutual advantage
Asserting  that  individuals  are  rational  utility  maximisers  implies  a  specific 
understanding of  justice.  Justice  as  mutual  advantage  requires  and assumes  rational 
agents since it “begins with fully informed individuals...who are driven to pursue their 
own self-interest” (Matravers 2000: 156). An agent participates in an interaction only if 
she expects to benefit from it. If all interacting agents do the same, there will be a set of 
interactions  that  promote  each  individual's  benefit  and therefore  the  common good. 
However,  the  assumption  of  rationality  is  not  as  important  for  justice  as  mutual 
advantage as the one of equal rationality. If one agent cannot take advantage of others 
because of a type of hyper-rationality, then agents who do not behave strictly rationally 
do not affect the structure of a theory of justice as mutual advantage. Justice as mutual 
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advantage describes a bargaining procedure between rational individuals that leads to a 
commonly accepted outcome. Both agents have more to gain by participating in the 
cooperative procedure than they lose by constraining their self-interest. 
Justice as mutual advantage assumes that individuals with conflicting interests 
participate  in  the  production  of  a  cooperative  surplus  which  is  mutually  beneficial 
(Barry, 1991; Gauthier, 1986; Vanderschraaf, 2011). Given rational agents and absence 
of  coercion,  all  voluntary  interactions  should  lead  to  just  outcomes.  Hence,  the 
connection  between  justice  as  mutual  advantage  and  individual  rationality  is  rather 
straightforward. Justice as mutual advantage by definition requires rationality as well as 
the  absence  of  coercion.  Moreover,  if  we accept  that  individuals  are  self-interested 
utility maximisers then the only account of justice that is meaningful is justice as mutual 
advantage.
It  is  essential  that  commonly  accepted  rules  of  justice  contain  a  method  of 
enforcing them. The only rational incentive for an agent's participating in an interaction 
is that her share of the cooperative surplus will increase her utility such that it will be 
greater  than  before,  or  in  the  absence  of  the  interaction.  Free-riding  threatens 
cooperation when agents'  future discount factor is very small, or when the distribution 
of the cooperative surplus is not seen as beneficial for all participants. Rational agents 
should be able to agree on such a rule based solely on their rationality. And rationality 
makes it essential that the commonly accepted rule must also be commonly beneficial. 
Conventional rationality as discussed earlier means that agents within a convention have 
access  to  similar  information  and  are  bound  by  similar  environmental  constraints. 
Therefore, their  rational deliberation has to lead to similar outcomes with respect to 
maximising strategies. And in this respect they will agree on what is a just outcome and 
on the rules to enforce it.
The above discussion is  based on the assumption that  rationality  and mutual 
advantage are linked; interactions among rational agents must lead to mutual advantage. 
Given  rational agents, mutual advantage is defined by a Nash equilibrium that is also 
Pareto efficient. This in turn is the definition of justice. Rational behaviour depends on 
an  agent's  environment,  others'  expected  behaviour  and  available  information. 
Therefore,  the possibility  of  justice  depends  on the  environment  which is  primarily 
defined by agents' dispositions as revealed by their history. An interaction that leads to a 
sub-optimal  Pareto  equilibrium can be as  just  as  an interaction that  leads  to  Pareto 
optimality.  Always defect is  as just  as always cooperate when we take into account 
155
environmental parameters. 
Gauthier, based on Hume, reached a similar conclusion: “In a world of Fooles...it 
would not be rational to be moral” (Gauthier 1986: 182). This can be problematic when 
the goal is to derive morality from rationality, as well as when it is asserted that justice 
can  be  the  outcome of  rational  behaviour.  In  Morals  by  Agreement  the  problem is 
addressed by postulating that it is rational to be a constrained maximiser.
In a game theoretical framework, the issue of deriving morality from rationality 
or  even  linking  the  two  takes  the  form of  a  discussion  relating  to  the  equilibrium 
selection  problem.  Both  in  game  theory  and  in  evolutionary  game  theory  rational 
behaviour and  evolutionary  dynamics respectively lead to stable equilibria; the same 
applies to the conventional account presented here. The related literature (Sugden, 2001; 
Binmore, 1998) proposes various solutions to the problem of equilibrium selection by 
introducing aspects of individual morality or rationality in the analysis as opposed to 
rely exclusively to social  dynamics.  Traditional game theoretical models of repeated 
interactions show that there are many stable equilibria but do not propose a convincing 
mechanism for selecting the optimal, or even for distinguishing amongst them. 
7.1.3 Conclusion
The following section will deal with the equilibrium selection problem in the context of 
repeated  interactions  between  rational  agents  and  the  conventional  account.  Given 
inter-conventional communication and availability of information, an  equilibrium that 
complies  with the premises  of individual  rationality,  as  described in  Chapter  Three, 
must  also  comply  with  the  principles  of  justice.  The  equilibrium selection  problem 
relates to traditional contractarian theories in that it sets a different basis for examining 
and discussing the status-quo and the contract point.
7.2 Equilibrium selection
The theory of  justice suggested in  Morals by Agreement  and the typical  contractarian 
paradigm require a status-quo where the bargaining procedure starts and a description of 
the bargaining process itself. However, this implies a static description of interactions. 
Information  and preferences  remain  the  same during  bargaining and  depend on the 
original  position.  The  conventional  account  of  behaviour  proposes  a  more  realistic 
account  of  human  behaviour.  Information  availability  changes  as  more  interactions 
occur  and  therefore  preferences  change  accordingly.  It  has  been  suggested  that 
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bargaining is part of the game that models interactions and therefore should not be seen 
as a separate set of interactions (Binmore 1998). In the following, social interactions 
will be assumed to include the game of bargaining and therefore it will be assumed that 
a single game describes all interactions, before, during and after the bargaining process.
7.2.1 Justice in conventions
In  the  conventional  account  of  contractarianism,  bargaining  is  not  an  essential 
requirement  for  a  stable  equilibrium.  Individuals  interact  and  reach  a  de-facto 
convention of  behaviour that does not have to include a formal  agreement or be the 
outcome of bargaining. Given rationality, a convention of behaviour that is not seen as 
mutually beneficial cannot be accepted by all participating parties and therefore cannot 
be a stable  equilibrium. Similarly to  rational theories of  justice such as  Gauthier's, all 
participants  have  to  be  benefited  by  the  formation  of  a  convention.  But  unlike  the 
bargaining process  in  Morals  by  Agreement there  is  no  need to  make claims  or  to 
bargain.  Actual  behaviour  and  past  interactions  replace  the  need  for  promises  and 
promise-keeping and interaction outcomes show whether equilibria shifts are possible. 
There is no need for one to promise to abide by the existing social contract rules; one's 
past behaviour will serve as a measure of one's acceptance in the social contract and the 
incremental increase of the benefits associated with interactions makes it too costly for 
new members to take advantage of the cooperative surplus. Thus, in the  conventional 
account individuals are accepted or rejected by interaction structures based on their past 
behaviour and the development of the  convention is incremental in order to allow for 
the  exposing  of  defectors.  That  is  in  direct  contrast  to  the  theory  in  Morals  by  
Agreement  where  rational  agents  are  expected  to  guess  others'  dispositions  before 
internalising constraints on their behaviour.
For Gauthier, given certain conditions, constrained maximisation leads to justice. 
In  a  group  of  constrained  maximisers  justice  requires  adopting  strategies  that  are 
characterised  by  constrained  maximisation.  Interactions  among  rational  agents  who 
have internalised  constrained  maximisation  leads  to  just  outcomes.  Similarly,  in  the 
conventional account presented here, justice requires agents to behave according to the 
rules  of the  established  convention.  Having assumed  rational  agents and absence of 
coercion  the  established  convention  will  be  one  that  promotes  individual  utility 
maximisation which in turn leads to group welfare maximisation. In this context, justice 
as well as rationality require that one accepts the established conventional rules, which 
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are the result of repeated interactions. For instance, in the divide the cake example the 
two agents can experiment with repeated  divisions of the hypothetical cake. The fair 
division will be reached once both agents are satisfied with the outcome, irrespective of 
their share (Vanderschraaf, 1999). Agents acting according to the conventional account 
would experiment with small portions of the cake and would only actually divide the 
cake once they had reached an understanding on how it should be divided. Therefore in 
a sense  bargaining still  takes place,  but just  not as described in  bargaining theories. 
Instead  of  claiming  and  consenting,  individuals'  actions  show  the  most  sustainable 
equilibrium point.
The  main  difference  between  the  conventional  description  of  the  bargaining 
process  and  typical  evolutionary  game  theoretical  explanations  is  that  evolutionary 
game theory does not take into account repeated interactions among the same agents. In 
Skyrms's analysis (2004) there is high correlation between interacting agents, but this 
does not imply that most interactions occur among agents who remember each other and 
their past. Therefore, this analysis does not take into account the possibility of repeated 
interactions in an  evolutionary  dynamic framework which is what makes  constrained 
maximisation rational. In the conventional account equilibria are selected in roughly the 
same manner  that  evolutionary  game theory suggests;  but  interacting agents  have a 
memory of their recent interactions and decide their future  behaviour based on their 
past.  This  will  create  dynamics  of  developing  equilibria  as  similarly  behaving 
individuals will be drawn together and form social conventions. 
If the evolutionarily stable behaviour in divide the cake situations is to claim half 
(Skyrms, 2004), accepting agents' rational capabilities makes it possible to explain other 
non-equal  distribution  fairness  norms that  have  been  established and are  present  in 
many cultures (Binmore, 1998). For instance, the surplus is to be divided equally, but 
remembering that the last time the rule was applied in a division between a healthy adult 
and a sick infant will create a non-equal division equilibrium. Given that the health of 
the adult is not threatened significantly by claiming less and the infant will have an 
increased probability of surviving by claiming more than half, it is reasonable to assume 
that  in  similar  interactions  in  the  future  the  same  behaviour  will  be  followed.  The 
marginal cost of claiming less for the adult is much less than for the infant and can be 
seen as incremental. Furthermore, it can be asserted that the survival of infants serves as 
insurance  for  adults.  Hence,  both  parties  maximise  by  following  a  non-equal 
distribution which is rational and efficient and thus easier to be replicated. Therefore, in 
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this  sense the established commonly accepted  behaviour at  the eventual  equilibrium 
point for each social group will depend on the specific circumstances. There can be 
equilibria that demand equality as the only form of justice and others where justice is 
what  is  required by the most powerful.  All  of these  conventions  may be stable and 
long-standing. A rational comparison of the various equilibria will show that the most 
efficient one will be replicated. In order for this comparison to take place rationality is 
essential,  which  in  turn  implies  that  information  about  other  conventions  has  to  be 
available. Otherwise, each isolated convention that has reached a stable equilibrium can 
also be said to be a just convention.
7.2.2 The equilibrium selection problem
The  question  that  arises  from  the  rationale  of  justice  as  equilibria  of  repeated 
interactions is how one ought to choose among competing stable conventions. However, 
this  not quite the right way to put it;  to an extent individuals do not choose among 
competing  equilibria  but  among  competing  social  structures  that  lead  to  social 
equilibria. And these structures as well as the individuals' maximising strategies depend 
on  evolutionary  dynamics. Therefore,  evolutionary  dynamics in conjunction with past 
established conventions define the set of equilibria that are available for selection at the 
topical level of social conventions and individual action.
The differences among various conventions can be explained by “factors such as 
historical precedents and accidents that lie outside of the description of the coordination 
game” (Samuelson, 1998: 6). At the same time, coordination games such as the driving 
game have two equilibria that are both Pareto-optimal and therefore rational agents are 
indifferent  between  them.  Therefore,  in  this  type  of  game  it  is  irrelevant  which 
equilibrium will be chosen. Similarly, in non-cooperative games an optimal equilibrium 
selection mechanism is essential for a just outcome. However, it is not imperative that 
the chosen equilibrium or the mechanism of selection is included in or described by the 
game parameters. When there are several stable equilibria that can be seen as just, it is 
difficult for a rational agent to select one and then to risk change if she is already in a 
convention. Obvious Pareto superior alternatives can mean that informed rational agents 
will change their behaviour so as to reach them. Hence, the availability of information is 
central to the feasibility of individual behaviour shifting the evolutionary direction and 
indirectly influencing the selection of an equilibrium. Selecting an optimal equilibrium 
requires information about  other  social  states  and a possibility  of inter-conventional 
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comparison.
As implied earlier,  when there is  no information available in a given  society 
about a Pareto superior convention then their existence does not play a role in accessing 
the status of social structure equilibria or the social contract. Asserting that a social state 
is just or not, is only affected by other possible equilibria that are known. For instance, a 
hypothetical  society that has reached an ideal  social contract can only be imitated by 
other societies if there is information about its status. An isolated ideal social contract 
cannot have an effect on the evolution of other social contracts or their classification as 
just or unjust. The selection of an optimal  equilibrium is influenced by equilibria in 
other social groups, but for this to happen, information spreading and communication 
between conventions are essential.
A stable Nash  equilibrium  convention that is  weakly  Pareto efficient  but  not 
strictly  optimal  is  still  considered just,  given the present  information restrictions.  In 
many respects the chosen equilibrium, or in other words the established convention, is 
the result of a plethora of historical and environmental factors and thus can be seen as 
random. A social contract that is represented by the game of life (Binmore, 1998) is 
affected  by  too  many  parameters  to  be  included  in  a  meaningful  way  in  a  formal 
description  of  interactions.  However,  given  individual  rationality  and  a  reasonable 
degree  of  information  availability  it  is  possible  to  compare  conventions  and  social 
contracts and decide which is closer to  Pareto efficiency. Information availability and 
spreading becomes feasible and a plausible assumption in modern societies. At the very 
least it is much easier than it used to be; the effect of technological developments on 
information availability in contemporary societies will be examined more analytically in 
Chapter  Eight.  The  conclusion  from  the  above  is  that  comparisons  among  various 
conventions and their efficiency is realistic and can lead to change in sub-optimal social 
conventions.
Equilibrium points depend on previously established equilibria, which are to be 
seen  as  established  conventions.  In  turn  these  established  conventions  give  rise  to 
related types of new  conventions.  Therefore,  the ideal  convention is  social  structure 
specific and depends on the  convention's historical  evolution. Different societies and 
social groups will be more effective in various social conventions. In this context, there 
can be no universal ideal convention and Pareto optimality can be very different if we 
take  into  account  the  topical  histories  and  cultures.  Established  conventions  that 
facilitate  justice in social interactions are therefore the result of previously established 
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social  conventions. In other words, our understanding of fairness depends on group or 
society-specific norms that in turn lead to the selection of new equilibria of justice. For 
instance, in the meeting game Adam and Eve are to meet either at a boxing match or the 
ballet.  If  in  a  similar  situation  in  the  past  they  went  to  the  boxing  match,  which 
maximises Adam's utility, reciprocity dictates that next time they will go to the ballet. 
Reciprocal  behaviour  is  viewed  as  fair  in  most  human  cultures  (Binmore,  1998), 
however  that  does  not  mean  that  it  is  generally  fair  or  that  it  can  be  used  as  a 
justification for just  behaviour in more complex and more realistic situations. In the 
meeting game both alternatives are stable Nash and  Pareto-optimal equilibria; but in 
order to decide which corresponds to justice we have to take into account environmental 
parameters that are part of the game that represents the topical social (or for Binmore 
the game of life), but not of the specific game.
Using  evolutionary  game  theoretical  language  means  that  “groups  using  a 
Pareto-superior  equilibrium will  therefore grow in size or number at  the expense of 
groups  using  a  Pareto-inferior  equilibrium.  Eventually  the  inferior  groups  will 
disappear” (Binmore, 1998: 204). Societies and social conventions that do better expand 
at  the expense of those that  do not  perform as well.  Performance in the context  of 
cultural  evolution  can  include  anything  that  implies  better  living  conditions  for  its 
members. Doing better does not have to be an exclusive or specific definition; it refers 
in essence to utility maximisation, but in real terms it can include being more peaceful, 
more affluent, or happier. 
The difference between biological and cultural evolution is that human societies 
do not have to grow bigger in size or number to prove their  evolutionary superiority. 
Social  groups  that  are  on  Pareto-superior  equilibria,  on  conventions  that  help  more 
individuals  maximise,  attract  agents  who  want  to  maximise.  If  one  sees  that  one's 
neighbours (that can include neighbouring house, village, country or any other situation 
where information about different  social  conventions is available), do better, then it is 
only  rational to try to imitate their  behaviour and their customs if it is not possible to 
join  their  group.  This  change  of  behaviour  happens  obviously  at  the  expense  of 
Pareto-inferior  social  conventions that are gradually led to extinction. This description 
borrows terms from biological evolution theories, but it relies on individual rationality. 
Groups do not interact and do not expand in the sense that individuals forming these 
groups follow certain  social  conventions and thus cause changes on a group level. In 
this  sense  evolutionary accounts of  justice can be compatible with  justice as mutual 
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advantage. Conventions of behaviour that develop in groups and societies are the result 
of interactions among rational individuals. The same rational individuals are responsible 
for  selecting  among  stable  equilibria  and  remaining  informed  about  the  available 
alternative equilibria. 
At  the  basis  of  the  evolutionary  rationale  of  social  interactions  remains  the 
possibility of trial and error efforts to maximise. A rational agent who is informed about 
a  seemingly better  equilibrium can try its  established  behaviour in interactions with 
individuals  of  her  convention  in  order  to  determine  whether  it  is  actually  an 
improvement  on  the  status  quo.  Given  that  information  is  roughly  equal  in  her 
convention, one can expect others to imitate her. This description resembles Binmore's 
use of the concept of memes (Binmore,  1998;  Dawkins, 2006). However,  Binmore's 
account  refers  to  the  evolutionary  account  of  interactions  and  is  not  based  on  the 
assumption of individual rationality. However, broadly understood “a meme is whatever 
gets replicated when people imitate their more successful neighbours” (Binmore, 1998: 
294)  and  individuals  in  this  context  can  be  taken  to  be  characterised  by  imperfect 
memory and processing ability which is in accordance with the assumption of bounded 
rationality. Thus, efficient  conventions are replicated similarly to memes, without loss 
of agents' rational capabilities.
7.2.3 Conclusion
Discussing rational interactions is only useful in the absence of coercion. In cases where 
power  differences  are  significant  or  in  any  case  too  great  to  allow  for  rational 
interactions,  a  rational agent can find it  beneficial  to maximise by forcing others to 
comply with his will. The discussion so far having assumed agents of roughly equal 
rationality  and  an  evolutionary  understanding  of  social  structures,  excluded  the 
possibility of coercion and the existence of individuals who are significantly weaker 
than most others in a social group. 
The main criticism of  justice as mutual advantage is that it does not provide a 
convincing  incentive  for  rational  agents  to  be  moral  in  cases  of  extreme  power 
inequalities. The following section will discuss the possibility of providing a  rational 
justification for moral behaviour in these cases by focusing on the vulnerable within a 
society  and the  requirements  a  theory  of  justice  as  mutual  advantage  can  make  of 
rational, mutually unconcerned agents.
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7.3 Justice and the vulnerable
Plato's parable of the ring of Gyges exhibits the problem of justice very nicely. A person 
with a ring that makes him invisible is not bound by the same rules as others. The ring 
makes  him  immensely  more  powerful  and  he  does  not  have  anything  to  gain  by 
constraining his maximisation. It creates an extreme power discrepancy such that justice 
as  mutual  advantage  does  not  provide  an  incentive  to  behave  morally.  A theory  of 
justice however is especially, if not exclusively, useful in case of extreme inequalities; 
“among equals, morality would be a necessary evil” (Gauthier, 1986: 315).  
The following will discuss the requirements a theory of  justice has in terms of 
including in the social contract those who cannot contribute. It will begin by addressing 
the question of who is to be considered weak in modern societies. This will be followed 
by an examination of how a theory of justice as mutual advantage can be expanded to 
include non-contributors.
In  social  contract  theory  handicapped  individuals  of  various  degrees  are 
considered weak. A blind person and a person in a comatose state are both weak but at 
the  same  time  very  different  in  terms  of  their  potential  contributions  to  the  social 
contract. The next subsection will focus on individuals who are severely disabled or 
temporarily not contributing (such as the very old and the very young) and discuss how 
the definition of vulnerability depends on  social  structure and not just on individual 
contribution.  The requirements of  justice as mutual advantage for those who cannot 
interact with the world or the mentally insane,  who cannot contribute at  all  will  be 
addressed  in  the  following  subsection  where  justice  as  mutual  advantage  and  the 
vulnerable are examined more analytically.
7.3.1 The vulnerable
Vulnerability depends largely on social structures and also on technological means. In 
other words, the assessment about who is vulnerable is linked to a given social, physical 
and technological environment. A physically disabled person would be more vulnerable 
as a hunter-gatherer than in a modern society. Similarly, a dyslexic child would not be 
considered  vulnerable  in  an  illiterate  society.  A weak  person  in  one  society  is  not 
necessarily  weak  in  a  differently  organised  society.  Hobbes,  just  as  most  modern 
contractarians, would not fare very well in the state of nature and “vulnerability is really 
best thought of as a matter of degree, varying both according to one’s particular society 
and to one’s individual circumstances” (Vanderschraaf, 2011: 9). The same applies to 
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social  conventions within societies; the severity of one's weakness can be reduced or 
increased  by  social  surroundings.  This  is  in  essence  a  Rawlsian  argument;  social 
institutions can cater for those less skilful or to the disabled and therefore reduce natural 
inequalities or the number of those deemed as vulnerable
Institutions that deal with levelling the field for the unlucky effectively are just 
(Rawls 2005). Similarly, “[i]t is unjust if society fails to adjust its institutions and social 
systems to accommodate the fact that some of its members are blind” (Matravers 2011: 
139). Modern societies can make it  possible for blind people to participate as equal 
members and the same applies for disabled people; at the same there have been societies 
that  have  excluded  even  lightly  disabled  individuals.  Therefore,  characterising 
vulnerability depends on the specific society and its efforts to include as many people as 
possible. In the same spirit, it is rational for one to make society as inclusive as possible 
so as to maximise the number of those contributing to the cooperative surplus, since the 
more the contributors the greater the surplus and therefore the greater the individual 
gain from its distribution. This can be taken to mean that severely disabled people who 
have never contributed or are not expected to contribute are not owed any moral, or 
non-rational, consideration. Maybe in order to preserve the requirement of  justice as 
mutual advantage this is a necessary compromise. 
In contractarian thought, and especially when justice is seen as justice as mutual 
advantage,  as  in  MbA, the  vulnerable  and  non-contributors  are  not  “owed  moral 
consideration”  (Morris,  1991:  81).Therefore,  one  way  of  addressing  the  issue  of 
whether the weak should be included in a social contract based on self-interest is to 
follow Gauthier in accepting that “[a]nimals, the unborn, the congenitally handicapped 
and defective, fall beyond the pale of a morality tied to mutuality” (Gauthier, 1986: 
268). A second approach would be to argue that the weak participate in conventions of 
justice and therefore by extension they are moral agents. The following section will 
examine whether it is possible to include vulnerable and non-contributing members of a 
society in the realm of justice as mutual advantage, without abolishing the premises of 
rationality  or  the  principles  of  justice  as  mutual  advantage.  The  following  two 
paragraphs will look at how technological and social developments have been making 
the inclusion of disabled people more likely. Then, the focus will turn to examining 
whether it can be rational to interact with the vulnerable and with non-contributors.
The definition  of  vulnerability  includes  increasingly  fewer  people  as  society 
changes and technology advances. A person born with any severe paralysing disease 
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today in the Western world can hope that through advantages in technology, his life will 
be much easier  than it  would have been even a  few years  ago.  Moreover,  disabled 
people  today  can  be  more  socially  and  professionally  active  due  to  technological 
advances  that  have been accompanied  by,  and to  a  degree caused,  cultural  changes 
around the possibility of the social inclusion of the disabled. It is safe to claim that 
today disabled individuals are more active members of  society than they were a few 
decades ago and that this trend will continue. In addition, the disabled are more active 
professionally than anyone would have expected a few years ago as a result  of the 
technological progress and perception change. The disabled are increasingly included in 
social  structures  and expectations  of  their  contributing,  even  in  limited  ways,  have 
become the norm and the severity of disability less of a problem in matters of inclusion.
Severely physically disabled people can and are expected to contribute to the 
cooperative surplus as successfully as the able-bodied. “As successfully” does not have 
to mean “as effectively”; disabled individuals are not expected to contribute as much as 
the able-bodied, but they are expected to contribute to the best of their abilities. In this 
view, individuals with mental and physical disabilities can be expected to contribute to 
society. Social and technological developments have significant consequences in that 
they diminish the importance of physical ability as a requirement for one's contribution 
to  the  social  output  by comparison to  the  situation  a  few decades  ago.  As  long as 
existing  social  norms and rules  allow for  and assist  the  inclusion  of  the  physically 
vulnerable in  society, it can be expected that they will contribute. There are  rationally 
acceptable variations of net contribution to the cooperative surplus that can include the 
physically disabled without relaxing self-interested premises. 
In addition to the arguments in the previous paragraphs about the fact that with 
social and technological change fewer people are excluded from contributing because of 
their disability, we will have to take into account those who are too severely disabled to 
contribute as well as interactions between generations. It is difficult to see how extreme 
cases, including those who are severely mentally or physically disabled, can participate 
in a meaningful way in the creation of the cooperative surplus. Although it is possible 
that in the future there will be treatments that make it possible, in the present day they 
cannot be accepted in a  social contract that is based on rationality and mutual benefit 
alone. For this case, we would have to take into account the need for rational agents to 
sustain  a  cooperative  reputation.  One  who  interacts  with  someone  who  cannot 
contribute, loses from the series of interactions with the vulnerable but gains in terms of 
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reputation. A reputation as a cooperator makes it more likely that she will draw more 
cooperators  and therefore  increase  the  gains  from cooperative  interactions.  Rational 
agents do not expect any immediate and direct benefit from interacting with agents who 
cannot contribute;  they are benefited however from advertising their  disposition and 
therefore attracting similarly disposed  rational agents with whom interactions lead to 
optimal outcomes. In a sense, interactions with non-contributors are used as the basis 
for the real interactions for a rational agent – the ones yielding a benefit. The rationality 
of  interacting  with  non-contributing  agents,  which  also  includes  an  argument  for 
rational  interactions  with  the  weak  who  cannot  contribute  as  effectively  as  the 
able-bodied, will be discussed more analytically in the next section on justice.
The elderly and the very young are a special case of the vulnerable. Even if they 
do not contribute at present they have contributed or are expected to in the future. In 
that  respect,  intergenerational  interactions  are  an  easier  case  for  justice  as  mutual 
advantage  than  interactions  with  disabled  agents.  Moreover,  an  examination  of 
intergenerational justice can be part of the discussion about the requirements of justice 
towards the vulnerable. The very young are expected to contribute to the social output 
and thus they do not pose significant trouble in terms of  justice as mutual advantage. 
Gauthier (1986) argued that the too old to work have already contributed and therefore 
are entitled to their share of their cooperative surplus. The argument regarding a theory 
of justice for the very old or very young is very similar if not identical to the one for the  
very weak. However, it does pose less of a challenge to justice as mutual advantage as 
the young are expected to work at some point and therefore are to be included in the 
social contract as recipients only as an advance for their future contributions and in a 
form of insurance for the elderly; the rationale of including non-presently contributors 
as a form of insurance applies equally well to caring for the disabled in case one is 
found in their position. A rational agent has incentives to care for those who cannot care 
for themselves, so that if he becomes too weak to support himself, he will be able to 
count on others. The old, similarly to argument about the young future contributors, are 
to be included even though they do not contribute because they have contributed in the 
past and again as an insurance. Those who contribute for the too old to work can expect 
the  same when they are  too  old  to  work.  Younger  generations  can  act  as  potential 
punisher;  not  because their  utility  functions  include the very old but  because if  the 
convention  of  intergenerational  reciprocity  collapses,  they  will  not  be  benefited  by 
intergenerational reciprocity once they are too old to work. 
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One  can  be  hopeful  about  the  future;  even  severely  disabled  people  can 
contribute to the cooperative surplus in modern, developed societies. It is reasonable to 
assume that with the help of technology, this trend will continue to expand to include 
more people irrespective of their disability. Therefore, over time the theoretical tradition 
of justice as mutual advantage has been expanding the circle of individuals who can be 
included in its realm. 
In  some  respects  vulnerability  becomes  a  case  of  inequality  in  skills  and 
contribution which can be addressed by current theories of justice as mutual advantage. 
However, even though this optimistic account is very reasonable, it does not provide an 
answer for contemporary severely disabled people who cannot make any contribution to 
the cooperative surplus.
7.3.2 Justice
A theory  of  justice  as  mutual  advantage  must  give  an  account  of  why  rational 
individuals should care for others, especially the weak, even when there is no immediate 
benefit in so doing. The core of any theory of justice has to include a justification for 
helping  those  who  cannot  reciprocate.  Embedded  in  theories  of  justice  as  mutual 
advantage and practical  rationality is the notion of mutual unconcern.  Rational agents 
maximise their own utility functions without having an interest in the maximisation of 
others  or  put  differently  “utility  functions  are  to  be  defined  independently  of  one 
another” (Morris in Vallentyne, 1991: 81). The assumption of mutual unconcern is an 
essential  requirement  for  rational  agency  and  in  turn  for  a  discussion  of  justice  as 
mutual advantage. If not, one could just assume that humans are empathetic, benevolent 
and  mutually  concerned  and  therefore  justice  would  be  the  outcome  of  any  social 
interaction. In the account of justice as mutual advantage, which is the one discussed 
here, rational agents should only participate in interactions as long as it maximises their 
own utility irrespective of what happens to others. The essence of the assumption of 
rationality is that agents have to be self-regarding and only interact with others when it 
helps them promote their own interests. Therefore, it is obvious that combining justice 
as mutual advantage and participation in interactions without direct mutual benefit can 
be problematic.
It  is  very  difficult  if  not  completely  impossible  to  give  an  account  of  why 
conventions of caring for the weak were established in the first place. A very likely and 
plausible explanation can be that they serve as insurance. As mentioned in the previous 
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section,  it  is rational to care for the disabled,  as well  as the very old,  as a form of 
insurance  which  will  be  realised  if  one  becomes  very  old  or  disabled.  Despite  the 
difficulty of giving an empirical account of how conventions of caring for the weak 
have emerged, it is a fact that most modern societies have a justification and a method 
for doing so. Although it would have been very useful to be able to give a justification 
based on rationality of how modern social conventions include severely disabled infants 
for instance, it is not as important as recognising that this is an established convention. 
From an  evolutionary  account,  the  fact  that  conventions  of  helping  the  weak  have 
survived and become established social norms indicates that they do serve a purpose 
that is socially beneficial. However, this is just an indication, albeit an important one; 
societies have moved from excluding the weak, to discriminating against them, to trying 
to include them as equals in the  social contract. Therefore, we can claim that social 
cohesion  and efficiency are not  threatened by including those  who are  significantly 
weaker than the average.
Power  discrepancies  between  contracting  parties  refer  to  differences  in  the 
ability  to contribute to the cooperative surplus in similar  terms. The reasons behind 
unequal contributions may be the result of differences such as wealth, natural skills or 
may also  have  to  do with  an  agent's  age,  such as  the  too young or  the  too  old  to 
contribute. Also, significant differences include situations where a potential contracting 
party is so severely disabled that she cannot be expected to make any contribution at 
any time. The following discussion will focus on the latter case because it is the most 
challenging for theories of  justice as mutual advantage. If there can be a convincing 
answer for cases of severely disabled individuals participating in the  social contract, 
then cases of great power differences will be included. 
Theories of  justice as mutual advantage have been criticised for excluding the 
vulnerable (Barry,  1991); if  the criticism is  valid,  then it  is  claimed they cannot be 
convincing as theories of  justice – although contractarians like Gauthier disagree (as 
noted in section 7.3.1). However, a theory of justice as mutual advantage does not have 
to exclude the vulnerable. There are two distinct rational premises for justifying caring 
for the weak. First, a cooperative surplus is achieved even when there is an interaction 
with a disabled person, as long as he can contribute.  Secondly,  interacting with the 
weak, irrespectively of whether they can contribute or not, can be seen as insurance and 
can be justified through a rationale of indirect reciprocity. 
A  rational  agent  has  reasons  to  participate  in  interactions  characterised  by 
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extreme power inequalities interactions because they require smaller contributions from 
the powerful party than interactions between equals; an interaction with a weak person 
requires  a  contribution  that  does  not  have  to  be the  maximum possible  but  merely 
proportionate  to  the  contribution  of  the  weak.  In  this  respect,  an  interaction  with 
someone who cannot contribute as much can still be beneficial although not necessarily 
maximising. Hence, a rational agent should always choose to interact with someone of 
roughly equal capabilities. When this is not possible, interacting with someone weaker 
is also rational in the sense that there can be a cooperative surplus greater than would be 
through  individual  production.  A  handicapped  person  can  still  contribute  to  an 
interaction though she may not be as productive as an able-bodied individual. 
The second  rational justification for interacting with the weak is more directly 
linked to the understanding of social  behaviour as  conventional  behaviour. Caring for 
the severely disabled can be justified as a form of insurance and a type of indirect 
reciprocity.  Able-bodied  individuals  care  for  those  who  cannot  support  themselves, 
expecting that if they find themselves in the same position, others will do the same. 
These conventions are rational within small groups where free-riding can be identified 
and punished. And they can have only been established within small groups at first. 
Viewing modern societies as a collection of smaller social groups where reciprocity and 
cooperation are  rational would mean that there can be a  rational justification for this 
type of behaviour. Moreover, interactions with the weaker are rationally justifiable when 
we expect a form of indirect reciprocity; we “help those who cannot help themselves, so 
as to encourage those who can to help us” (Vanderschraaf, 1999: 349). The concept of 
indirect reciprocity is closely related with multilateral reciprocity, which was discussed 
in  the  previous  chapter;  agents  who  wish  to  cooperate  choose  agents  who  have 
cooperated in the past and avoid agents who have defected in the past (Sugden, 2004). 
In real life there is no ring of Gyges and at some point everyone will have to interact 
with someone who is significantly more powerful than the average. Interactions occur 
between parties of different power and most agents will find themselves interacting with 
much more powerful agents, more or less frequently.
The discussion in the paragraphs above mostly deals with cases of great but not 
extreme inequalities; the weak are considered to be contributors, even if they do not 
necessarily contribute as much. Although most of the arguments presented may apply in 
situations of extreme inequalities, in general they do not account for agents who cannot 
contribute  at  all  and  it  cannot  justify  such  interactions  from  the  perspective  of  a 
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mutually unconcerned agent. A rather stronger justification for rational agents to interact 
with  those  who  cannot  contribute  or  cannot  contribute  as  much,  is  that  in  the 
conventional  account  building  a  good  reputation  is  vital  as  well  as  using  these 
interactions as insurance. As mentioned earlier, one can use interactions where one’s 
benefit  is  very  small  or  non-existent  to  boost  one’s  reputation  and attract  similarly 
disposed agents. A rational agent who has built a reputation for  cooperation or even 
irrational  behaviour will find that it is much easier to convince cooperators to interact 
with her in interactions with higher than normal benefits. At the same time, she will 
avoid interactions  with agents  who have not shown similar  behaviour  and therefore 
avoid being taken advantage of. The assumption that interactions are repeated and their 
history is known ensures that those who have a cooperative history will only cooperate 
among  each  other  and avoid  agents  with  a  history  of  defection.  The  repetitiveness 
assumption also makes it possible to assert that the first stages of a series of interactions 
are a trial and error process during which interacting agents test the waters by engaging 
in small benefit and low risk interactions.
In  addition,  stable  conventions  have  been  assumed  to  build  and  develop 
incrementally;  low  significance  interactions  are  used  to  build  trust  among  rational 
agents and as a safety mechanism to make free-riding costly. In this context, someone 
who has a reputation of not taking advantage of the weak is much less likely to attempt 
to cheat his equals and be a free-rider and thus, will be more likely to be accepted in a 
cooperative convention. In the same spirit, a cooperative reputation is not very likely to 
attract  defectors  as  the low importance and low payoff  of  initial  interactions,  make 
cooperative interactions too costly for agents who do not aim at establishing long term 
interactions.  This  seems  to  be  the  strongest  case  for  including  severely  disabled 
individuals in the  social contract. It is in fact a case of indirect reciprocity. A rational 
agent  who  interacts  with  a  disabled  can  expect  to  be  rewarded  by  the  cooperative 
surplus of her increased future cooperative interactions. Similarly one can expect to be 
punished for  avoiding interactions  or  taking advantage  of  the  weak (Vanderschraaf, 
2011).  Given  a  reasonable  capacity  to  retain  information,  rational  agents  in  an 
established  convention  will  punish  those  who  have  exhibited  selfish  behaviour  and 
reward the altruists. An altruist may be irrational, but for the purposes of conventional 
rationality, and even for  Gauthier's account of translucent  dispositions, she meets the 
requirements set  by the  rationale of  constrained  maximisation both as introduced in 
Morals by Agreement and as presented in the conventional account of social behaviour.
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In conclusion, in all the above cases it is as rational to interact with agents who 
cannot  reciprocate.  The  account  of  conventional  justice  presented  here  can  be 
problematic on two accounts: it does not explain how conventions of interacting with 
the non-contributor emerged in the first place and secondly it can be argued that having 
a  reputation  for  cooperative  interactions  with  non-contributors  might  harm  one  by 
attracting  agents  who  are  disposed  to  defect.  The  first  point  is  addressed  by 
complementing the account of cooperative reputation with the rationale of helping those 
in need as a form of insurance policy. Attracting defectors as a result of cooperating 
with the vulnerable is a danger that is dealt with to a great extent when we take into 
account the fact that, in the context of repeated interactions, it takes time for a series of 
cooperative interactions to yield high enough gains so as to make a defector's time and 
effort worthwhile. 
Rational  conventions  that  are  based  on  such  inclusive  premises  are  more 
efficient  than  exclusive  social  conventions.  Including  the  severely  disabled  in  the 
cooperative surplus can only increase the total social output; especially if in the long run 
the  costs  for  caring  for  the  disabled  are  minimal  by  comparison  to  their  potential 
contributions.  Justice  as  mutual  advantage  does  not  have  to  mean that  mutuality  is 
restricted to interactions between two individuals. A rational agent can help someone 
weaker without expecting an immediate benefit from the specific individual. But having 
helped him has enhanced her reputation in order to make her future interactions more 
beneficial. Thus, when we conceive interactions as repeated within a  society, indirect 
reciprocity  is  a  valid  argument  for the  rationality  of behaving justly  and within the 
rationale of the theory of  justice as mutual advantage. In sum, creating a cooperative 
reputation leads to more cooperative interactions and thus greater benefits in the long 
run, but it needs to be viewed in conjunction with cooperation as insurance and whilst 
taking into account that cooperators will not engage in high benefit interactions with 
agents who have not proven their intentions.
A final point that needs to be included in the present examination of justice is the 
concept of desert. Justice is usually discussed in conjunction with desert (Rawls, 2005; 
Gauthier, 1986). In a just situation everybody gets what she deserves, or in other words, 
justice provides the regulation according to which a society should decide who deserves 
what. From the above understanding of justice as mutual advantage it may be concluded 
that  the vulnerable do not  receive anything as  a result  of thinking about  what  they 
deserve.  In  essence  they  do not  deserve  to  be receivers  of  the  cooperative  surplus. 
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However,  this  does  not  have  to  imply  that  they  do  not  receive  anything  from the 
division of the cooperative surplus. Their not being contributors is irrelevant since their 
participation in the social contract promotes the interests of those who are contributors. 
Therefore, participation in the social contract does not have to be tied to contribution to 
the cooperative surplus (Vanderschraaf, 2011).
7.3.3 Inter-conventional Justice
The  discussion  of  justice  presented  in  the  previous  paragraphs  has  not  included  an 
examination of possible  conventions of the weak. Given extreme inequalities either in 
skills and wealth or mental and physical capabilities, it is theoretically possible, and a 
plausible alternative scenario, that rational agents will choose to interact with those of 
similar  strengths.  Conventions  have  been  argued  to  be  formed  by  individuals  with 
access to similar information and thus similar outcomes of  rational deliberation. The 
same can be argued for individuals  whose capabilities  are  characterised by extreme 
inequalities. If coercion cannot be avoided in cases of extreme inequalities, the weak 
will  choose to interact with agents of similar strength and therefore roughly similar 
maximising strategies. As a result, there will be  social  conventions including  rational 
agents  of  similar  strength  who  achieve  optimal  outcomes  within  the  given 
environmental parameters. In this case we can have different types of social conventions 
within a social contract; social conventions consisting of the weak who simultaneously 
participate  in  conventions  with  stronger  agents,  should  that  help  them  maximise. 
Conventions of the weak is a realistic proposition, especially if we take into account 
how in contemporary societies patterns of behaviour change even within the same city. 
For instance, it is a common phenomenon in contemporary cities to have areas of low 
crime rates and other areas with very high criminality. These can be seen as different 
conventions within the boundaries of a single social contract. In this view, interactions 
between agents of different conventions are possible, though rarely maximising.
Interactions among individuals of different conventions might seem irrational at 
first view but, as discussed above, inclusive conventions can be more efficient; the same 
applies when we look at  conventions in the context of the social contract and not just 
individuals in the context of  social  conventions. Individuals who cannot contribute in 
one  convention can be useful in another; those who are too weak to contribute in a 
certain  environment  may  be  invaluable  in  a  different  one  when  they  interact  with 
different individuals.
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A more  interesting  albeit  not  always  as  realistic  case  would  be  one  where 
rational, non-coercive interactions among individuals of different  conventions are not 
possible.  Within  an  isolated  convention  rational  deliberation  can  lead  to  practical 
outcomes  that  are  incompatible  with  the  rules  of  other  established  conventions. 
Assuming there was no communication between those two conventions in the past but 
that they can interact in the present, their fundamental differences can make  rational 
interactions impossible. For instance, anthropological and historical evidence shows that 
European explorers  in the 17th century encountered a couple of isolated Polynesian 
island  societies  that  were  not  aware  of  each  other.  One  had  a  completely  peaceful 
culture of conflict resolution and the other was a typical hierarchical society lead by a 
warrior  elite.  The  Europeans  made  the  latter  aware  of  the  former  resulting  in  the 
destruction of  the peaceful  society  (Diamond,  2006).  In  this  example,  both isolated 
social contracts can be said to be based on rational conventions, given information and 
other  environmental  parameters.  However,  they  had  reached  extremely  different 
equilibria  such  that  any  interaction  between  them could  not  be  rational.  The  same 
probably applies for interactions between the Polynesian and the European culture of 
the time. Their extreme inequalities in combination with the radically different culture 
would make rational interactions impossible.
In the modern world there are social states that are considered rational by their 
members but are viewed as fundamentally irrational by outsiders. Western European 
states consider many states that do not accept European enlightenment principles as 
irrational and vice versa. Similarly, within societies there are localised  conventions of 
behaviour can be too different to make rational interactions a realistic possibility. It is 
obvious that in their circumstances one cannot rely on the rationality of individuals or 
on  conventions  for  addressing  conflicts  of  interests.  This  is  even  more  true  when 
between  conventions  there  are  significant  power  and  cultural  differences.  Avoiding 
interactions is a solid idea theoretically, but not always feasible. Therefore, in cases like 
the above a third party enforcer may be necessary.
The notion that a third party is needed to solve problems between rational actors 
that  cannot  reach  agreement  is  of  course  nothing  new.  A  form  of  government 
intervention is needed, and in some cases is essential, when differences in conventional 
rationality are too great for an agreement to be reached. This does not have to mean that 
all differences are reconcilable nor that an arbitrator is always needed. It is possible that 
differences are so extreme that there can be no meaningful method of interaction even 
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with an impartial arbitrator. Furthermore,  evolutionarily stable  conventions cannot be 
altered  significantly  within  short  periods  of  time  and  therefore  any  government  is 
powerless when its policies collide with the established conventions. The fact remains 
that impartial arbitrators cannot be ideal agents disconnected from reality and from the 
social conventions and structures that appointed them in the first place. Therefore, their 
behaviour  should  also  be  described by the  conventional  account  and is  limited  and 
bounded by existing  social  structures.  In  cases  of  extreme inequalities  like  the  two 
island societies above, an impartial arbitrator is not a more plausible solution than the 
one offered by the  conventional  account.  Extreme inequalities meant  that  there is  a 
possibility that there can be no agreement on a third party enforcer making coercion or 
abstention from interactions the only viable alternatives.
7.3.4 Conclusion
The above discussion has attempted to provide a  rational justification for interacting 
with those who cannot contribute, or who cannot contribute as efficiently, to the creation 
of the social surplus. Indirect reciprocity and the need for a cooperative reputation make 
it rational for one to help the weak. Within the conventional account of rationality there 
can be a similar argument for the inclusion of the weak. Once a convention of inclusion 
in the social contract has been established then rational agents have reasons to follow it. 
The difficulty therefore lies in accepting that it is possible for such conventions to come 
about as a result of  rational interactions. Once this argument is accepted,  established 
conventions  include  stability  dynamics  that  make  their  destabilisation  very  unlikely 
unless there are rational reasons for it. As long as inclusive equilibria are more efficient, 
then they cannot be destabilised. A rational agent within such a  convention does not 
analyse  each interaction  individually;  she  behaves  conventionally  unless  there  is  an 
environmental change that forces her to reconsider. Hence, an agent in a convention of 
justice behaves morally, not because it is in her best interest to do so but because it is in 
her best interest to behave conventionally.
7.4 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to show that  conventional  rationality can support a 
realistic version of justice as mutual advantage. If we take into account the fact that all 
interactions are to be seen as repeated and that  rational agents have incentives to act 
within  stable  and  efficient  conventions,  justice  can  be  reached  through  interactions 
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among individuals who want to maximise in the long run. Moreover, the outcome of 
interactions can be known at least within the boundaries of a social  convention which 
means that agents can be punished or rewarded for their behaviour. Thus, rational agents 
will want to advertise their behaviour in order to maximise in their future interactions.
Interactions create obligations that can be described as moral; that is, they are 
not immediately maximising. An idealised individual who has never interacted with any 
other  human  being  cannot  have  moral  obligations.  The  beginning  of  a  series  of 
interactions means the beginning of one's moral obligations, towards the topical social 
convention  and  by  extension  towards  society  and  not  exclusively  towards  another 
person. Thus, obligations stem from a need for a social life; in an idealised account of 
humans, where a Robinson Crusoe is a possibility, morality and justice have no role. A 
human above the social  realm,  who has always been completely disassociated from 
society can have no meaningful debt to  society and therefore no moral obligation to 
adhere to any principles of  justice.  In a realistic and plausible setting, humans need 
social interaction to maximise and in this respect need rules of justice.
This chapter attempted to show how principles of justice can be conceived in the 
context of  social  conventions and  rationality. In this context, and provided we accept 
that social interactions are seen as infinitely repeated and that  evolutionary  dynamics 
determine social structures, there is a need for an equilibrium selection mechanism. In 
the  conventional  account  this  mechanism is  provided  by  a  combination  of  rational 
agency  and  the  evolutionary  dynamics  of  social  structures.  Provided  there  is 
information availability about other conventions, social equilibria points will converge 
towards  Pareto  optimality.  Pareto  optimality in conjunction with a Nash  equilibrium 
define justice as mutual advantage in the conventional account. Adapting the definition 
of  vulnerability  to  social  and technological  advancements  as  well  as  using  indirect 
reciprocity to justify  rational interactions with the vulnerable make  justice as mutual 
advantage  a  valid  theory  of  justice  that  complements  the  evolutionary  account  of 
rational conventions.
The  realism  and  plausibility  of  the  assertions  and  assumptions  of  this  and 
previous chapters will be addressed in the next chapter. The  conventional account of 
rationality will be shown to be realistic in the contemporary world where there can be 
cheap and efficient information spreading. Moreover, the theoretical paradigm that has 
been presented so far will be viewed in relation to actual behaviour as it is exhibited in 
contemporary societies. 
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8. Rational morality and social conventions in the real 
world
The previous chapters have been based on assumptions that can be seen as idealistic. 
Rationality, even bounded, and availability of information are not always present in the 
real world. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how these assumptions and the 
account of conventions in general can be seen in the context of real contemporary social 
life. The focus will be on showing that although idealistic and simplifying to a degree, 
assumptions  of  rationality  and  information  availability  are  not  very  far  from  the 
behaviour and the capabilities of real people. 
At the same time, these theoretical concepts need to be adapted in order to be 
realistic and to correspond to the behaviour of actual persons. In addition, the analysis 
of  the  chapter  will  focus  on  showing  to  what  extent  the  assumptions  of  rational 
behaviour and information availability are realistic as they are. The adaptations needed 
and  the  realism  of  the  assumptions  are  obviously  linked;  the  more  realistic  the 
assumptions the smaller the amount of adaptation needed. Bounded rationality requires 
individuals  to  be  reasonable  and  not  necessarily  hyper-rational  as  in  the  economic 
account  of  rationality.  Similarly,  information  availability  and  knowledge  of  the 
interaction history within a convention do not require unrealistic processing capacities. 
In  contemporary  societies  the  assumption  of  rational  and  informed  individuals  is 
plausible.
Information  technology  facilitates  the  plausibility  of  equal  information  and 
bounded  rationality.  In  the  contemporary world the  assumption of  equally informed 
agents is more realistic than ever before. In addition, it is plausible to assert that the rate 
of technological advancements will only increase, facilitating even more the spread of 
information as well  as  its  availability  to  more people.  From that  perspective,  social 
conventions as shaped by information availability obtain new meaning. They do not 
have to be limited by geographical boundaries, but rather they are shaped by individuals 
whose  rational  deliberation  leads  them to  search  for  a  certain  type  of  information. 
Therefore, information technology is a great tool for quick information spreading while 
ensuring  higher  information  accuracy.  In  this  context,  cultural  memes  can  also  be 
viewed from a new angle; they can spread quicker and go through a more rigorous trial 
and error process involving more agents.
Information  technology,  by  making  available  greater  amounts  of  accurate 
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information  to  more  people,  reinforces  stable  social  conventions  and  thus  social 
contracts and at the same time weakens those conventions that are based on coercion or 
on similar unsound grounds and hence that are not  evolutionarily stable. Thus, in the 
modern world technological progress makes it increasingly plausible to assume equal 
information and rationality. In addition, the understanding of social  conventions in the 
contemporary world in which they are bounded and affected by information technology 
limits, does not replace the traditional understanding of  social  conventions, in which 
their  structure  relies  on  geographical  and  cultural  factors;  on  the  contrary  the  two 
understandings  are  complementary  and  mutually  reinforcing.  Obviously  information 
spreading is easier among people who speak the same language or deal with the same 
problems and therefore it is more likely that individuals in the same neighbourhood, city 
or country will be drawn to similar sources of information causing the collapse or the 
empowerment of the existing  conventions. However,  social  conventions of  behaviour 
are not formed exclusively by these factors because of information technology.
Moreover, the account of evolution and the establishment of social conventions 
is only one of the paradigms that can be used for explaining social  behaviour. In that 
respect, there has to be a discussion about how they relate to real life through historical 
and  anthropological  examples.  Evolutionary  accounts  of  social  structures  and  of 
individual behaviour within them are closer to reality as they can include historical and 
anthropological factors that have influenced cultural  evolutions and the formation of 
social conventions.
Finally, the fact that the assumptions of  rationality and conventional  behaviour 
are realistic does not mean that agents always behave  rationally within  conventions. 
There  are  incidents  of  unexplained,  irrational  behaviour  that  can  be  attributed  to  a 
different, unique psychology of the actor and varying local  environmental parameters 
that affect the outcome of rational deliberation, or more accurately influence the bounds 
of  rationality. These inconsistencies are not as problematic for the account of human 
behaviour  within  social  conventions  as  they  are  in  a  theory  assuming  idealistically 
rational agents, but nevertheless they will have to be discussed and explained.
The next section will  deal with  rationality and the extent to which it  can be 
plausibly  attributed  to  human  beings.  More  specifically,  it  will  examine  rational 
behaviour with reference to social behaviour in the real world.
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8.1 The realism of conventional rationality
In  terms  of  rational  agency,  traditional  game  theory  is  based  on  idealistic 
hyper-rationality assumptions whereas evolutionary game theory uses assumptions that 
vary from bounded to the complete absence of  rationality. Bounded rationality, within 
an  evolutionary  framework,  is  more  realistic  and more  effective  in  examining how 
reasonable agents, who are mutually unconcerned and aim at maximising their utility, 
behave in  the  context  of  society  and  social  structures.  It  is  plausible  to  assert  that 
individuals are  rational utility maximisers, but that they are not capable of predicting 
accurately far into the future or of having complete memory of all past interactions. 
Moreover,  it  is  also  realistic  to  argue  that  societies  and  social  structures  evolve 
following  patterns  that  are  not  directly  linked  to  individual  action.  The  following 
paragraphs will attempt to show that humans are boundedly rational and that the typical 
assumptions of bounded rationality are to be found in the real world.
8.1.1 Bounded rationality
There  are  a  multitude  of  parameters  that  have  to  be  taken into  consideration  when 
looking  at  how  social  structures  come  about  and  how  they  change.  Most  of  these 
parameters can be influenced significantly by individual action and even more by the 
collective  action  of  rational  individuals.  Therefore,  it  is  essential  that  we  use  a 
framework  that  includes  both  explanation  of  collective  behaviour,  focusing  on  the 
behaviour of social groups, and also explanation of the individual behaviour of rational 
agents.  All  interactions  are  repeated  in  a  society  as  individuals  follow  patterns  of 
behaviour based on the established conventions. Within a society or a social group, it is 
unrealistic to assert that interactions are random; on the contrary, especially in human 
populations, interactions and their frequency depend on factors such as the outcome of 
past interactions and the agents' relative location. Real world societies are at equilibria 
which might be of various types, but individuals within these societies know what kind 
of  behaviour the  equilibrium requires of them. Therefore,  a person can have certain 
expectations of others and also has a rough memory of how she fared against specific 
other individuals.
In other words, “when in Rome do like the Romans do”; those who do not in the 
conventional  account  of  social  interactions  can  be  traced  and excluded  from social 
interactions (Andrés Guzmán & al, 2007). Rational agents conform to established social 
conventions and norms since their rational strategies have coevolved with the dynamics 
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of the existing social structures. A single visitor in Rome may be involved in one-off 
interactions and may be indifferent to the prospect of being excluded. In this sense, 
there  are  two  groups:  the  Romans  and  the  visitors.  If  many  visitors  perceive  their 
interactions as one-off interactions,  where cooperation is  irrational,  the Romans will 
behave accordingly.  Then,  Rome will  develop a  reputation as being hostile  towards 
strangers, and over time there will be fewer visitors, harming both groups. 
In an idealised model of the world, one's  behaviour would become known and 
punished either in Rome or in one's native convention. In the real world this is not as 
easily  achieved.  However,  it  is  plausible  to  assert  that  lone  exploiters,  visitors  who 
break local  conventions, can be punished even within the limited scope of their visit. 
Provided that they will interact with the local population, punishment is possible. For 
instance, a visitor to a foreign country who litters might not be fined or the fine might  
be insignificant, but he can expect lack of  cooperation from the natives next time he 
asks for information. Therefore, by littering, agents do not maximise their utility even 
for short-term interactions given there is information about their actions.
Interactions  are  to  be  seen  as  repeated  since  individuals  act  within  a  given 
convention  where  there  are  established  norms  of  behaviour  and  communication  of 
information and there is information about their interactions outside the convention. The 
repetitiveness  of  interactions  means  that  all  interactions  can  be  described as  games 
where joint strategies yield higher utility to all players. For example, in the PD game, 
when both prisoners know that they will interact again in the same environment, they 
will coordinate their behaviour so as to maximise their utility. Whether this is still a PD 
game or not, in the formal sense, is not important. What matters in this context is that it 
more accurately describes rational interactions. Repeated interactions and the capability 
of  agents  to  learn and remember,  within reason,  shows that  an account  of bounded 
rationality is more plausible and effective in describing rational behaviour. In addition, 
the above understanding of game theory as a descriptive tool of social interactions gives 
an  account  of  existing  social  structures  that  are  cooperative  and a  result  of  having 
adopted joint and not individual strategies. 
The account of bounded rationality that has been used to support the concept of 
rational conventions, as opposed to economic rationality, is not unrealistic. People learn 
from their experiences and they want to maximise their benefit as often as possible. 
Moreover, it is common and expected that the same people interact more than once; it is 
more realistic to claim that individuals encounter each other in repeated interactions 
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than not. People live in societies, towns and neighbours and therefore, it is much more 
likely that most of their interactions will be with their neighbours and people living in 
the same town, than with people living in a different country. At the same time low 
individual rationality does not necessarily lead to sub-optimal equilibria (Young 2001). 
Assumptions  of  rational  agents  with  near  complete  information  are  usually  seen  as 
idealised  assumptions;  however,  through  recent  technological  developments  full 
information has become a more plausible assumption. Furthermore, it is reasonable to 
assert that most people within a  convention have access to the same information and 
that information spreads quickly within the bounds of the given convention. 
A social convention is bound and formed by information availability, a common 
conception  of  maximising  behaviour,  and  a  general  common understanding  of  how 
social  problems  can  be  resolved.  It  is  in  a  sense  tautological  to  say  that  within  a 
convention agents have access to similar information and similar rational capabilities. If 
they did not, the convention would not have formed in the first place. Similar accounts 
of  rationality lead to similar deliberative outcomes about how to maximise individual 
utility. For instance, some conventions may call for maximisation through debate while 
others through force; in the former case intellectual skills are needed, whereas in the 
latter  physical  power  is  required.  In  both  conventions,  despite  their  fundamental 
differences, there is a common understanding of how to maximise. And within the limits 
of each  convention, it is  rational to behave  conventionally. Therefore, if we take the 
existence  of  social  conventions  as  a  given,  the  assumption  of  agents  with  similar 
capabilities to reason and access to similar information,  is anything but an idealised 
assumption.
Bounded or  conventional  rationality and economic  rationality are identical in 
that  agents  are  assumed  to  be  mutually  unconcerned  utility  maximisers.  However, 
conventional  rationality does not require complete memory, infinite processing power, 
or  a  capacity  to  predict  the  future  with  high  degrees  of  accuracy.  Hence,  the 
conventional account of  rationality is closer to the way real humans reason. In fact, 
including  mutual  unconcern  in  bounded  rationality  may  be  seen  as  an  unnecessary 
addition since individuals are not always mutually unconcerned; they develop bonds 
and behave in ways that are frequently not explained by rational choice theory. In reality 
humans care for family and friends without a need for constraints on their  rationality. 
Most humans are not always mutually unconcerned with respect to any person with 
whom they interact, which at least sometimes makes them behave irrationally according 
180
to  the  economic  account  of  rationality,  which  requires  that  a  rational  agent  should 
maximise her utility irrespective of whom she interacts  with or other environmental 
parameters. Assuming that they are mutually unconcerned however, means that moral 
responsibilities  deriving  from an assumption  of  mutual  unconcern  will  also  include 
interactions  between  agents  who  are  mutually  concerned.  Offering  an  account  of 
rationality  based  incentives  for  moral  behaviour  can  only  strengthen  the  argument 
presented here. Therefore, in a realistic setting mutual unconcern, although not always 
present in interactions, does not threaten the assumption of rational agency.
This subsection aimed to show that the account of  rationality used in previous 
chapters is realistic and can be used to describe to a great extent the actual behaviour of 
humans  in  societies.  The  following  subsection  will  expand  on  that  and  take  into 
consideration  how  the  assumption  of  rationality  is  influenced  by  the  existence  of 
conventions. Social  conventions as presented before will be shown to offer a realistic 
account of social structures.
8.1.2 Rationality in conventions 
Conventional rational morality aspires to be a descriptive account of social behaviour, at 
least to an extent. But it is not limited to that; its normative dimension has been implied 
but is also rather clear. An individual has to be rational, which means that she has to stay 
open  to  receiving  new  information  and  actively  seek  new  knowledge  about  the 
possibilities  of  conventional  maximisation.  A  rational  conventional  agent  has  to  be 
ready to be critical of her  convention should there be a rational justification for doing 
so. At the same time a rational agent who has accepted the rationality of her convention 
has to behave conventionally other things being equal. Put differently, a rational agent 
ought to behave rationally. This sounds tautological and superfluous but there is a need 
for a type of active  rationality. Conventional  rationality demands that agents use their 
assumed  rationality  to  confirm  that  they  are  part  of  a  rational,  utility  maximising 
convention.  This  thinking  creates  explicit  normative  obligations  for  conventional 
agents. Realistically, one cannot continue behaving in the same way when those around 
have shifted to a new behavioural pattern. In the real world people behave in a certain 
way only if it pays; should they realise that their  behaviour is no longer maximising 
they change it. For instance, a rational committed party voter will only continue voting 
if  the  party's  political  positions  remain  similar  to  hers.  If  either  her  or  the  party's 
positions change, she will also change her voting behaviour. This is not always the case, 
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but it seems reasonable to assert that it is the case more often than not and whenever is 
not, it merely shows how conventions influence rational behaviour.
Conventional  behaviour is  plausible and can describe  rational  behaviour with 
high degrees of accuracy. However, there are several problems when we try to apply 
conventional  accounts  of  rationality  to  the  real  world.  First  of  all,  although  it  is 
plausible to say that everyone living in a region or within a social group has access to 
the same information, this is not a sufficient condition for  maximisation. Individuals 
choose to make use of some pieces of information and to ignore others. Using different 
information,  both  in  terms  of  quality  and  quantity,  results  in  adopting  different 
strategies. Although the information processing power in all adult humans can be said to 
be roughly the same, some people are better at it. Thus there are inequalities arising 
from the ability to use the available information efficiently. Moreover, in the real world 
information is often expensive and/or not widely available. Again, those who can afford 
it or know where to find it have an advantage in interactions. In this context, therefore, 
the discrepancy between the real world and the theory lies on information availability. It 
is plausible to assert that information is rather readily available, especially since the 
creation and development of the internet, but real life experience shows that to be less 
than accurate. 
Another, closely related, assumption that can be criticised as idealistic, is the 
ability of individuals and groups to learn. Long-established  conventions resist change 
and people within those conventions are more likely than not to prefer a status-quo that 
is  not  Pareto  optimal  than  the  uncertainty  of  change.  Accounts  of  conventional 
rationality can deal with these problems. Rationality is viewed at the level of social 
convention,  where  information  is  roughly  similar,  learning is  easier  and trying  new 
strategies  is  not  irreversible.  Therefore  the  realism  of  the  assumptions  of  bounded 
rationality is related to the realism of the assumptions of social conventions which will 
be discussed next.
This section attempted to show how the assumptions of rationality and rational 
conventions  that  were presented in  the previous  chapters are  plausible  and realistic. 
Thus, the theoretical analysis of  conventions as they are formulated through  rational 
interactions offers realistic description of human social behaviour. The following section 
will  attempt  to  do the  same for  the  account  of  social  conventions  presented  in  the 
previous chapters.
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8.2 Social conventions in the real world
Established rational conventions serve as boundaries of action by constraining irrational 
and non-conventional behaviour. In cases where a type of behaviour is rational but not 
conventional, the role of the established convention would be to preserve conventional 
behaviour until it becomes clear to a large number of  convention followers that their 
behaviour  has  become irrational.  In  that  respect  conventions  are  conservative;  they 
resist  change in order to protect  maximisation.  If for instance a new higher welfare 
convention becomes known to an individual or to a minority, the established convention 
–  through  its  structures,  formalised  rules  and  majority  of  support  –  will  protect 
conventional behaviour and punish defectors. As it is not always apparent to all agents 
within a convention that alternative strategies are preferable, there will be discrepancies 
as to which is the maximising strategy. As there are information asymmetries within a 
convention, there will be a latency in the convention moving to a new equilibrium.
8.2.1 Rational conventions
Usually  there  is  conflict  between  the  actions  required  by  individual  and  collective 
rationality.  A  social  group  maximises  social  welfare  by  limiting  individual 
maximisation. Rational conventions are established to reconcile the two and to an extent 
achieve both. Social welfare maximisation depends on the conventional behaviour of its 
members. Conventions that are based on the rationality of their members constrain the 
maximisation  of  the  individual  in  order  to  maximise  social  welfare;  through  the 
maximisation of social welfare, individual utility is optimised. When some members of 
the convention adopt non-conventional strategies, they will have to be punished in order 
for the convention to be sustained. Rational conventions ensure that individual utility is 
maximised  within  the  constraints  of  limited  resources  and  social  welfare.  In  other 
words, rational conventions ensure that one individual or a group of individuals cannot 
destabilise conventional equilibrium.
In the real world people follow established conventions of social behaviour as a 
means of maximising their  utility within the given social  and physical  environment. 
Conventional  behaviour  does  not  necessarily  imply  uniform  behaviour  by all,  but  a 
common understanding of what is accepted. Individuals within a  society behave in a 
certain manner and according to the established social norms, which is what defines a 
society in the first place. Following those norms is  rational since it means they avoid 
punishment for defecting. 
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Arguably, an individual or a group of individuals who do not agree with the 
established conventional rules have little choice but to comply. They might be able to 
deviate  slightly,  but  outright  breaking  of  conventional  rules  will  result  in  their 
punishment  and  social  exclusion.  For  instance  a  rational  agent  may  believe  it  is 
irrational to pay taxes either because it does not allow his utility maximisation or even 
because  he  thinks  that  social  welfare  maximisation  can  be  achieved  differently. 
However, unless he is able to convince others about the fact that their  convention can 
achieve higher social  welfare through not paying taxes,  he does not have a  rational 
choice not to pay. Similarly, in the tragedy of the commons example (Hardin 1968), an 
established convention according to which everyone maximises their individual utility 
will also be maximising for society, at least for the short term. Depending on the size of 
the pasture and the number of farmers this can last for several generations. This then 
will  be  viable  and  rational  both  on  an  individual  level  and  collectively.  A  rational 
individual who will be able to predict that the pasture will be depleted, does not have a 
rational alternative to continuing to follow conventional behaviour. If he stops using the 
pasture,  he  will  not  change  the  end  result  while  his  utility  will  be  reduced.  When 
individual  rationality conflicts the  conventional  rationality, the individual who cannot 
extend a new behaviour to his neighbours will have to behave 'irrationally' until others 
accept his reasoning.
8.2.2 Real social conventions
An appropriate example of how conventional analysis can be used in a real world case 
is  the Rwanda genocide in  1994. Farming land in  Rwanda had been expanding for 
decades. People continued doing what maximised their and previous generations' utility 
in the past; therefore it was rational to try to farm on as much land as possible. This in 
turn led to a population increase up to the point where the land could not support so 
many  people.  Since  more  land  was  becoming  available  through  methods  like 
deforestation, there was no rational incentive for farmers to modernise or try new crops 
(Diamond, 2005). 
Farmers  in  Rwanda  during  the  1980's  were  behaving  rationally,  both  as 
individuals and a society. Within the limitations of conventional rationality this outcome 
could not be foreseen. Even if scientists in Rwanda had all the data available and could 
predict  that  there would be a  Malthusian food crisis,  it  would have been extremely 
difficult for them to predict the genocide. Despite the fact that crises like the 1994 one 
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had occurred before in Rwanda, they were limited by comparison and usually attributed 
to  tribal  competition  and  local  culture  rather  than  an  over-exploitation  of  natural 
resources and lack of economic and social planning (Diamond 2005). People in Rwanda 
were being boundedly rational within the limitations of the available information and 
knowledge.  Based  on  the  history  of  interactions  and  the  rules  of  the  established 
convention, foreseeing the catastrophe was realistically impossible.
A boundedly  rational  agent  could  have  analysed  the  situation  and reached a 
useful conclusion – at least it seems so after the effect. Previous violent outbursts as a 
result  of  land  and  food  shortages  were  not  considered  serious  enough  to  convince 
people who had been farming for generations on the same lands using similar methods 
that their tried and tested lifestyle would lead to a genocide. As discussed previously, the 
longer a social convention has been established for and the more successful it has been, 
the  more  difficult  it  is  to  change.  Successful  farming  and  population  growth  was 
controlled  by  local,  non-catastrophic  violence  that  included  redistributing  land  and 
reducing the population. The 1994 genocide was the peak of a series of smaller scale 
violent events stemming from the same roots. 
These  factors  created  a  relative  indifference  to  violence  that  was  seen  as  a 
cultural or racist phenomenon unrelated to individuals' living standards. A rational agent 
in pre-1994 Rwanda would have to constrain his maximisation; live off smaller areas of 
land  and  follow  family  planning  principles.  This  case  exhibits  how  conventional 
rationality can define individual preferences and limit agents' freedom to act. Moreover, 
it shows that great inequalities within a social contract have to be dealt with through a 
third  party.  Furthermore,  cynically  speaking  the  genocide  itself  can  be  seen  as  an 
evolutionary step. The overpopulation was controlled, land was redistributed and the 
violence had such a great effect on the local culture as to ensure that future similar 
events will be avoided by a better informed and more knowledgeable population. 
Usually in the real world, the case with established  social  conventions is that 
they have been active over many generations and therefore it is more difficult for a 
single  rational  agent  to  have  accurate  information  and  to  reason  adequately  about 
individual and social  maximisation. Incremental change over long periods of time is 
very difficult,  if  not impossible,  to detect and poses significant problems to  rational 
agents trying to understand their  environment. Looking at historic societies can offer 
significant insights into the behaviour of social conventions and rational agents.
Easter Island had a complex  society and culture before being first  visited by 
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European explorers in the second half of the 18th century. However, by the time of the 
first contact with Europeans, Easter Island inhabitants had been reduced in number and 
their  society was in decay. Archaeological evidence indicates that the famous Easter 
Island monuments were erected at a time of affluence for religious purposes. The island 
had rich forests that provided timber that made building such monuments possible while 
supporting  a  healthy  economy  and  society.  A  combination  of  specific  climatic 
conditions and human  behaviour lead to the almost complete deforestation of Easter 
Island by the end of the 18th century. Rational or even reasonable people should have 
been able to adjust their behaviour to the changing physical environment of the island. 
Deforestation  has  to  have  taken  place  over  several  generations  and  its  devastating 
outcomes must have been apparent at some point before all the trees of the island were 
extinguished.  The same applies  of  course in  the  case  of  human intervention.  If  we 
accept that deforestation was a result of the islanders' over-consumption, we have to 
question their inability to be even marginally prudent. Easter Island's climate is more 
fragile by comparison to similar islands and therefore, more sensitive to human activity. 
The  physical  climate  is  not  as  interesting  for  this  discussion  as  Easter  Islanders' 
response to a changing environment; or rather the lack of response. 
Most  archaeological  evidence  suggests  that  the  Easter  Island  statues  were 
erected to exhibit political power or as religious symbols (Diamond 2005). At the time 
of their construction they promoted social cohesion and peace while showing off the 
local  chief's  power.  In  that  respect  they were essential.  The islanders'  religious  and 
social culture required these sculptures to continue being built even when it became 
apparent that  it  was becoming unsustainable in terms of resources.  The motives  for 
building  monuments  became  so  socially  entrenched  that  they  overpowered  rational 
calculation.  A  political  and  religious  system  that  had  become  so  successful  and 
long-lived would pose problems to rational sceptics. The gradual deforestation and its 
incremental  effects  on  social  life  were  not  powerful  enough factors  to  cause  social 
change,  before the lack of trees enforced that  change and lead to  decay (Diamond, 
2005). 
The Easter  Island geographical  isolation  created  more  problems as  the  local 
society could not have asked for outside help or discovered information about more 
successful social conventions that they could then imitate. Just as in the case of Rwanda, 
the Easter Island society failed to adapt to a changing environment. What was rational 
originally  became catastrophic as social  structures  failed to  evolve and the physical 
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environment  could not  sustain the same  behaviour.  Although it  might seem that  the 
physical environment was central to the Easter Island case, that is not true. The physical 
resources of the island as well as its isolation played a role, but the important factor was 
that the local society failed to perceive that social changes were needed; and that failure 
to evolve culturally had to do first and foremost with the structure of the given society 
and only then its physical environment.
The above cases of Rwanda and Easter Island show how rational agents ought to 
take  into  account  historical  evidence,  learn  about  similar  societies  and  adapt  to 
environmental changes in order to maximise. The same principles apply to successful 
social conventions. Preserving conventional behaviour can be destructive or productive, 
depending on an accurate understanding of the  environment. It becomes obvious then 
than accurate information and data, as well as communication, are paramount for the 
adoption of  rational strategies. Given that human  rational capabilities cannot change 
significantly, a rational agent and a rational convention must take into account as many 
parameters as possible in order to sustain maximisation. 
Both in Rwanda and Easter Island, “human activities dramatically altered the 
environment, and this in turn changed the course of cultural evolution” (Ehrlich 2002). 
Both these examples focus on the environmental impact of human behaviour and on 
how societies  fail  to  adapt to a  changing physical environment.  However,  they also 
apply as realistic paradigms of how rational agents and sustainable social conventions 
need to continue evaluating their behaviour in order to remain rational. An agent must 
take into account her social and physical environment in order to be rational. If changes 
in  the  environment  occur,  it  might  very  well  be  rational  at  a  given  time  to  follow 
strategies  that  several  years  or  decades  later  would  be  catastrophically  irrational. 
Moreover, these examples show how information availability is essential for rationality 
and also poses the problem of evolutionary time. 
Even in cultural  evolution  environmental changes occur slowly by comparison 
to the duration of a human life and, just as in  biological  evolution,  social  conventions 
change over several generations. This raises questions about the realism and usefulness 
of  a  rational  agent  model  in  a  cultural  evolutionary  context.  The  problems  of 
evolutionary  time in  political  and moral  philosophy and the  realism of  information 
availability will be discussed in the following paragraphs, where there will be special 
emphasis on the changes in the establishment and stability of social conventions caused 
by technological advancements. The next section will discuss how the assumption of 
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equal  information and information availability  is  more realistic  in the contemporary 
world than it used to be and how that affects the possibility of equal rationality.
8.3 Information availability 
Cultural evolution refers to the changes of social conventions that lead to changes in the 
social contract; in addition, it encompasses changes in the available information and its 
processing. Hence, cultural evolution is intrinsically linked with information availability 
and communication. Rational capabilities cannot be assumed to change over time, but 
rational  deliberation  yields  different  outcomes  as  the  available  information  is  being 
enriched  with  past  experiences.  Thus,  cultural  evolution  depends  on  the  available 
information, or put differently “[c]ulture is information stored in people’s heads, which 
can be transmitted among individuals” (Henrich et al., 2001: 2).
Especially in a cultural  evolutionary context, information availability has to be 
taken  into  consideration  in  accessing  rational  behaviour;  available  information 
determines rational strategies and as a result, individuals in similar cultures will adopt 
similar strategies that are maximising. Therefore, cultural  evolution to a great extent 
refers to  information availability,  which in turn is  essential  for rational  deliberation. 
Information increases as our history becomes longer and the means for its storage and 
transmission  become more  efficient  and reliable.  Modern  people  have  been  able  to 
make better decisions because of the fact that they know more than people in the past, 
“if progress is real...[it is] because we are born to a richer heritage” (Durant, 2010: 102). 
Hence, we can claim that the accumulation of knowledge works to our advantage as 
history evolves. Technological developments and social changes have been making the 
spreading of this knowledge increasingly easier and therefore have been affecting the 
outcomes of rational deliberation.
8.3.1 Information availability and rationality
The ease of information spreading in the contemporary world shows knowledge of a 
plethora  of  social  conventions  and  social  contracts,  a  fact  that  would  have  been 
impossible  without  the  technological  advancements  of  the  past  couple  of  centuries. 
Being able to travel further in the 19th and 20th centuries as well the availability of 
more  accurate  information  in  the  last  a  hundred  years,  gives  us  the  capability  to 
compare and contrast our conventions with those in every other part of the world. This 
ability creates responsibilities from a rational choice perspective; if we find out about 
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